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NMCI is a mechanism to transform the Navy and Marine 
Corps information systems and prepare 21st century warfare.  
Just as the Internet has transformed business and commerce 
around the globe, NMCI may transform the U. S. Navy and 
Marine Corps by harnessing the power of an integrated 
network. The Navy and Marine Corps Intranet constitutes the 
first major step into a truly network-centric warfare 
environment and makes them full participants in the cyber 
world. This network will handle the data on which an 
increasing percentage of the Navy and Marine Corps mission 
essential services will rely. Yet, the hardware and 
software that make up these systems have demonstrated 
vulnerabilities that put these mission essential functions 
at risk.  Consequently, the Navy and Marine Corps must 
consider systems and strategies that address the need for 
survivability of the mission essential functions in the 
same manner applied to major weapons systems on the 
battlefield.   
 
“Network survivability” is a field of study that 
addresses exactly this issue. Developed in 1998 under a 
Department of Defense contract by the Carnegie Mellon 
University Software Engineering Institute, network 
survivability addresses the need of a network to fulfill 
its essential mission in the presence of failures, 
compromise, or attack. 
 
This thesis examines the Navy and Marine Corps 
Intranet mission and structure in an attempt to determine 
its inherent survivability and ability to support the needs 
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of the Navy and Marine Corps team.  It focuses on 
identifying the network mission functions and the ability 
of the network architecture to produce the required 
survivability characteristics.  Based on this examination I 
propose a mission definition for NMCI and highlight the 
need within the security architecture to achieve a 
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I.NMCI OVERVIEW  
A. WHAT IS THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INTRANET (NMCI) 
When beginning any examination of Navy and Marine 
Corps Intranet, the first consideration should be given to 
the definition of NMCI and what it’s intended to be used 
for by the Navy and Marine Corps.  Having a definition of 
NMCI will then lend context to the examination of the 
system as a whole and help distinguish what is relevant in 
the process of examination.  Once we have established what 
NMCI is, we can begin to consider what NMCI should be. 
The NMCI implementation is being overseen by the 
office of the Department of the Navy Chief Information 
Officer (DON CIO) and this office should provide the answer 
to the question of what NMCI is.  The DON-CIO hosted 
website can be found at http://www.don-imit.navy.mil.  The 
links provided to the program documentation found there 
offer a fundamental view of what the DON CIO is expecting 
NMCI to do for the Navy. The following is a summary of the 
purpose of NMCI that can be found there; 
 NMCI is an initiative that launches the 
Department of the Navy’s first step toward 
reaching Joint Vision 2010’s goal of information 
superiority for the Department of Defense. 
Defined as the ability to collect process and 
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information 
while denying the same to an adversary, 
information superiority has been called the 
backbone of the revolution in military affairs. 
As DoN’s first step, NMCI will establish a 
standardized end-to-end system for voice, video 
and data communications for all civilian and 




Immediately below this summary is a link that provides 
the Report to Congress on NMCI by the then Secretary of the 
Navy, the Honorable Richard Danzig, of 20 May 2000.  In the 
first page of the Executive Summary to the Report to 
Congress on NMCI, Secretary Danzig explained the rationale 
behind the decision to deploy NMCI the following way: 
 
 The Navy Marine Corps Intranet offers the 
opportunity for the Department of the Navy (DON) 
to leverage new technologies and industry 
innovation to better achieve our global Naval 
mission.  This investment in the future will 
build the modern Navy-Marine Corps on the 
transformational power of networking.  It will 
enable connection to the National Infrastructure, 
extend sharing and creation of knowledge and 
expertise worldwide, empower innovative work and 
training and enhance the Quality of Life for 
every Marine, Sailor, and DON Civilian. 
 Replacing the Navy's numerous shore-based 
networks, NMCI will equip us with the access, 
interoperability, and security for our 
information and communications by providing 
voice, video and data services to all Navy and 
Marine Corps personnel. Coupled with the Navy's 
shipboard Information Technology for the 21st 
Century and the Marine Corps' embarked Marine 
Corps Tactical Network (MCTN), NMCI will provide 
a world-wide reach-back capability for our 
deployed forces. 
 The NMCI approach adapts what is commonly 
practiced in the commercial sector to acquire IT 
services for the government.  This approach uses 
performance based, enterprise wide services 
contract that incorporates future strategic 
computing and communications capability and is 
managed much the same as a utility. [RD00] 
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 This summary is quite effective in highlighting the 
three fundamental purposes that support the NMCI 
deployment.  Taking them one at a time we can expand these 
statements to better understand the path that NMCI will 
take. 
 First, NMCI is a mechanism to transform the Navy and 
Marine Corps information systems and prepare them for 21st 
century warfare.  Just as the Internet has transformed 
business and commerce around the globe, NMCI is intended to 
transform the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps by harnessing the 
power of an integrated network.  NMCI is a piece of the 
“Global Information Grid” that is intended to support all 
U. S. forces deployed and in the Continental United States 
(CONUS) with administrative, logistical, force projection, 
or battlefield management data and communications [JC01].  
Through the development of “virtual communities” within the 
Navy/Marine Corps, NMCI will leverage the Navy’s knowledge 
base to improve how we fight, how we organize our forces, 
and how we manage our capital assets.  NMCI is a means of 
moving the Navy toward network centric-warfare and 
transforming the organization as a whole. 
 Second, NMCI is a procurement strategy for the Navy’s 
Information Technology (IT) assets.  The Navy recognizes 
that industry, and not government, is the primary driver in 
IT business systems.  Given its limited funding, it is 
logical for the DoN to follow the best practices of 
industry in their effort to secure IT services. NMCI shifts 
the burden of legacy hardware, software, and the expense of 
systems maintenance by procuring a service contract in the 
same way many large corporations have done. In doing so, 
the Navy maximizes its flexibility by not being tied to any 
single technology and being able to take advantage of new 
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technological advances in the market place.  In the long 
view, NMCI is a procurement strategy that will reduce the 
cost of the Navy’s IT service while maintaining the 
hardware technology of the system within one generation.     
 Third, NMCI is a mechanism of connectivity between all 
of the DoN Activities and personnel, both military and 
civilian.  In May of 1999 the Space and Air Warfare Command 
(SPAWAR) identified three primary goals for the Navy and 
Marine Corps Intranet.  They were; 
• Provide quality service at a low price 
• Greatly enhance information assurance of the 
naval enterprise 
• Provide the enabler for the enterprise-wide 
BRP/ERP and the Revolution in Business Affairs  
These goals have been refined and in the Navy and Marine 
Corps Intranet Brief presented to NMCI Information Bureau 
Oversight Council, 18 April 2001, by Mr. Joseph Cipriano, 
Program Executive Officer for Information Technology, 
identified them as follows;   
• Repurposed network as a Navy-wide asset 
• Bandwidth on demand  
• Extend sharing and creation of knowledge and 
expertise worldwide 
• Technology to support innovative work and 
training 
•  Make life better for every Sailor, Marine and 
DON Civilian 
With the exception of the first two bullets from the May 
1999 goals listed by SPAWAR, all of the others directly 
relate to the connectivity between the members of the DoN 
for the purpose of building community, knowledge, or 
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enhancing the individual quality of life.  This was largely 
the benefit realized by both industry and the community 
with the advent and maturity of the Internet. Metcalf’s Law 
is the relevant factor in this decision.  Metcalf’s Law 
states; “The value of a network grows as the square of the 
number of its users.”[WRD98] Simply put, as more and more 
connections are made on a network, the more valuable each 
connection becomes, and the more valuable the network 
becomes as a whole. This is directly relevant to the 
implementation of NMCI and reflects the desire to achieve 
maximum connectivity within the DON.   Looking again at the 
DON CIO webpage we find the following summary to describe 
the logic behind the procurement strategy for NMCI; 
 NMCI, an adaptation of what is commonly 
practiced in the commercial sector, represents a 
new approach to acquiring IT services for the 
government. NMCI will be a performance-based, 
enterprise-wide services contract that 
incorporates future strategic computing and 
communications capability and is managed much the 
same as any "utility." It will be purchased for 
the commercial sector just as we buy other types 
of utilities (e.g., water, telephone, gas and 
electricity) paying for the service as it is 
delivered. [RD00] 
The most focused definition of NMCI provided by the DoN CIO 
is the function of a utility, something that provides a 
specific service to an end user.  From this we can infer 
that the primary intent of NMCI is pure connectivity. If 
you examine the goals as they are listed from 1999 to the 
present, the importance of connectivity to the achievement 
of those goals is obvious.  
 If the Navy hopes to develop and foster 
virtual communities they must maximize 
connectivity throughout the Navy organization.  
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The same can be said for the development and 
sharing of knowledge bases.  The connectivity 
provided by NMCI is the catalyst for any of this 
activity.  High connectivity and a high 
availability of service are also essential for 
the procurement strategy to be successful. To 
gain acceptance and for new practices to be 
assimilated, any business enterprise system must 
provide the desired level of services to the 
members. If NMCI meets this objective of 
connectivity then the formation of community, the 
development and sharing of knowledge bases and 
improvement of the quality of life of every 
sailor and marine will eventually follow.  For 
the Navy to move to the fulfillment of Network 
Centric Warfare and for the IT procurement 
strategy to succeed, connectivity must be 
achieved.  The first two principles flow from 
connectivity, and so it can be argued that 
connectivity is the heart, if not the central 
purpose of NMCI and its implementation for the 
Navy and Marine Corps.  
 
B. WHY EXAMINE NMCI? 
 The establishment of the Navy and Marine Corps 
Intranet (NMCI) represents a fundamental change in the 
business model for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.  The 
deployment of NMCI will move the United States Navy into a 
realm not fully explored by any of her sister services, or 
for that matter, any other part of the United States 
government.  While there are significant numbers of 
websites that represent the arms of local, state, and 
national government, they do not constitute full 
participation in the web environment by any part of the 
government.  Web sites are a means of utilizing the 
cyberspace arena for one’s own purpose.  Fully 
participating in cyberspace is to assume all the risks and 
pursue all the possibilities and benefits that it offers, 
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not just the use of a portion of its capabilities for 
expedience or convenience. The Navy and Marine Corps 
Intranet (NMCI) will make the U.S. Navy a full participant 
in cyberspace, subject to all its potential benefits and 
risks. Full participation will mean the U.S. Navy will 
experience organizational pressures and hostile threats 
they have not experienced before, or even foreseen.  
Cyberspace, an arena now familiar to many in business and 
industry, is largely “Indian country” for the U.S. Navy.  
An examination of NMCI’s preparedness for operation in this 
environment is a logical step given the fundamental nature 
of the change likely produced by NMCI’s deployment. 
When fully deployed, NMCI will touch every part of the 
Navy’s organization in a way that has become a fundamental 
part of our business and war fighting capability, through 
the Navy’s Information Technology Infrastructure.  The 
business community is a good source for comparison when 
examining the transition of the U.S Navy into the e-
business environment.   
This is not meant to say that the Navy will fight 
battles using only electrons, but rather that more of the 
basic functions necessary to operate a modern armed force 
are and can be done via the World Wide Web.  Many of the 
military’s basic functions are already dependent upon the 
Internet for operation [RC02].  
For example, we can look to the U.S. Army and its 
effort to develop a single networked enterprise.  Much like 
a corporation, the majority of the Army’s budget—60 
percent—goes for salaries, business programs and systems 
[GCN02].  The business community is still wrestling with 
the effects and implications of such a fundamental 
connection as they work to secure their networks from 
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intruders that intend to do harm or steal valuable 
information.  The e-business environment has been the 
proving ground, or the killing field, for intrusion 
detection systems (IDS), firewalls, anti-virus, and 
operating system software. What history has shown is that 
while we have been working harder to secure our networks, 
security failures continue to occur.  Table 1-1 shows the 
trend of cyberspace security incidents from 1990 through 
2001.  


























Figure 1 CERT Statistics 1990 through 2001  
 
 The trend of reported incidents was steady from 1990 
through 1998, however in the 1999 through 2001 time period 
the number of reported incidents has more than doubled from 
year to year.  The increases indicate that for all the 
effort placed on securing networks, those that wish to 
penetrate and damage networks are still achieving some 
measure of success.  Firewalls, IDS’s, and anti-virus 
software comprise an “ex post facto” defensive system. 
These software systems are effective at protecting the user 
from events that are widely known and have already occurred 
on a large scale, while doing little to prevent, deter, or 
blunt the effects of future viruses or computer network 
attacks. These figures also suggest that the basic approach 
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to network defense may be flawed.  Protecting the 
infrastructure of national defense with “new” software 
systems that are dated when measured against the evolving 
threat may be akin to preparing for the last war.   
The paradigm of security and the state of the art of 
network security software may be inadequate to protect NMCI 
and the Navy organizations, planning systems and assets it 
serves. Networks, especially those operated by the armed 
forces, need to have more than security as their framework 
for defending against an attack. Hardening a target will 
not guarantee its security or success in the face of 
attack. The mission-directed behavior of a network needs to 
be considered when designing a protective scheme [RJE99].  
A network must be protected to be useful, but it must also 
be useful while being protected, lest it lose all relevance 
and value to the user.  Examining alternative methods of 
network defense for NMCI is then reasonable, given the 
value of the assets being defended, the historical 
likelihood of an attack, and the probability that the 
attack would have some measure of success.  An alternative 
method that could be applied to NMCI is Survivable Network 
Systems analysis, developed by the Carnegie Mellon 
University Software Engineering Institute (CMUSEI). 
The Survivable Network Systems concept is based on the 
idea that a network should be designed to continue to 
function in the face of intrusions and compromises, and 
then regain full functionality soon after the intrusions or 
compromises end [RJE98].   Survivable Networks exhibit two 
essential characteristics (1) survivable networks will 
continue to deliver their essential services in spite of 
active intrusions or compromises, and (2) survivable 
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systems recover, in a timely manner, full mission services 
and capability.   
Survivability is a concept readily familiar to any 
naval officer. Watertight compartments, a survivability 
feature of warships, merchant vessels, and passenger 
liners, have been an integral part of ship design for over 
100 years.  The U.S Navy’s most valued and well-protected 
assets, the carriers, were built on the premise of 
survivability.  With an attending force of surface and 
subsurface units, along with 100 combat aircraft, the 
designers assumed that the aircraft carriers would likely 
sustain combat damage. They were designed and constructed 
so as to be capable of absorbing significant damage while 
continuing to steam and operate independently.   
This same logic should be applied to the Navy and 
Marine Corps Intranet.  NMCI, it should be assumed, will be 
attacked and will be damaged, and like the carrier at the 
heart of the modern battle group, it must survive, and 
continue to operate and fight effectively.  The examination 
of NMCI’s survivability is therefore as relevant as 
evaluating the survivability of any other major weapons 
system deployed by the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps.  The 
Survivable Network Systems paradigm is suitable for NMCI 
because it focuses on both the mission of NMCI and the 
protective systems of the network itself.  To understand 
the relevance of survivability in the context of networked 
systems, we must understand the definition of network 
survivability and how it differs from the traditional 
approach of network security in the protection of such a 




C. THE CONCEPT OF SURVIVABLE NETWORK SYSTEMS 
To understand survivable networks we first need to 
define what bounded and unbounded networks are, and then 
describe the environment of survivable networks and where 
its application is relevant.   
An unbounded network is a network that possesses no 
central administrative authority for the imposition of 
policy or sanctions on the members.   In an unbounded 
system the members do not have complete visibility, execute 
control only within their domain, and must rely upon trust 
relationships among their neighbors to operate. The 
Internet is an example of the ultimate unbounded network.  
There is no central figure responsible for its content, 
protocols, or number of members.  It limits are indefinable 
except for any instance in time since it is in constant 
flux.  It is an open network, available to any that chose 
to participate. An unbounded network can consist of both 
bounded and unbounded systems that are subsets of the total 
network [RE99].  This concept is relevant to NMCI since it 
will participate with the Internet, a definitively 
unbounded system, for a relevant portion of its functions 
and services.   
A bounded system, by contrast, is one whose elements 
are controlled by one central authority that possesses the 
right to impose policy, sanctions, and can be completely 
enumerated and controlled.  NMCI will be in part a bounded 
system that is regulated by a central authority, regionally 
if not globally.  Theoretically a bounded system’s behavior 
can be understood by examining its individual parts.  Table 




Bounded Systems Unbounded Systems 
• Centralized 
administrative control 
• Total visibility of 
network nodes 
• Behavior predictable 
by examining the 
components of network. 
 
• Multiple administrative 
domains with no central 
authority. 
• No global visibility (full 
enumeration not possible) 
• Interoperability 
determined by convention 
• Widely distributed 
interoperable networks 
• Users and attackers can be 
peers in the ecosystem 
• Can Not be partitioned 
into finite number of 
bounded systems 
 
Table 1 Bounded vs. Unbounded Systems 
 
With these definitions we can turn our attention to 
understanding the concept of Network Survivability.   The 
domain of survivable networks is one that is dominated by 
large unbounded networks that coexist and collaborate to 
create a common ecosystem in which they collectively exist 
and materially participate.  The Internet or World Wide Web 
is exactly this type of ecosystem.  Thousands of networks 
interconnect around the globe to create this mechanism for 
commerce and information exchange.  NMCI will be one of 
those networks.  While bounded in a sense, many nodes 
within NMCI will have access to the Internet – and vice 
versa, creating a connection to this unbounded system. In 
addition, many members of the NMCI community, particularly 
the surface ships of the Navy, will enter and exit NMCI 
while participating in other unbounded networks in the 
interim.  The net effect is to give NMCI some 
characteristics of an unbounded network, making the 
application of network survivability to NMCI relevant.   
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 What sets survivable network systems apart from simply 
secure networks is the focus on the central mission of the 
network.  The distinguishing characteristic of a survivable 
network is its capability to provide essential services in 
the face of attacks [NRM00].  Identification of the network 
mission, and the essential services needed to accomplish 
that mission are then critical to the concept of 
survivability.  Essential services are defined as the 
system functions that must be maintained to assure the 
networks mission success, when the system is under attack, 
suffers failures, or experiences or detects threats.  There 
may be several essential services or several sets of 
essential services that can be complimentary or duplicative 
in function.  These can be grouped or layered so as to meet 
the requirement of an essential service through a multiple 
of methods.  It should be remembered that the primary goal 
of survivability is the accomplishment of the networks 
assigned mission, not the preservation of any one 
component, node, or subnet within the network.  To maintain 
the essential services, survivable networks must 
demonstrate the key properties listed in Table 1-3.   These 
properties are the fundamental building blocks for 
developing a survivable network system and are the 
categories that define the survivability services 
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Table 2 Survivability Characteristics 
 
 In the development of the survivability requirements, 
each category must be subdivided based on the standard 
attack profile.  Typical intruder profiles can be 
subdivided into three separate phases. They are 
penetration, exploration, and exploitation.  In the 
penetration phase an intruder attempts to enumerate, 
profile, and then enter a network through the exploitation 
of known system vulnerabilities.  Once the intruder 
penetrates the network he enters the exploration phase.  In 
the exploration phase the intruder attempts to further 
enumerate the network and examine its internal structure 
for weaknesses.  Having successfully penetrated and 
explored, the intruder has the desired access to the system 
and begins compromising actions or damage to the network 
capabilities.  Requirements definitions for resistance, 
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recognition, recovery, and adaptation services assist 
development of survivability strategies to deal with each 
phase of an intrusion [RJE99].   
 Resistance is the ability of a network to deter or 
repel intruder attempts to penetrate and explore its 
system.  Resistance embodies the majority of traditional 
computer security.  Firewalls, encryption, user 
authentication, and file access controls are the state of 
the art for computer security and are the first line in 
resistance strategies.  Diversity is also a resistance 
strategy and is intended to produce a non-homogenous target 
set within the network.  Creating diversity of operating 
systems, programs, or network routing mitigates or 
eliminates the intruder’s ability to compromise additional 
hosts based on a common configurations of identical 
software.  Diversity requirements can be more difficult to 
achieve because the concept runs contrary to the common 
business model that demands the economic gains achieved 
through 100 percent commonality within a system.   
 Recognition is the ability of the network to perceive 
and react to patterned or atypical activity that precedes a 
penetration, exploration, or exploitation event.  
Recognition strategies are the use of Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS), log parsing, and the use of intelligent 
agents.  IDS typically rely on known patterns of intruder 
behavior, or through anomaly detection based on the user 
profile.  Intelligent agents work within a host computer 
and monitor registries for changes in configuration, 
reporting any changes to a central administrator, 
monitoring software, or to a “black box” internal to the 
host for post event reconstruction.  Recognition is 
relevant and critical to all three phases of attack   as 
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recognition at any point in the intrusion is essential for 
the system to perform any recovery or adaptation services.   
 Recovery is the ability of the network to reconstitute 
or restore essential services either during or after an 
intrusion has occurred.  Recovery requirements are what 
distinguish survivable networks from systems that are only 
secure [RJE99].  If an attack can not be repelled, a system 
must have a capability to recover in order for it to be 
survivable.  Recovery is most relevant during the 
exploration and exploitation phases.  Typical recovery 
strategies are off site data backup and storage, backup or 
redundant hardware (RAID), host mirroring, and transaction 
roll back processes.  Recovery must also consider the 
ongoing operation of the network and the maintenance of 
essential services.  The ability to segregate traffic based 
on the condition within the network and the priority of the 
individual message is key to maintaining mission essential 
services.  
 Adaptation is the ability of the network to rapidly 
update itself to eliminate exploitation of the network due 
to poor administrative control.  Adaptation strategies 
include the auto updating features of some software or the 
updating of intrusion detection rule set based upon 
published alerts or updates.  The limited actions of some 
firewall software are also an adaptive system behavior.  
Adaptation requirements relate to all categories of 
survivability services, as adaptive behavior must be 
present in each for them to remain effective and relevant 
in the providing support to the survivable network system.  
A lack of adaptability would reduce the overall 
survivability of any individual survivability service as 
well as the survivability of the network as a whole. 
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 These four concepts are the fundamental elements of 
survivable networks.  They are the yardstick for measuring 
the capability of a networked system to survive and 
continue its assigned mission. To apply these principles to 
NMCI we must first have a basic understanding of the 
security architecture of NMCI and how the system intends to 
defend itself. 
 
D. NMCI SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
NMCI is an expansive terrestrial network that is 
comprised of five essential components.  The components to 
the NMCI infrastructure are a dedicated wide area network, 
six regional network operating centers, many local area 
networks, server farms, and client computers or “seats” 
[RAY01]. A multiplicity of technical protections and 
policies are deployed in a layered manner to achieve the 
desired level of information assurance within NMCI.  This 
process is used to achieve a high resistance to attack and 
minimize the weaknesses of any single security component of 
the defensive mechanism [RAY01].   There are five basic 
elements that constitute the NMCI information assurance 
architecture as defined by the NMCI Information Strike 
Force.  They are [RAY01]; 
• Network Boundaries and Infrastructure 
• Public Key Interface and Directory System 
• Seat  
• Server 
• Security Operations Center 
The Network Boundaries and Infrastructure and the Seat 
are the focus of this work because they embody the majority 
of the issues related to a survivable network systems.  
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Changes at this level can improve the survivability of the 
network without adversely changing the system architecture 
or changing significant components.  If effective 
survivability measures can be employed within the 
infrastructure and client seats, then these other 
architectural elements can be both more effective and more 
survivable. The Public Key Infrastructure, Servers, and the 
Security Operations Center will be described in basic 
detail for understanding of their operation or intent. The 
Public Key Infrastructure, the Security Operations Center, 
and Servers are relevant; however, a detailed examination 
of them extends beyond the scope of this thesis.   
The NMCI Network Boundaries are a standardized set of 
policies and protective mechanisms that define both the 
interface between NMCI and other networks or an enclave of 
security within NMCI.  These other networks include the 
internet routing protocol network (NIPRnet), secret 
internet routing protocol network (SIPRnet), IT-21 
networks, Marine Corps enterprise network (MCEN), DISA and 
commercial WANs, and the Internet[RAY01].  NMCI will 
interface with each of these and depending on the level of 
trust deemed appropriate for the collaborating network. A 
variation on a standard suite of hardware and software are 
used to achieve information assurance. The boundaries 
created within NMCI effectively create a series of enclaves 
that are in tended to protect the network and the data that 
flows within it.  The individual boundaries are identified 
as the Transport Boundary and Boundaries 1 through 4 and 
each Boundary, with the exception of Boundary 4, possesses 
both a classified and unclassified side of the network.  
Each boundary has specific tasks it is designed to perform 
and the configuration of the hardware systems and the 
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associated policies reflect the level of trust associated 
with the collaborating network that is connected at that 
boundary.  
The Transport Boundary is meant to provide protection 
between NMCI and the wide area network transport services 
provided by either DISA or a commercial very high 
performance backbone network services (vBNS).  In addition, 
the Transport Boundary provides the connection for remote 
dial in services via the UUnet. Protection of the physical 
assets that make up these two wide area transport services 
are the responsibility of either DISA or the commercial 
provider as appropriate. The vBNS and DISA incorporates the 
following protective features [RAY01]: 
• Denial of Service Protection 
• User Data Confidentiality 
• Identification and Authentication 
• Access Controls 
• Security Alarms and Audit Trails 
• System and Data Integrity 
• Personnel Security 
• Physical Security 
• Ongoing Security Improvements 
As with all the other boundaries within NMCI, the Transport 
Boundary possesses both a classified and unclassified side.  
The unclassified side of the wide area network relies upon 
virtual private network (VPN) devices, IP layer 
protections, intrusion detection systems, and policy based 
routing for protection.   
 The protection mechanisms of the Transport Boundary 
are positioned at the access points of the WAN.  Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) devices, routing table 
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authentication, and IDS monitoring compose the defensive 
elements of the unclassified network.  For the secure 
portion of the network, Type 1 encryption is used and the 
IDS are omitted.  Host IDS systems guided by network 
security policy are deemed adequate to prevent illegal 
activities at the host level (Boundary 4) and the bulk 
encryption used will prohibit access by other vBNS and DISA 
users unauthorized access to NMCI [RAY01].   
Boundary 1 provides protection between NMCI and any 
external network, to include NIPRNet, SIPRNet, and the 
Internet.   The mechanisms used for defense are firewalls, 
content scanners, IDS, routing table authentication, and 
both single and dual sided VPN service.   Classified use of 
boundary 1 is via the (SIPRNet) and Type 1 encryption is 
used for communication across the SIPRNet. Single and dual 
sided VPN is also available through Boundary 1 in a manner 
consistent with that of the unclassified Boundary 1.  The 
primary difference between the classified and unclassified 
side of Boundary 1 is that only one firewall and one 
content scanner will be used on classified side.  This is 
deemed adequate since through-put for the classified side 
is anticipated to be substantially lower [RAY01]. 
Boundary 2 provides protection between legacy systems 
and NMCI. The definition of a legacy system is applicable 
to BAN’s and LAN’s that were deployed prior to the 
inception of NMCI and its security policies.   This 
specific definition of legacy systems includes all IT-21 
networks (shipboard), the Marine Corps Enterprise Network 
(MCEN) and other legacy base area networks and application 
that reside within the Navy organization or are accessed by 
a part of the Navy organization for operation.  The 
defensive mechanisms here are the same as used in Boundary 
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1.  Boundary 2 is also has both a classified and 
unclassified side to it.  By default access to Boundary 2 
will be via the firewall suite.  However, it is anticipated 
that some systems will not meet firewall policy and 
therefore be routed via a VPN connection.  In this 
situation the legacy server would remain within the legacy 
network and the NMCI user would be connected via a VPN 
client. The access to the legacy applications carries with 
it some risk that should be balanced with the functionality 
gained by their entrance into NMCI.  These legacy 
applications often contain know vulnerabilities and if 
compromised could provide a point of entry for an adversary 
into the NMCI environment.  The Boundary 2 requirements for 
legacy applications are still to be determined and 
ultimately will be approved by the NMCI Connection Approval 
Process [RAY01].  Classified Boundary 2 design would be 
similar to the unclassified design [RAY01]. 
Boundary 3 provides protection between communities of 
interest (COI’s).  How NMCI deals with communities of 
interest is based on their sensitivity and the geographic 
location of its members.   The defensive mechanisms used 
for each COI is then based on this same information.  Table 
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Notes: 1. To limit network access to a private serve 
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Table 3 Communities of Interest within NMCI  
 
For COI type A, enforced group policies and potentially a 
VLAN are used to control access to their server.  For COI 
type B, VLAN, policy based routing and would segregate the 
COI from NMCI.  VPN’s and group policy would provide data 
confidentiality and access to distributed members of the 
group.  For COI type C, the server resides in the same 
location as the members.  Group policy and a VLAN control 
access to the server and a firewall may be deployed to 
improve the segregation of the group from NMCI.  For COI 
type D, NMCI provides only the connectivity to the server 
for data access.  In this situation a dedicated firewall 
and an IDS are deployed.  NMCI will also support foreign 
nationals who are assigned to the Department of the Navy 
(DoN) installations, activities, or commands within 
Boundary 3. Specific configurations are made for their use 
within NMCI [RAY01].   
Boundary 4 protects NMCI at the host and server level. 
The defensive systems employed at this level are numerous 
and are dependent upon the classification of the host or 
server.  They include but are not limited to secure 
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operating systems, VPN client, Smart Card sign-on, email 
encryption, web server authentication, host IDS, virus 
scanning, and policy enforcement [RAY01].   The specific 
configuration of the host or server can be determined by 
examining the CLIN for the specific seat being used.  The 
CLIN configurations define exactly what classification the 
seat is cleared for and what the configuration of the seat 
should be.     
The public key infrastructure for NMCI will be 
developed and managed by the Department of Defense (DoD), 
with the National Security Agency (NSA) and DISA 
responsible for the development of the core components.  
The DoD will establish a central certification authority to 
create, assign, and issue public key certificates for NMCI.  
The same organization will maintain the directory.  The 
directory will be based on Windows 2000, using the Windows 
2000 Blackcomb update, identify and authenticate for the 
domain or logon. 
NMCI security is managed and controlled through NMCI 
security operations centers (SOC) that are co-located with 
the regional NMCI Network Operating Centers (NOC).  The six 
classified and six unclassified SOC’s monitor the IDS, 
manage firewall policy, virus and content scanning, 
encryptors, VPN devices, and remote access servers [RAY01].     
  Client Seats and their configurations are numerous, 
and the possible number of variations significant.  The 
Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) list contains all CLIN 
information and the specific descriptions of each client 
seat. The primary element to be taken from the seat 
configuration is the importance of standardization of each 
seat, server, router throughout the NMCI network.  All 
hosts will run a common Windows-based operation system and 
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a common software suite. Windows will also be the basis for 
the authentication and identification for server operation. 
The last major component of the security architecture to be 
examined is the Network Management Network (NMN). 
The Network Management Network is the mechanism for 
the monitoring, updating, and configuring the routers, 
servers, and switches that reside on the unclassified side 
of NMCI.  The NMN transport is provide through a separate 
wide area network that connects the NOC’s with the 
individual routers, servers, and switches. The status of 
these nodes will be monitored via the NMN using HP 
Openview, Tivoli, and Remedy software suites.  The NMN has 
no redundancy or fail-over and therefore when connectivity 
is lost, monitoring service capabilities will also be lost 
until service is restored [RAY01]. Having completed a 
lengthy look at the major components of NMCI Security 
Architecture, we can step back and begin to examine the 
potential weaknesses that arise from it.  
 In examining the survivability of the NMCI 
Architecture we should begin by parsing out the overall 
network into three major areas of interest.  Those three 
areas are availability of the network (Ao), security, and 
quality of service (QoS) (or differential service). For a 
system to be survivable it must be available, secure, and 
possess differential services that permit traffic to be 
segregated or prioritized when the network is under stress 
or in extremis.  Taking a look at the NMCI architecture in 
this manner will help understand the difference between a 






 To evaluate the availability of a network we must 
first define what availability means and then consider the 
basic principles of high availability engineering. When we 
have done these things we can then use them as a framework 
to compare to the NMCI structure.  Availability of a 
network has two different definitions that can be used to 
evaluate performance.   In a telephone circuit, network 
availability is defined as the ratio of the time the 
circuit is operational to total elapsed time.  In a network 
switching system availability is defined as the 
accessibility of input and output ports.  For the purpose 
of this thesis, availability will use the later definition, 
that is the availability of access to input and output 
ports.  This definition is relevant since NMCI will be 
essentially a stateless system.  NMCI is not concerned 
about the state of a particular connection, but intends to 
provide connection end-to-end utilizing a packet switched 
network.  Since state is not a consideration, the important 
aspect of NMCI availability is then the operational 
capability of the hardware systems that make up the NMCI 
infrastructure.  Under the NMCI contract the Navy and 
Marine Corps will not own the hardware infrastructure.  The 
Navy has contracted for services from a vendor and the 
desired availability for services was agreed upon in a 
conforming contract awarded in October 2000.  The best way 
then to evaluate the Ao of NMCI is to compare the 
contractual agreements with the basic principles and 
practices used in the construction of networks.  The key 
elements to high reliability engineering are to eliminate 
single points of failure, provide reliable crossover (from 
primary to backup), and promptly detect failures upon 
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occurrence [RB02].  Appendix 1 contains a discussion and 
examination of how a multi-threaded system can achieve 
availability rates of 99.99% or above. This can be achieved 
through simple redundancy of components within the 
supporting infrastructure. 
 Independently generated statistics on the availability 
of commercial network providers can be found on the 
internet.  These statistics show that commercial only 6 of 
the 26 providers surveyed by this site could not meet 99.9 
% availability (reachability) [MTX02].   The average among 
all the US providers from this survey was 99.86%.  When 
compared to the standard performance measure contained in 
the NMCI contract, 99.86 % availability met or exceeded the 
requirements for each specific service level agreement 
[PEOIT02].  The NMCI contract also includes provision for 
evaluation of services based on latency and packet loss 
within some of the SLA’s.  Examining the same open source 
data we can see the average latency was 67.12 mili-seconds 
and packet loss was .2705%. When compared to the standard 
performance measure contained in the NMCI contract, .2705% 
packet loss and a latency of 67.12 mili-seconds exceeds the 
requirements of the relevant service level agreements 
[PEOIT02]. 
 In essence, the Navy has contracted for services that 
are no more reliable than what is presently available from 
any other internet service provider (ISP).   
 While this may be adequate for some services used 
within NMCI, it may be inadequate in times of crisis, or 
for high integrity or time critical data used in battle 
management or force projection operations.  Any limitations 
that result from this are then relevant to what NMCI should 
be used for and ultimately what the mission function or 
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functions of NMCI should be.  They also go directly to the 
overall survivability of the network.  Even if security and 
quality if service are established within a network, the 
system availability must be adequate to meet the needs of 
the primary mission. The SLA’s negotiated for the service 
should be traceable to the operational requirements for the 
network. If the network availability is inadequate to 
support the mission essential functions then the network 
has failed.  
  
F. QUALITY OF SERVICE   
 Equally important to mission functions of NMCI is the 
concept of quality of service.  Again we must begin with a 
definition. Quality of service refers to the ability of a 
network to provide better service to selected traffic that 
is flowing within the same network.  The primary goal of 
QoS is to provide priority including dedicated bandwidth, 
controlled jitter and latency (required by some real-time 
and interactive traffic), and improved loss 
characteristics. Also important is making sure that 
providing priority for one or more flows does not make 
other flows fail [CSCO02].  This can be contrasted with the 
current methodology within the internet of “best effort” 
delivery.  Under best effort delivery methodology, all 
packets (or transmissions) are treated equally and delivery 
to their destination is arbitrated by routers on the 
pathway the packet takes to its destination on that 
equivalent basis. When the network experiences congestion 
due to demand, failure, compromise or a combination 
thereof, all users experience an approximately equivalent 
level of degradation.   This is suitable for commercial and 
most military applications, but is inadequate for military 
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applications that demand as near real-time or “hard real- 
time” service. Some tightly coupled combat system 
applications require a deterministic level of service that 
guarantees delivery within specific time frames to an end 
user [RB02].  Deterministic service then includes the idea 
that the packet has guaranteed delivery to an end user 
within a specified time.  To achieve this within a network 
we then must consider that determinism has two levels of 
complexity within itself. First, we must establish 
determinism within the application.  How do we assign the 
priority to packets of a specific application? Second, we 
need to resolve the priority among a multiple of “priority” 
applications flowing within the network [RB02].  Policy and 
configuration solutions, or partial solutions to these 
problems exist, but they are not widely deployed in either 
the commercial or military world because of the complexity 
and effort required to implement and manage them.  At 
present, the standard practice to resolve quality of 
service issues is the massive application of bandwidth 
because of its relative low cost and ease of 
implementation. 
While the deployment of more bandwidth is a solution, 
it is a hardware solution that in a time of crisis may not 
be adequate to a combined or coordinated attack on a 
network. The topology of a particular area may limit the 
alternative paths available.  A series of cable paths 
buried in a common trench or terminating at a common point 
are single points of failure within the network. For a 
network to be survivable it needs to be able to 
discriminate among the traffic flowing within the network 
and handle that which is mission essential while delaying 
or discarding that which is not.  The inability to perform 
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this discriminatory behavior results in default “best 
effort” service to all users, granting equal privilege to 
traffic that is both mission and non-mission essential.  
For this reason there should be another solution to the 
problem of providing a deterministic level of service 
within NMCI for it to be a survivable system. 
 
G. SECURITY  
 The term security contains within it a long list of 
characteristics that express what designers hope to achieve 
within any particular network.  The presence of these 
characteristics determines the level security that exists 
within that network.  Consequently, the lack of their 
presence also says a great deal about how secure the 
network should be considered.  The characteristics that 
define security within a network are;     
• Confidentiality. Unintended recipients can't read our 
traffic. Confidentiality includes secrecy of the data. 
 
• Authenticity. Unintended originators can't fake 
traffic. Nobody forged my messages. Authenticity is a 
superset of integrity. 
 
• Integrity. Traffic hasn't been tampered with. What you 
got is what I really sent you.  
 
• Non-repudiation. I can't get away with saying 
something and later denying it.  
 
• Access control. Unauthorized users can't use network 
and computing resources. More colloquially, keep the 
riff-raff out of my corner of the 'net.  
 
• Assurance of service. The network is available for use 




• Traffic analysis. Ability to derive intelligence from 
the addresses of messages, even if the contents are 
confidentiality-protected. 
 
• Traffic flow analysis. Derivation of intelligence 
inferences by observing flows to and from commands and 
individuals. 
 
• Interceptability. Ability of unintended recipients to 
receive traffic (regardless of whether they can read 
it). 
 
• Jammability. Vulnerability of a link to interruption 
by signal interference.[RB02]  
 
 
There are numerous ways of achieving these characteristics 
within a network and they can be applied to a multiple of 
layers within the OSI model.  This is drawn out in ISO 
7498-2 that lists the potential areas of application of 
security measures at each of the seven layers within the 
OSI model. 
 
Service  OSI Layer 
Confidentiality 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 
Authentication 3, 4, 7 
Integrity  3, 4, 7 
Access Control  3, 4, 7 
Non-Repudiation 7 
Table 4 ISO 7498-2 Layer Model 
  
It should be noted that the ISO has expressed these as 
theoretically possible at the noted layers of the OSI 
model.  ISO 7498-2 makes no reference to whether the 
decision to choose any one or all of the relevant layers is 
either effective or manageable.  It should also be noted 
that there are specific characteristics (traffic analysis, 
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traffic flow analysis, interceptability, and jammability 
are not even addressed).  Taken a step further we can look 
at how the OSI model overlays with the requirements and 
solutions in what I shall refer to as the “Buddenberg 
Matrix”.  This table better illustrates the objectives, 
methods, and examples of how the security characteristics 
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Table 5 Buddenberg Matrix of Security Requirements 
 
The operative theory behind the Buddenberg Matrix is that 
in order to achieve the most efficient and effective level 
of security, all the elements (problem, solution, 
objective, and application) must be in alignment.  This is 
not to say that security measures are not or cannot be 
employed in another fashion.  What this matrix 
demonstrates, however, is two things;  
(1) misalignment at best creates significant 
inefficiencies in network implementation and operation, 
and  
(2) misalignment at worst creates security which 
misses the objective and in actuality provides less 
security than desired.   
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Using the Buddenberg Matrix and the logic derived there, we 
can examine the security architecture of NMCI to evaluate 
the logical match between the requirements and solutions 
needed to secure NMCI.   
 Recalling the earlier discussion and description of 
the NMCI security architecture we readily see that enclave 
security is the centerpiece of its network defense scheme.  
The defense-in-depth strategy employed by NMCI is 
implemented in physical and logical layers to provide 
security enclaves at the regional, command, and host level. 
It is intended to provide confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, non-repudiation, access control, 
authenticity, identification, survivability of information 
systems [RAY01].  Immediately there is an obvious mismatch 
between the requirements and the methods employed when the 
NMCI architecture is compared to the Buddenberg Matrix.  
The defensive mechanisms are employed primarily at layers 3 
and 4 of the OSI layer model while some of the requirements 
can best be handled at layer 7, the application layer.  
This indicates that more efficient and effective security 
may be had by employing object level security at the 
application level.  When compared to the ISO 7498-2 
recommendations in table 1-4 we can see that may of the 
security characteristics can be addressed at OSI layers 3 
and 4, but non-repudiation should  be handled at layer 7.  
The security solutions employed within NMCI may not provide 
the most effective security because of a mismatch between 
the requirements and the applied technologies.  Looking at 
confidentiality and authenticity we can see the mismatch by 
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Table 6 NMCI Misalignments within Buddenberg Matrix 
 
 Within NMCI, confidentiality and authenticity are 
being handled primarily by the application of various 
encryption methods.  This constitutes a misalignment 
between the requirements and the technology when compared 
to professor Buddenberg’s matrix.  VPN’s do reside within 
NMCI and could provide the authenticity and confidentiality 
desired, but their application is less than optimal.   
 As designed, NMCI uses VPN’s to provide access to 
legacy applications and servers, and for remote access 
[RAY01].  This application provides access to these systems 
as an alternative to the weakening of firewalls.  This 
application, however, is limited in scope and doesn’t 
provide end-to-end security.  In the context of this 
thesis, and in reference to the Buddenberg Matrix, end-to-
end security means that the IP datagrams travel from the 
sender to the intended receiver host in a “black” or 
encrypted form.  The originating and destination IP 
addresses may or may not be encrypted, but the data within 
the message is encrypted by the sender and remains so until 
decrypted by the receiver.       
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 The figure below is taken from NMCI System Security 
Authorization Agreement and depicts the Classified Boundary 
1 configuration.  Note the VPN path is depicted in the 
dashed lines connecting the VPN clients external to the 






Figure 2 Classified Boundary 1 
(Figure 2.1.2-2 from NMCI System Security Authorization Agreement of 19 March 2001) 
 
The limitation to his application is that the encryption is 
provided only as far as the gateway.  Once the VPN reaches 
the gateway the information travels in an unencrypted form 
within the network and is stored within the network servers 
Encryption 
starts at the 
host  
Encryption 
ends at the 
host  
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in the same way.  The same configuration is used within 
other Boundaries within NMCI.  Below is a diagram of the 
unclassified Boundary 2.  The encryption ends at the VPN 
device.  The weakness of this is that there is no 
consideration given to the potential   alteration of the 
message from within the NMCI network.  So while the 
authentication and confidentiality can be maintained 
between the client and the gateway, there is no such 
guarantee between the gateway and the NMCI host that that 
reside within the BAN or LAN 
 
Figure 3 Unclassified Boundary  
(From NMCI System Security Authorization Agreement of 19 March 2001) 
 
The assumption is that the data would be inaccessible or 
that an intruder would not be able to enter the NMCI BAN 
Encryption 
ends at the 
gateway 
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without being discovered.  Insider attacks are a real 
threat to any network and this application of a VPN, while 
providing some security, also presents a vulnerability it 
its application within NMCI.  It should be noted, however, 
that the application of VPN’s, as well as many other 
devices to provide network security, are merely the tactics 
employed in the battle for network security.  The network 
defensive strategy, or the underlying logic for the use of 
the specific tactics within the network, must also be 
examined to obtain a full picture.   
 As discussed earlier in this chapter the NMCI network 
defensive strategy is essentially an enclave-based system 
that relies upon a multiple of layers to restrict 
unauthorized access or malicious behavior within the 
network [RAY01].  This enclaving strategy represents the 
state of the art for network defense as it is employed 
today.  The problem with this strategy is that historical 
data has shown us that making a network a hard target alone 
will not ensure its success.  The CERT data listed in Table 
1-1 on page 7 of this text shows that for all the effort 
made, security compromises still occur.  The strategy of 
enclaving networks assumes that security is a binary 
relationship. The multiple layers are intended to blunt or 
repel the attack, and the system will not be compromised.  
If, however, the attack succeeds, the enclaving strategy 
does not address what to do next. Under this strategy 
networks as either secure or compromised, and there is 
really no middle ground. There are usually plans for 
contingencies, they tend to revolve around the recovery and 
reconstitution of the data within the network in a post 
event environment.  This is a non-real time evolution that 
does not provide for the continued operation of the 
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network.  NMCI is considered a mission critical system and 
it loss would have a serious effect on the mission support 
and operation of the Navy and Marine Corps [RAY01].  To 
fail to provide continued operation cedes victory to those 
that hope to conduct “information denial” attacks against 
NMCI.   
 The concept of information denial was drawn from the 
theories of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and follows his 
theories on sea control and sea denial in times of 
conflict.  Information denial is the practice of disruptive 
or destructive activities intended to deny the flow of 
information across the network [RB02].  The enclave 
strategy only partially addressed information denial 
attacks by providing the best possible resistance within 
the network. Once penetrated, however, the defensive 
enclave provides little or no capability to ensure 
continued operation. This is particularly true when the 
homogenous software suites intended for NMCI are 
considered.  The standardization of software suites across 
the network both improves security while providing a common 
weakest link.  A compromise employed at one nearly 
guarantees that exploit will be successful at any other 
similarly configured point within the network.   
 In Mahanian terms, the NMCI enclave strategy hopes to 
ensure information flow across the entirety of the network 
by securing regional “information dominance” through the 
defeat information denial attacks. Much like the strategic 
hamlet strategy of the Vietnam War, the initiative is ceded 
to the attacker, allowing him to pick the time, place and 
method of attack.  In network terms, the attacker need only 
find a single crack to enter, while the defender must 
protect all avenues of approach, even those he would be 
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unable to see.  Applying the Survivable Networks Systems 
strategy would be employing Mahan’s concept of sea control 
to the network environment, “information control” [RB02].   
The strategy of information control is the process of 
transmitting traffic across the network in the face of all 
the information denial activities. Implicit to this is the 
guarantee of authenticity and confidentiality, ensuring the 
integrity of router configurations, and planning the 
network to be appropriately robust to guard against 
individual link outages [RB02].   Recall that Network 
Survivability is defined as the capability of a system to 
fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of 
attacks, failures, or accidents [RE99].  The concepts of 
information control and Survivable Network Systems are 
therefore closely related, if not identical in intent and 
purpose.   
Just as the U.S. Navy practices sea control as its 
basic strategy, NMCI should employ information control to 
its network operations.  Employing such a strategy aligns 
the tactics of network defense with the network strategy of 
continuous network operations.  Designing the system to 
operate in spite of damage or compromise is essential to 
the mission success of NMCI and the U.S. Navy, and 
therefore the application of the Survivable Network Systems 
concept is relevant to security of NMCI. 
 
H. METHODOLOGY FOR EXAMINING NMCI 
The examination of NMCI conducted in this thesis is in 
every sense on a “macro” level.  The Survivable Networks 
Analysis method was used to guide the examination.  The 
focus of this thesis is to give the readers a larger view 
of the NMCI structure as a whole.  Many individuals inside 
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and outside the Navy organization are working diligently to 
find solutions to extremely complex and complicated 
problems within NMCI.  There appears, however, to be a lack 
of focus on the larger context of what NMCI will mean to 
the Navy and how this larger view of NMCI relates to the 
very specific problems being addressed.    
The Survivable Networks Analysis method was applied to 
NMCI in the following manner.  The first step was to gather 
information available from DoD and business sources on the 
structure, composition and mission of the Navy and Marine 
Corps Intranet.  All the sources used for this part of the 
analysis were publicly available from the either the 
primary contractor for NMCI (EDS Corporation) or the 
relevant DoD web sites.  These materials formed the basis 
for evaluating the mission and business model of NMCI under 
the Survivable Networks Analysis method.   
Next I gathered information from the end users of NMCI 
about what they desired to achieve from the implementation.  
These client organizations provided input as to what they 
were presently engaged in over networked systems and what 
they would like to see provided from NMCI.  These 
interviews were used to help evaluate the mission of NMCI 
and develop what the essential services might be under the 
Survivable Networks Analysis method.   
Third, a top level view of the NMCI security 
architecture was made and the system evaluated for soft 
spots, vulnerabilities, or a lack of capability when 
evaluated under the Survivable Networks Analysis framework.  
Fourth and last, an overall evaluation of the survivability 
of NMCI was made, based upon the information derived from 
the previous three steps.  When summed up, the total effort 
should provide a top level view of the NMCI system and what 
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its mission, essential services, vulnerabilities, and 
overall survivability are under the survivable network 





II. MISSION AND THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS INTRANET  
A. THE CURRENT MISSION DEFINITION 
 The network survivability analysis method first 
examines what the mission of NMCI is and from there 
determines what the mission essential services for NMCI 
are.  By defining the mission function for NMCI we can then 
determine what essential functions within the network must 
be maintained for the system to remain viable and function 
in the desired manner in a time of compromise or when under 
attack.  As discussed in Chapter One, the network is 
intended to provide connectivity throughout the entire 
force in cooperation with, and as part of, the Global 
Information Grid [RD00].  NMCI is essentially a 
communications system that connects all the DoN activities 
in a manner similar to other communications systems that 
already exist. The obvious differences between NMCI and the 
other communications systems are in the mission definition 
and scope of the communication that occurs within them. 
NMCI, unlike the other communication systems, has as its 
mission the maintenance of connectivity of all the 
participating members.   
The majority of the communications systems or networks 
used within the Navy and Marine Corps operate with a 
purpose or mission function as their focus.  Communication 
plans within a battle group, amphibious group, or 
expeditionary force are designed around specific functions 
or mission areas with the intent of segregating voice 
traffic and data traffic into logical subsets for ease of 
use by the operators. When decision makers request 
information, or pass it on to others, there is typically a 
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dedicated circuit that correlates to the mission area 
relevant to the information.  Consider the following 
example of a communication network that is part of a 
communication plan with a battle group.   
 
1. Alpha-Xray Battle Group Communications Example 
The responsibility for the coordination of anti-
submarine and anti-mine warfare resides with the undersea 
warfare commander (designated AX) within the battle group.  
His job is to coordinate the employment of anti-submarine 
and anti-mine warfare assets (ships, submarines, and 
aircraft) for the battle group commander in both offensive 
and defensive operations.  To complete his mission AX will 
have two or more dedicated radio circuits available to 
employ his undersea warfare assets.  These radio circuits 
are segregated by function and AX is responsible for 
arbitrating the use of these by his warfare elements based 
on his (AX) prioritization scheme.  For example, one 
circuit can be used for contact and reporting, and another 
for coordination.  If there are adequate radio circuits 
available, these can be subdivided by region or relative 
position from the battle group, further segregating the 
traffic (subnets).  Within each of these subnets, the 
reporting information is prioritized in a predetermined 
manner by the warfare commander.  Actual contact reporting 
has the highest priority, while other forms of 
communication fall in an established hierarchy based upon 
the status of the network and the level of activity.   
During periods of high demand or limited connectivity, 
some voice calls are not required or not permitted at all.  
The reporting and coordination information is often further 
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segregated in an ad-hoc fashion by the participating units, 
who may randomly select an unassigned or low demand 
frequency or channel  for coordinating communications. An 
example of this is the use of 303.0 MHz frequency, commonly 
referred to as “Winchester”, for local area coordination by 
the assigned assets.  A means of fail-over is provided to 
the participating assets through a predetermined hierarchy 
among the channeled frequencies.  
If a channel fails or is unusable, the undersea 
warfare units have a predetermined routing for their 
information by merely switching to another dedicated 
circuit for passing priority information.  If the undersea 
warfare circuits fail completely, the members do have the 
ability to use other nets that are dedicated to other 
mission areas if their traffic is deemed to be of a high 
enough priority by the warfare commanders that control 
those other mission area subnets.  There are often other 
communication systems, some intended primarily for data, 
which contain a voice channel that can be used for voice 
communication in local area coordination.  The LAMPS Mark I 
VHF data link and the LAMPS Mark III microwave tactical 
data link are examples of data systems that can be used for 
voice communication with other assets.   
Regardless of the channel or channels utilized by a 
reporting unit, there is an accepted standardized format 
for the establishment of communications and the content of 
each transmission within any subnet.  Each transmission 
begins with a call to the destination, giving the 
destination call sign and followed by the sending unit’s 
call sign.  The receiving unit then acknowledges that call 
in the same format, giving the sending unit permission to 
begin their data transmission.  The format of the 
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transmission and the method of establishing communications 
can be viewed as a very crude use of internet protocol 
datagram employing the three way handshake to establish 
communication. 
 When viewed in the aggregate, the well established 
communication plans and protocols used by the Navy and 
Marine Corps for radio frequency communication and the 
standards for IP networks have many similarities.  Each 
node of the network has a distinct address (call sign) used 
for communications.  Both networks have a protocol for the 
establishment of communications between two or more of its 
members.  Both networks have an agreed upon format for the 
transmission of data.  Both networks possess mechanisms or 
protocols for fail-over protection.  Both networks use 
subnets to segregate communications into relevant 
communities of interest. For all these similarities there 
are, however, significant differences that make the IP 
network less capable when compared to the simple radio 
frequency nets.   
The most significant of the differences is the mission 
orientation of an IP network, in this case NMCI.  The 
primary mission focus for NMCI is connectivity of the Navy 
organizations.  The implication is that unlike the radio 
networks there is no established hierarchy or 
prioritization of communications within the network.  There 
is also no single arbitrator (warfare commander) 
responsible for establishing a hierarchy or prioritization 
of communications.  The resultant behavior of IP network 
communications is contingent upon every node getting best 
effort service.  The IP network will attempt to retain 
connection to all of the nodes regardless of the demand and 
ignoring the relative value of the information being 
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transmitted within it.  With the focus on connectivity, 
every transmission has equal value regardless of war 
fighting or mission relevance.  While fail-over protection 
exists within an IP network, its value is diminished 
without an accompanying prioritization scheme to assist in 
the segregation of traffic within the network.  While this 
may not cause a complete system wide collapse of an IP 
network, it could impair its performance regionally and 
reduce its usefulness and effectiveness as a communication 
system.  
These differences are significant when considering the 
numerous NMCI sites located outside the continental United 
States. NMCI serviced sites in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan, 
Iceland, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and Puerto Rico would likely 
rely on satellite transmission for connectivity to the 
mainland and the remainder of the network.  These sites are 
geographically isolated and the application of additional 
optical fiber to increase available bandwidth has its 
limitations and vulnerabilities.  There are physical and 
fiscal limits to achieving diverse paths on the ocean 
floor.  Radio frequency systems (satellite or terrestrial) 
do not yet have the bandwidth available to absorb the 
entirety of the traffic within NMCI for these locations.  
Without arbitration or prioritization of the traffic within 
NMCI, these sites could experience significant delays or 
their respective portion of the network could become 
isolated by an intrusion or other event. Mission critical 
communications could be thwarted completely because of 
limited available bandwidth and the lack of prioritization 
of traffic. Given that NMCI is considered a mission 
critical system for the Navy and Marine Corps; this is 
likely a very undesirable situation [RAY01].  
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 The other major difference between the radio networks 
and NMCI is the lack of a central authority to arbitrate 
the priority of traffic. The absence of an arbitrating 
authority is a direct consequence of the mission focus of 
connectivity.  The decision to make connectivity the focus 
for NMCI performed the arbitration function in advance, 
making all transmissions equals of one another.   
Connectivity is the essence of developing and fostering the 
growth of community within NMCI and the Navy as an 
enterprise [JH97]. However, it is probably an inadequate 
mission focus for NMCI.  Even within the internet market 
forces have begun to push the focus of service beyond that 
of purely connectivity.  
Internet service providers are offering improved 
quality of service in some areas of application (video and 
voice) to those users who are willing to pay a premium for 
it [SBC02].  This is classic market economics at work. But 
what then does it say about the NMCI mission focus?  The 
implication is that only those commands who can achieve the 
desired funding will achieve better than best effort 
service.  This is not practical or even logical when 
considering the established process within the military of 
developing requirements.   
Requirements for military systems of any type derive 
from the mission need statements generated by those 
responsible for managing the relevant communities within 
the Navy or any of the other Services.  The communities 
that exist within the Navy are largely drawn along the 
lines of warfare specialty or mission area. There is no 
warfare specialty or community with a single claim to NMCI, 
and so no community leaders to determine the prioritization 
for the traffic flow within NMCI. The requirements 
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methodology with a mission focus should be applied to NMCI 
given that the network has been identified as a mission 
critical system by the Navy [RAY01].  What the Navy and 
Marine Corps team then needs to do is define the warfare 
mission for NMCI and give it context for its inclusion in 
the Navy and Marine Corps measure of combat capability. 
 
B. NMCI MISSION DEFINITION 
The Navy needs to define the mission or warfare 
function of NMCI.  The “mission need” to connect the Navy 
nodes is obvious and NMCI will fulfill that need when fully 
deployed. The Navy needs to take the next step and begin to 
define just how this massive network fits into our war 
fighting capability.  This process starts by creating a 
more granular mission definition to NMCI that will allow 
for the development of a mission hierarchy. Logically then, 
the arbitration and quality of service issues should fall 
in place along the lines of the mission capability that 
NMCI is intended to provide for the Navy and Marine Corps 
team.    
In addition, the responsibility for policy or hardware 
implementations necessary to perform the arbitrating 
function will logically fall to the relevant warfare area 
or support organization commander(s).  Ultimately, this 
method should produce the prioritization of transmissions 
within NMCI and the application of quality of service that 
is aligned with both the capability and primary mission 
functions of NMCI.  Redefining NMCI’s mission will begin to 
transform it into the war fighting asset that the Navy’s 
simplistic voice circuits have proven to be for over 50 
years.  Once this has been done then we can move to define 
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what the essential services of NMCI are or should be and 
then how survivable the network is.   
 
C. REDEFINING THE MISSION FOR NMCI 
In the process of redefining the mission for NMCI we 
first need to take a step backwards and begin by looking at 
what the potential mission areas could be.  By defining the 
potential mission areas they each can be examined 
individually and their respective requirements mapped to 
the capabilities of NMCI.  This allows for a comparative 
examination of the each mission individually. The 
respective mission areas can then be evaluated and the most 
appropriate one(s) selected through a process of 
elimination.   
To begin the process we must define what I believe are 
the three potential mission areas are for NMCI.  They can 
be broadly categorized as administration, force projection, 
and battle management.  These mission areas embody the 
essential functions of the Naval Service and capture the 
functional requirements necessary to the determination of 
their applicability within NMCI.  
 
 
D. EVALUATING NMCI MISSION CAPABILITIES 
Given that NMCI as a complete entity does not yet 
exist, we must make some assumptions so that we can 
establish as frame of reference for the examination. First, 
since no historical data exists for NMCI we need to use a 
surrogate for performing the evaluation.  NMCI as proposed 
today (approximately 360,000 client seats) in size and 
scope will be comparable to large commercial ISPs [RAY01]. 
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These commercial wide area networks are constructed in a 
similar manner, using similar technologies and software, 
and operate in a comparative environment to NMCI.  Their 
performance data then is a valuable yardstick for measuring 
the future performance of NMCI in each of the mission 
areas.   
Second, a basic assumption about NMCI security must be 
made since we don’t yet have metrics or data for security 
performance within NMCI. We can assume that NMCI will 
embody much of what has been gleaned from the over ten 
years of commercial and military experience in operating 
wide area networks. The firewalls, IDSs, and virus checkers 
represent the best of breed in the commercial sector. This 
assumption is in line with the basic concept of securing a 
services contract for NMCI.  The prime contractor is 
responsible for security and the assumption is they will 
provide the best possible security given the monetary 
incentives provided by the government in the NMCI contract 
award.  To summarize then, the basic assumptions for this 
comparison are; 
(1) Once fully deployed, NMCI will be an equivalent in 
size and scope to the larger commercial ISPs operating in 
the United States and that the commercial ISP data is 
representative of the minimum performance NMCI will achieve 
when fully implemented.   
(2) NMCI will possess equivalent or better than 
network security compared to that of the larger commercial 
ISPs operating in the United States and the security 
capability of commercial ISPs is the minimum performance 
NMCI will achieve when fully implemented.   
In addition to these assumptions we must establish 
common characteristics for examining performance 
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requirements of NMCI in each mission area.  The relevant 
factors that determine successful completion of the 
required tasks in each mission area are analogous to those 
needed to function in the existing e-commerce environment.  
In the commercial sector those factors are defined as 
availability, security, and non-repudiation [RC98].  These 
factors are essentially identical to those used for the 
evaluation of the NMCI architecture.  For this reason, each 
mission area will be examined for suitability within NMCI 
based on the same framework used to examine the NMCI 
architecture, that of availability, quality of service, and 
security.  This is a logical division of mission 
requirements and will provide a consistent reference for 
comparing essentially dissimilar missions.    
With these assumptions and common framework 
established as the ground rules we can turn to publicly 
available statistics on commercial ISPs and compare them to 
the requirements of each specific mission area in the 
process of examining NMCI.  If the existing commercial 
network performance is adequate for the mission 
requirements it is logical to then assume NMCI performance 
in the same mission area will be equivalent or better. The 
converse can also be said to be true.  This comparison will 
form the basis for determining whether a particular mission 
area is suitable for use within NMCI.    
 
E. ADMINISTRATION 
For the purposes of this examination, administration 
is defined as the functions necessary to complete the day 
to day operations and maintenance of the Navy and Marine 
Corps as an enterprise.  This includes the coordination and 
execution of all actions required for the routine movement 
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of personnel and material, as well as the requirement to 
transfer monetary instruments to organizations both 
internally and externally for the conduct  of routine, 
peacetime, non-combat operations.  The Administration 
mission area requirements are analogous to e-commerce 
requirements in the private sector of the economy.  
1. Availability  
In a network switching system availability is defined 
as the accessibility of input and output ports.  The 
requirements for availability in this mission area are 
essentially identical to that required for commercial ISPs. 
Commercial networks seek to connect end users for the 
purpose of communication or commerce. The goal for NMCI 
under this mission area would be to connect all Navy 
organizations with their desired end user, whether they are 
a Navy, other Service, other governmental organization or 
private company.  The NMCI contract award contains specific 
performance parameters for the availability characteristics 
of latency and availability. These parameters are 
established under several separate service level agreements 
(SLA) that govern different portions of the NMCI services 
contract and the requirements differ slightly among them. 
SLA 10 governs NMCI Intranet Performance and is the most 
germane since it establishes performance requirements for 
the entire network.  SLA 10 therefore will be used as the 
standard for comparing performance of NMCI to the 
commercial ISPs.  The standard of for availability and 
latency under performance under SLA 10 are 99.8% and 70-100 
milliseconds respectively [PEOIT00].   
The source used for statistics on commercial ISPs is 
by Matrix.Net, an independent web site that monitors many 
internet providers in the U.S. and around the globe. 
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Specific data for latency, packet loss, and availability 
are kept for 26 different ISP’s that operate within the 
United States.  Looking at the statistics calculated by 
this site we can see that 20 of the 26 major U.S. ISP’s 
provide connectivity that meets or exceeds the desires 
expressed in the NMCI contract award [MTX02][PEOIT00].  
Looking further into the statistics of the Matrix website 
we can see this level of performance holds true for the 
availability performance of global internet [MTX02].  
Assuming then that NMCI will provide availability on par 
with that of existing large ISP’s, it is logical then that 
the connectivity of NMCI is adequate for this mission area.   
2. Security 
The security architecture presented by NMCI is 
arguably superior to the average defensive measures 
provided by commercial ISP’s.  NMCI is held to 
significantly higher standards prescribed by National 
Security Agency and the Department of Defense to maintain 
secure communications [RA01].  The IDS and firewall 
configurations are likely to be best of breed within the 
industry when fully deployed.  The multiple enclave system 
established within NMCI is more extensive and comprehensive 
than common business applications of security.  In 
addition, NMCI makes extensive use of link encryption 
within the network for long-haul communications which is 
uncommon in the private sector.  Additionally, the level of 
encryption used within NMCI is of greater sophistication 
and complexity than presently available in the commercial 
sector and is the equivalent of that used for secure voice 
communications by DoD.  This is not to say that the NMCI 
system would be impervious to attack or penetration, but 
the level of encryption and coordinated defense is much 
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less interdependent than that of other enterprises 
operating in the internet [CERT02]. The use of host 
configuration monitoring and active network management, 
coupled with layered defensive systems, make NMCI as 
defended if not more so than the commercial networks or 
ISPs.  For these reasons it is assumed that the security of 
NMCI is adequate for the conduct of the Administration 
mission area. 
3. Quality of Service 
The Administration mission area makes no requirement 
for the network to handle or segregate traffic internally 
based on any priority status.  This mission area can be 
accomplished using best effort service as there is no 
requirement for arbitration for use by the network members. 
A reduction of throughput will affect all members equally, 
sharing the adverse consequences that result in an 
equitable fashion.  The quality of service demand for the 
Administration mission area is no greater than that needed 
to provide basic internet connectivity in the public 
domain.  Millions of businesses employ the internet for the 
conduct of normal business today without the need for a 
specific or on- demand quality of service requirements.  
The best effort quality of service offered by NMCI is then 
adequate for the Administration mission area.   
 
F. FORCE PROJECTION 
For the purposes of this examination, force projection 
is defined in the terms of the functions necessary to 
train, ready, provision, position, and then deploy combat 
forces to a theater of operation for either combat 
operations or presence in support of the national security 
objectives.  Force projection differs from administration 
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in that the actions are directly related to the deployment 
of forces and all logistical support required placing them 
in a combat ready status.  Movement of personnel for force 
projection is typically, but not exclusive to unit level 
movement.   
The transactional requirements placing a unit in 
deployable or combat ready status are influenced by the FAD 
or Force Activity Designator.  The FAD is the mechanism 
that establishes the logistical support priority to the 
unit as it approaches its deployment date and then departs 
for the theater of operation [15].   Once the unit has 
received a FAD equivalent to deploying status, their 
transactions, either personnel, material, or movement, 
would fall under the Force Projection mission area.  By the 
same standard, units that are deployed for presence or 
actual combat would fall under this definition of Force 
Projection.    
Units that are actually deployed are considered under 
this definition as many of their logistical requirements 
are handled by or from organizations that reside within the 
continental United States.  By virtue of this their traffic 
would require a position in the hierarchy of NMCI to 
receive the appropriate handling. Force Projection 
functions reside primarily in the preparation, positioning 
or provisioning of forces before or after an engagement.   
 
1. Availability  
The force projection mission area requires a very high 
degree of availability, but not necessarily a guaranteed 
100 percent availability of the network to be successful.  
Under the NMCI contract award, SLA 10 provisions NMCI 
Intranet availability at only 99.8 %.   This is significant 
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in that it is less than the 99.99% that could be provided 
by simple dual threading.  However SLA 24 does provision 
WAN availability at 99.99%, giving a very high degree of 
connectivity within a particular Naval Region. Preparations 
in the deployment cycle possess predictability about them 
based on the long term planning and coordination required 
to execute such deployments, much of which is done within 
the units own Naval Region.  This lead time and regional 
planning function mitigates the lower availability 
provisioned for NMCI Intranet performance.  
It should also be considered that there already exist 
multiple paths external to NMCI that in essence provide a 
fail-over protection that could preclude a denial of 
service to the deploying unit.  The Defense Messaging 
System and commercial or government dedicated voice 
circuits can provide an adequate means of communicating 
with any unit or organization supporting the Force 
Projection mission area.  These systems, while supported by 
NMCI are not wholly contained within the network and should 
be available should a failure, compromise or denial of 
service of NMCI occur.  Employment of these systems is a 
risk management strategy for the Navy and provides a means 
of contacting units in the event of an emergent requirement 
to deploy.   
Should a crisis situation occur that requires the 
deployment of assets ahead of schedule or on an unscheduled 
basis the orders would likely to fall to units that are in 
the early stages of the deployment cycle.  Response time of 
the affected units would be in terms of days or weeks. 
Other Navy owned communication systems could provide 
adequate connectivity if NMCI were unavailable.    
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 The net affect of alternate paths provided by other 
Navy systems, the greater provisioned reliability of the 
WAN, and the long lead planning for deployments is to 
mitigate the lower availability of the NMCI Intranet and 
make the availability of NMCI as an enterprise system 
adequate for the force projection mission area. 
 
2. Security 
The security requirements under the force projection 
mission are more significant than that of Administration 
because of their significance to national security. Failure 
of security at this level represents a loss of strategic 
advantage to the United States by allowing an adversary to 
more accurately estimate the response time or capability of 
American forces to a threat.  Opponents of the United 
States could gain valuable insight into the level of 
readiness of Navy and Marine Corps forces if they were able 
to compromise data within NMCI relevant to the Force 
Projection mission area.  This constitutes a greater 
requirement for NMCI security than under the Administration 
mission area.    
Much of the readiness and disposition of forces data 
required for Force Projection would fall at or below the 
SECRET/NOFORN classification level.  The SIPRnet is 
certified to carry information classified up to and 
including SECRET/NOFORN. The SIPRnet will interface with 
and is supported by NMCI and will become and integral part 
of NMCI once security certification is achieved for NMCI. 
The mechanisms for transporting classified data within the 
SIPRnet are being applied to NMCI. Specifically the use of 
link encryption for the transport of data over long haul 
lines between the NMCI networks operating centers (NOCs).    
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Certification for NMCI to perform this function is still 
pending.   
Certification for NMCI can be viewed as problematic.  
There may be significant problems to overcome, however 
those would largely be technical in nature and will 
ultimately produce a binary result, certification or non 
certification.  A failure to certify NMCI for the transport 
of classified information would cause NMCI to be unsuitable 
for much of the force projection mission area. If however, 
certification is achieved, NMCI security would be adequate 
for the performance of this mission.  The suitability of 
NMCI to perform this mission area is then conditional upon 
NMCI receiving certification for the transport of 
classified data.  
 
3. Quality of Service 
 The Force Projection mission area will impose some 
requirements for differential service within NMCI.  There 
will be a need to give the higher priority mission function 
(Force Projection) a higher degree of service within NMCI.  
This requirement is driven primarily by the need to 
communicate during periods where there is limited 
throughput due to a compromise or damage.  During these 
periods it should be the priority to forward traffic that 
is most relevant to the primary mission of the Navy.   
 Currently, the primary mission of the Navy is forward 
presence and consequently then the highest priority traffic 
within NMCI should be that generated by or for the support 
of deployed or deploying units. The question then becomes 
how to discern which units have priority. The simplest 
discriminator between units that is presently available is 
the assigned units FAD.  The FAD is a logistical 
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discriminator that provides a prioritization to requests 
from deploying or deployed units.  Segregating traffic on 
the basis of FAD assignment will give the deployed units, 
or those preparing to deploy, a higher priority cueing 
within the network.    
 At present, the NMCI system doesn’t employ any 
specific method for the prioritization of network traffic 
based on a hierarchy of needs or mission. NMCI is 
constructed to provide essentially best effort service. The 
question then is how to provision such a prioritization 
scheme within NMCI that would fit into the existing 
structure.  There are essentially two different models for 
provisioning quality of service within the confines of the 
existing NMCI network protocols.  They are Integrated 
Services and Differentiated Services.   
 The Integrated Service model is based upon the 
reservation of service along a negotiated path for the 
transport of the data [SRSD99].  Before any data sent the 
resources necessary and the path to the destination are 
determined and reserved.  The weakness of this method is 
that a path is negotiated before the transmission and so 
creates a single point of failure.  A failure along the 
route would cause the transmission to be lost or cause the 
entire process to be reinitiated. When viewed in the 
context of network survivability, a protocol that creates a 
single point of failure is less than desirable.  This 
process also fails to make full advantage of the multi-path 
capability of a networked system.  Given the need for a 
quality of service implementation is greatest when the 
network in under duress, a protocol that reserves services 
for a single path is unlikely to provide the desired 
service for a survivable network.   
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 The Differential Services model has as its premise the 
differential classification of packets for there 
prioritization for movement through the network [SRSD99].  
The prioritization scheme as applied in the commercial 
environment is complex and requires ISPs to negotiate 
bandwidth allocations based on the economics of the 
services provided.  For there to be a consistent 
application of services the cooperating enterprises must 
have equitable agreements for the application of bandwidth.  
If however, the service is to be provided within a single 
domain, it would be a simpler proposition.   
Applying a quality of service scheme within NMCI may 
be possible by employing a differential services method.  
The quality of service granularity would be rather course, 
but could provide a means of arbitrating traffic flow 
during times of high bandwidth demand or low availability.  
Traffic could be prioritized first by FAD (deployed vs. 
non-deployed) and second by classifications: routine, 
priority, or mission essential, in ascending order of 
precedence.  The routine and priority classifications would 
be the equivalent of what the naval message system 
currently uses. The mission critical classification could 
be on the immediate or flash precedence.  The ability to 
assign a traffic classification could be awarded to users 
within the local area network by the network administrator 
in a manner similar to that used for the release of naval 
message traffic.  This places the control and 
responsibility at the local command level where it can be 
best managed and controlled.   
 Appendix B contains a more detailed discussion of how 
quality of service could be implemented within NMCI, but 
there is the potential for a scalable solution that could 
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segregate traffic based on a very modest hierarchy.  The 
net result would be to produce a quality of service 
adequate for the Force Projection mission area.   
 
G. BATTLE MANAGEMENT 
Battle management is a relevant mission area for NMCI 
in spite of the statements limiting NMCI to the confines of 
the continental United States. In the light of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 it is quite 
conceivable that NMCI may possess a critical role in the 
mission of homeland security.   
NMCI as designed is part of the integrated network 
defined as the Global Information Grid.  The implication is 
that to be functional the systems must be compatible.  To 
be interoperable the system must have equitable capability 
internalized in their design. Whatever can and must be done 
in one system can and must be done in the others for the 
network to be successful.  Failing to ensure either of 
these means we no longer have am information grid but an 
“information island chain”.  While supportive of one 
another they are essentially independent because of the 
lack of similar capability.   
The growth of networks has emphasized both 
compatibility and interoperability to the point of creating 
what are essentially large homogenous cooperative networks 
that constitute the World Wide Web.  To achieve an 
information grid, the existing IT-21, NMCI, and other 
service networks will need to merge at some level. It is 
logical that all these systems be both compatible and 
interoperable.  Therefore it is logical that whatever 
Battle Management functions are implemented in the afloat 
force be supported by the terrestrial WANs (NMCI). 
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Implementation may not be simultaneous, but is likely 
inevitable and should be considered.   
For the purposes of this examination, battle 
management is defined as the active command, control and 
communication with field level units for the purpose of 
conducting combat operations against an enemy force or the 
coordination of emergency services (fire, police, etc.) 
within CONUS in support of the homeland security mission. 
The relevant activity for the network then is how it 
facilitates the communication to the field units and or the 
control of weapon systems used in the actual combat.  To 
perform this mission effectively the network must 
communicate on a near real time or real time basis.  
Networks must also provide a high degree of integrity and 
confidentiality for the data to be of valuable to the 
network members. Lastly, for the network to reflect the 
mission priorities in the battle management scenario, it 
must possess a granular quality of service that is flexible 
to the needs of the commander managing the conflict.  
Priority assignment within the network must be responsive 
to the demand of the mission commander so that the priority 
mission is receiving the priority service.   
    
 1. Availability  
As a means of communication to both internal and 
external organizations an IP based network has a well 
established history.  The flow of information between 
individuals has become comparatively reliable as evidenced 
by statistics available in the public domain on network 
performance.  Based on the 26 internet service providers 
surveyed by the Matrix.Net site discussed earlier under 
Administration, 20 met or exceeded the standard performance 
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metrics (SPM) for NMCI in terms of availability, packet 
loss and average latency [MTXO2].  The question then is 
whether the SPMs within the NMCI contract award adequate 
for the mission.  The relevant SLAs and their standard 
performance metrics (SPM) for network availability within 
NMCI are summarized in the table below. 
 
 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) Availability Requirement in 
NMCI Contract Award 
SLA   6:  Web Access Services 99.5% 
SAL 10:  NMCI Intranet Performance 99.8% 
SLA 11:  NIPRNET Access 99.5% 
SLA 12:  Internet Access 98.0% 
SLA 13:  Mainframe Services Access 99.5% 
SLA 14:  Desktop Access to 
Government Applications 
99.5% 
SLA 18:  Unclassified Remote Access 99.5% 
SLA 19:  Classified (Secure) Remote 
Access 
99.5% 
SLA 24:  WAN Network Connectivity 99.99% 
SLA 25:  BAN/LAN Communications    
Services 
99.99% 
SLA 35:  Information Assurance 
Operational Services – 
SIPRNET 
98.0% 
Table 7 NMCI Contractual SLA Availability Levels 
(Summary of SLAs taken from the NMCI Contract Award of 6 October 200, NMCI 
Contract N00024-00-D-6000) 
 
Not all of the service requirements are provisioned to 
meet the availability threshold of a dual threaded system 
as discussed in appendix A. Only SLAs 24 and 25 are 
provisioned to the level of “four nines” of availability 
(99.99%).  These SLAs refer to the availability or 
connectivity of the wide area (WAN), base area (BAN) or 
local area (LAN) within NMCI.  The consequence of this is 
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that the highest levels of connectivity are assured only at 
the WAN or below.  These small differences in the 
percentage availability are significant because they 
represent the difference between a system that possesses 
redundant capability and one that contains a single point 
of failure.  
Provisioning availability in this manner creates 
islands of higher availability within NMCI.  The true 
requirement for availability in this mission area is 
dependent upon how this mission function is accomplished 
organizationally.  If the battle management function is 
ceded to a particular region, the WAN availability may be 
adequate. If not, then the lower availability of the NMCI 
Intranet (SLA 10) is likely inadequate based on the less 
than dual threaded level of availability that has been 
provisioned.  
Without provisioning a higher degree of availability 
across the entirety of NMCI, particularly the very high 
speed backbone network system (vBNS) that connects the NMCI 
WANs nationally, it is unlikely NMCI is suitable for the 
Battle Management mission area.   
 
2. Security 
 A network employed for battle management places a 
premium on the demand for integrity and authenticity.  Even 
when data is received in a timely manner there must exist a 
very high level of assurance that (1) what was received was 
what was sent and (2)  the sender is exactly who the 
receiver thinks he is.  If either of these conditions 
cannot be met the value of the data is seriously in doubt.  
High degrees of authenticity and integrity can be achieved 
in a number of ways in different networked systems.  Recall 
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the example Alpha-Xray Battle Group Communications example 
used earlier in the chapter.  A similar lesson on integrity 
and authenticity can be drawn from examining carrier air 
wing strike operations.   
It is common practice for air wings to conduct strike 
operations using clear voice (non-encrypted) channels.  
This practice has developed because of the difficulty in 
achieving full connectivity among all aircraft using 
encrypted voice transmissions.  The link encryption systems 
can be problematic when implementing across a large number 
of aircraft. The air wing has been successful at this 
because of the trust that is built within every layer of 
the network (air wing, squadron, flight, and section) 
during pre-deployment training.  The individual nodes 
become very familiar with the other nodes with which they 
routinely interact, to the point of being able to recognize 
the other’s transmissions.   
This trust relationship is developed over the multiple 
rehearsals in the primary mission area of the network (air 
wing). The network is decentralized and mission 
responsibilities are resolved down to every node within the 
network. Data integrity is checked by the receiving node 
through the validation of the sending node (does the pilot 
recognize the voice/call sign) and by logical comparison of 
the message with the environment as the receiving node 
understands it currently and has experienced it in the past 
(does the message make sense when referenced to the pilots 
situational awareness).   
This method is not unlike the pattern recognition and 
anomalous behavior used by intrusion detection systems.  
The difference is that IDS are used in IP networks to 
prevent denial of service attacks while this voice 
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recognition and nodal behavior patterns in voice circuits 
are used for integrity and authenticity.  The key is that 
the voice circuits have many intrinsic clues that are 
unavailable to the nodes of a computer network.  The sound 
of the voice, the background noise, the clarity of 
transmissions all play a role in helping the aircrew 
authenticate the source as trusted or untrusted.  The 
aircrew (nodes) develops a historical log for evaluating 
the integrity of the data provided by the sender and 
sometimes a factor of error correction applied to achieve a 
common picture.  IP networks do not the luxury of such 
interpretation and therefore require a more binary measure.  
In the IP world, the digital signature is the 
analogous system to voice recognition used in the air wing 
clear voice communications.  PKI is a suitable solution; 
however the scale of the problem is immense. The number of 
certificates to be issued and managed for even a small 
battle problem would be significant considering the number 
of ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapon systems that would 
feed a common battle management network.  Some form of 
object level security is likely the answer to this problem.  
Object level security could give the individual nodes the 
authenticity and integrity capability that equates the 
voice recognition capabilities of radio networks.  The 
difficulty comes in the full implementation of the PKI 
system within NMCI and across the Navy as an enterprise. 
This is a large and formidable problem that has yet to be 
completely resolved.  The Force Net project under 
development now may answer many of these issues and its 
emphasis is primarily on the cohesion of shipboard combat 
systems first, with the integration of terrestrial networks 
coming later. Given the emphasis on shipboard systems in 
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the Force Net project and the lack of full implementation 
of PKI within NMCI, the security of NMCI is likely 
inadequate for use in the Battle Management mission area.  
Until PKI or other implementations can be deployed and 
their authenticity, integrity, or security validated it is 
doubtful that NMCI could support the Battle Management 
mission area. 
 
3. Quality of Service 
The quality of service demands for the battle 
management mission area would be as complex as the 
requirements for security. In addition, any quality of 
service scheme for battle management would also have to be 
extremely flexible. A quality of service management scheme 
would need to be responsive to commander’s intent on a real 
time basis.  This is driven by the need of the commander to 
emphasize a particular geographical area (over land, over 
water, inner zone, outer zone) or warfare specialty (anti-
submarine, anti-air) based on the developing engagement. 
This would guarantee the traffic deemed most relevant to 
the mission commander gets the priority handling to and 
from the end nodes.  The routers handling this information 
must respond to the prioritization, or reprioritization 
immediately for the network to be an effective system for 
managing an engagement that captures all the required data.  
If the scope of the data handled by the network was 
limited, a method may be found to achieve some 
prioritization. It is possible that, should the data flow 
be small enough, and the throughput large enough, quality 
of service may become irrelevant.  In this situation best 
effort service may be adequate for most transmissions.   
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Ultimately, the requirement for quality of service for 
battle management is driven by the system or systems with 
the highest quality of service need.  If any single 
application requires guaranteed service, then the only way 
to presently implement such a scheme (integrated service) 
creates single points of failure for that application. If 
the demanding application is pivotal to the battle group 
defense then an opponent need only destroy a single node to 
deny the entire battle group the advantage gained by having 
the network in the first place.  The answer is complex in 
that to resolve it there must be a resolution between 
competing demands for bandwidth “on demand” and the 
delivery of guaranteed service to specific systems.  NMCI 
will service a deployed Fleet that will be reached via 
satellite or radio WANs that presently experience limited 
bandwidth availability.  Until these issues are resolved it 
is doubtful NMCI will be suitable for the Battle Management 
mission area.  NMCI as it is being deployed now is likely 
unsuitable for this mission. 
 
H. MISSION AREA SUMMARY 
Reviewing the mission summary for NMCI we can see 
there are shortfalls in what the system needs to be to 
complete all these mission areas effectively and what is.  
The question resolves to what mission NMCI could do best 
now.  The obvious choice from the perspective of the 
existing network capability is Force Projection.  The table 














Administration Yes Yes Yes  “Best Effort” 
Force 
Projection Yes No Pending1 No Possible Solution2 
Battle 
Management No No No 
Table 8 Mission Requirements Summary Matrix 
1.  Pending certification will resolve this to a “yes” answer 
2.  A scalable solution exists to produce some level of QoS within NMCI, but is not 
implemented 
 
The Administration mission area is easily suitable as 
this mission area entails the deployment of an enterprise 
wide network.  NMCI is this very thing for the Navy. The 
mission requirements for this fall completely within the 
intent of NMCI from its very beginning and are fully 
supported in the implementation.   
Battle management is a demanding mission for which 
NMCI, or as yet any other IP network, may not yet be ready.  
The FORCENet program, under development by the Naval 
Warfare Development Center (NWDC), Space and Air Warfare 
Systems Command (SPAWAR), Naval Air Systems Command, and 
the Naval Sea Systems Command is an effort to congeal all 
of the existing tactical networks into a single coherent 
network within the shipboard units.  Once that is achieved 
the requirements to implement the Battle Management 
solutions within NMCI must be balanced with any associated 
costs and potential gains from it.  There will also need to 
be a discussion and decision as to whether this mission 
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function for a terrestrial WAN is appropriate tactically or 
organizationally within the Navy. 
The majority of the functions to support the force 
projection mission are in place within NMCI with the 
exception of quality of service. The availability needs in 
the force projection mission area are mitigated by the 
designed lead times and semi-routine nature of the mission 
in its execution.  Security certification is likely to be 
approved and the system deemed capable of supporting the 
security requirements.  A quality of service application 
within NMCI is possible using existing technologies and 
while coarse, would provide a means of segregating traffic.  
The significance of resolving the quality of service 
problem should not be underestimated.  Implementing quality 
of service within the network is what provides it with the 
self sealing qualities it needs to become a survivable 
system.  Security and availability are important, but there 
are viable existing solutions that could be applied to 
those issues within NMCI.  Quality of service can be viewed 
as the long pole in the NMCI tent.  Even if security is 
adequate, availability is high, and the mission is well 
defined, there must be a quality of service upon which the 
network can rely to allocate the available bandwidth.  
Security, availability, and mission definition serve to 
create a connection between the nodes, and predetermine a 
hierarchy of functions within the network, but quality of 
service makes the decisions of how to use the bandwidth 
that is made available. 
Examined within a purely naval frame of reference, 
security, availability, and mission are the damage control 
parties for the network, keeping it afloat when damaged by 
an attack.  Quality of service is the network captain, 
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determining how to fight the ship and complete its mission 
with what is left unscathed. 
 
I. THE NEW MISSION DEFINITION FOR NMCI 
“… amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk 
logistics…” 
Having examined the potential major mission areas for 
NMCI in the previous pages, we can now redefine the mission 
for the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet.  The previous 
discussion showed that the Force Projection mission area is 
the most applicable to NMCI as it is being deployed.  
Redefining the mission of NMCI as Force Projection will 
accomplish three very important things for the Navy.  
First, it aligns the central mission of NMCI with a core 
mission of the Navy and Marine Corps team.  
Second, it should provide near and long term economic 
advantages to the Navy by the disintermediation of the 
supply chain, placing the combat units (consumers) closer 
to their suppliers (the supply system) and shifting more 
power to the consumer organizations just as the internet 
created “reverse markets” in the business world [JH97].  
And lastly, placing the logistical and readiness functions 
within NMCI will infuse it (NMCI) within the modern Navy 
culture and begin to harness the great potential network 
centric warfare may offer.  The question in the context of 
survivability then is to define the mission essential 
functions NMCI will need to perform in this mission area to 





1. Mission Essential Functions  
The functions of NMCI under the Force Projection 
mission can, on an aggregate scale, be segmented into two 
primary functions with two sub-functions under each.  Table 
2-2 shows the concept of how these mission essential 
functions could be logically divided. In the fullest 
application of the Survivable Networks System Analysis 
method the mission essential functions should be identified 
specifically to the network, but under this examination and 
given the vast scope of this problem such a process is 
impractical within this thesis. However they can, on an 
aggregate level, be logically subdivided in this manner and 
the matrix used as a guide for the process of identifying 
and prioritizing those mission essential functions. 
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The primary functions can be categorized along the 
lines of deployed and non-deployed operations. Deployed 
operations are those functions necessary to support 
deployed units or those units with 30 days of departure. 
This roughly corresponds to the FAD designation mechanism 
that exists within the logistical system today and provides 
a division of emphasis that aligns with the operational 
concepts of the Navy and Marine Corps. Non-deployed 
operations are then the supporting functions required for 
units that are in garrison or home port and are outside of 
30 days of departure in their deployment cycle.   
 The mission essential function sub-categories are 
logistics and readiness.  The logical division here is 
based upon the high level criteria used by commanders in 
their decision process in their selection of units for any 
particular operation.  Operational commanders need to 
understand the logistical and operational readiness status 
of any combat unit in their area, what their strengths or 
deficiencies are and when they are likely to be resolved. 
Supporting commanders must have visibility of the continual 
progression of a unit’s logistical and operational 
readiness status throughout the pre-deployment cycle.  This 
allows the supporting command to emphasize the training and 
logistical requirements that are relevant to the individual 
unit and align them with the needs of the operational 
command that will gain the combat unit once it is deployed.  
These functions occur now, but not in any networked 
environment and not or any real time or near real time 
basis as would be capable under NMCI.  These two mission 
essential function sub-categories embody the Force 
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Projection mission, which is readying, deploying, and then 
supporting combat units around the globe.  
 Beneath each mission essential function sub-categories 
there are identified mission essential function data flows.  
These are meant to classify and prioritize the primary data 
flows within each mission essential function sub-
categories. The emphasis again is on the operational 
requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps team.  An 
operational commander’s concern lies in the logistical and 
operational readiness of his engaged units first.  Next is 
the readiness of his disengaged or redeploying units and 
what their needs are to return to full combat strength.  
And third he must have knowledge of the logistical and 
operational readiness of his available supporting units.  
The supporting commander’s requirements are the basically 
the same.  He must understand the status of his units in 
the pre-deployment cycle in order to provide the 
operational commander the combat units when and where he 
needs them and trained for the appropriate mission. The net 
result of structuring the NMCI mission functions in this 
way produces gains that can be realized in both deployed 
and non-deployed operations.    
 
a. Logistics 
  Operational commanders will gain from the near 
real time data provided by logistical data flows that would 
be available from this mission realignment.  Battle groups 
and Marine Expeditionary units currently deploy with their 
own networks that are linked to CONUS via satellite or 
other means.  The development of common data bases linked 
via the existing networks could feed theater commanders and 
Fleet CINCs important logistical data.  This data is 
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presently transmitted via the naval message system and a 
multiple of individuals and systems are required to collate 
and respond to those requests.  An integrated logistical 
data base riding on NMCI would minimize the operational 
units required inputs while increasing their visibility 
within the operational chain and the supply system.  At the 
same time, operational units would obtain greater 
visibility into the supply system.   
 Operational commanders would be able to view 
requisition status, priorities, and supply status in a real 
or near real time basis.  They can demand more timely 
response by creating competition for the delivery of the 
service among internal Navy providers.  Individual 
suppliers will no longer be tied to customers 
geographically as they are today.  If the required 
components can be located, the only requirement is to 
coordinate the delivery.  This method is more like the just 
in time inventory methods employed by businesses today.   
 Non-deployed commanders will also gain from the 
increased visibility within the supply system but the 
primary benefit to them will be monetary.  The gain within 
non-deployed operations will be in the efficiencies created 
by the disintermediation of the supply system.  The greater 
visibility up and down the supply chain will again create 
competitive pressure among the members of the supply 
system.  The result will be to eliminate the inefficiencies 
that exist under the hierarchical supply system of today.  
The resulting supply system will likely represent more of a 
mesh and less of a chain.   The net result for deployed and 
non-deployed units is greater supply system responsiveness 




 Operational commanders will benefit by greater 
visibility of the readiness status of their forces.  This 
data is presently collected via the Status of Readiness and 
Training System (SORTS) reporting.  The data is provided by 
the individual units but is not real time or even near real 
time.  It is taken on face value that the status is valid 
unless otherwise reported, but in times of crisis 
operational commanders may not have the time to revalidate 
the data.  A near-real-time system would provide the 
answers quickly and allow those units requiring additional 
or refresher training to have those needs identified in a 
timely manner.  Supporting commands can view the specific 
requirements of the gaining commands and train and prepare 
the deploying combat units accordingly.  This is 
particularly useful when operational requirements change or 
supporting unit are to be provide by the Reserve Force 
organization.  The supporting command can anticipate the 
gaining commands needs and plan accordingly.  Greater 
visibility will require more accurate reporting by the 
combat units, but ultimately a more clearly accurate 
assessment of unit readiness can be made.   
    
J. CONCLUSION 
 It is well understood that there are significant 
challenges in the implementation of this mission area.  
There are many applications and data bases that must be 
merged into common forms for all of this the functionality 
to emerge and provide the data flow necessary to make the 
logistical and readiness benefits achievable.  This 
transition process is, however, an implicit part of the 
implementation of any enterprise wide network such as NMCI.  
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Many businesses have engaged in this transition 
successfully, though possibly not on the scale faced by 
NMCI.   
 The significance of  the mission redefinition for  
NMCI is that it will focus the efforts of that transition 
process in a way so that when it is completed, the NMCI 
structure and function directly supports the core mission 
of the Navy and Marine Corps.  The present transition to 
NMCI is driven by the need to connect all the nodes, 
without real a great deal of consideration as to what the 
central mission of the network should be in support of the 
Navy and Marine Corps team.  
 The projection of combat force around the globe in 
support of U.S. national interests is a core mission of the 
United States Navy and Marine Corps and by logical 
extension so should it be for NMCI.  Aligning the mission 
of NMCI with the operational mission of the Navy will 
ensure NMCI becomes a viable part of the operational 
capability and will provide the greatest benefit to the 
individuals at the tip of the spear. 
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III. LEGACY SYSTEMS AND NMCI  
A. WHAT IS LEGACY AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? 
 The term legacy is used extensively with the IT 
community, but it does not necessarily mean the same thing 
to everyone.  One man’s legacy 386 computer is another 
man’s upgrade. In a very general way, the term legacy 
describes the existing components (hardware and software) 
that constitute a network (local or wide area) during a 
transition to a newer network standard. The terms “legacy” 
and “upgrade” are moving targets, but they define one 
another during a fixed period of time.  Therefore, the 
definition of what legacy is or is not must be based on a 
common reference.   
 NMCI, like many enterprise networks endeavors must 
have a fixed reference since it is an inherently moving 
target.  The definition of legacy in terms of NMCI will 
change as NMCI becomes an ongoing concern for the Navy and 
Marine Corps. Iterations of the NMCI contract could bring a 
new reference for what is legacy and what is not.  In 
essence then, legacy can then be defined in terms of 
compliance, or the lack there of, of existing application 
and network standards established by the most recent NMCI 
contract award.   
 Under this examination then, the reference would be 
the 6 October 2000 NMCI contract award by the DoN PEO-IT. 
The advantage for the Navy and Marine Corps is that those 
systems under the NMCI umbrella will be brought into 
compliance with the NMCI standards as part of the NMCI 
contract.  The disadvantage is that for an undetermined 
period of time, legacy applications and or legacy networks 
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will operate in the NMCI environment in non-compliance with 
the established standards 
 Legacy networks and applications within the Navy and 
Marine Corps are one of the specific targets of the 
transition to the NMCI environment.  NMCI was contracted as 
a service to address the specific problem of multiple 
stove-piped networks that exist within the Navy and Marine 
organizations.  Procurement of the necessary hardware and 
software for the operation of local area networks was the 
responsibility of the organizational level authority in the 
pre-NMCI environment.  Under NMCI, this is no longer the 
case.  The great success of the NMCI contract to date has 
been the consolidation of the many small organizational 
level networks under the NMCI umbrella.  Doing so has 
enhanced the overall security of the organizational and 
higher echelon level networks by producing a largely 
consistent suite of hardware and software that are 
compliant with the established security and 
interoperability standards.  
 In addition, the Navy has achieved cost savings by 
eliminating the cost of operating and maintaining these 
smaller nets.  There are, however, significant Navy and 
Marine legacy networks and applications that can not or 
will not be transitioned under the initial NMCI contract 
award.  The largest and most relevant of these networks are 
the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) and the IT-21 
standard shipboard networks [RAY01]. 
 The significance of the inclusion of Marine Corps 
Enterprise Network and the IT-21 legacy networks is that 
their presence is necessary for the larger success of NMCI, 
while their noncompliance to the standards within NMCI 
present a vulnerability that could be exploited.  These 
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existing, older systems create a tension between what is 
best for NMCI network security and what is best for the 
organizational and mission functions of the Navy and Marine 
Corps and NMCI.  The need to include these legacy networks 
and applications is driven by the operational and fiscal 
realities faced by the Navy and Marine Corps.  For NMCI to 
be effective at its mission it must include these older 
networks and the information and connectivity gained from 
them. 
 If NMCI is to be a part of the greater global 
information grid, it will certainly be required to 
interface with dissimilar network structures that may or 
may not meet the same security and application standards. 
These networks could be intra-service (MCEN and IT-21) or 
inter-service in origin. Creating NMCI as a bounded 
(closed) system would improve its security, but would 
ignore the mission functions of the other external networks 
and their relevance to the overall NMCI mission.  Doing so 
also ignores the fiscal realities of the investment made in 
those external networks and the logical goal to eventually 
merge NMCI with the other Navy and Marine networks into a 
single coherent system [RM02].   
 So, to be effective both now and in the future, NMCI 
must be able to accommodate the existence of legacy 
networks and applications in some manner and for some 
period of time for it to be mission effective.  For this 
reason, the effective transition of legacy applications and 
networks is relevant to NMCI now and in the years to come.  
The focus should be on how to transition legacy without 
making diminishing the positive effects of new standards 
for security and availability. Legacy transition for NMCI 
during the initial cutover is of particular importance 
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because it will lay the ground work for the future success 
or failure of the network.   
 
B. LEGACY TRANSITION  
Legacy systems represent a distinct challenge for any 
enterprise network implementation either in government or 
the private sector.  While there is no specific discussion 
of legacy transition under the survivable network system 
analysis method, legacy networks and applications are 
relevant to NMCI network survivability in two ways.  First, 
the requirement to operate with legacy inter-service and 
intra-service networks places NMCI squarely in the realm of 
unbounded networks as discussed by the authors of the NSA 
model. 
NMCI will not be able to impose any administrative 
control or likely possess great visibility within these 
other external networks (domains). This is effectively true 
now with NMCI interoperation with the MCEN and IT-21 which 
are defined as legacy networks under the initial NMCI 
contract award.  The IT-21 in particular and MCEN (to a 
lesser degree) networks are comprised of nodes that enter 
and exit the NMCI environment at will.  These deployable 
nodes (USN ships and USMC units) operate independently with 
other external networks and then return at their own will 
and reconnect to NMCI. There is an interface between the 
IT-21 node (ship board LAN) and NMCI, but the IT-21 node is 
still directly connected to NMCI.  The same can be said of 
the deployable NMCI seats. 
These hardware items are contractually procured for 
the purpose of moving between the NMCI and IT-21 network 
for the purpose of supporting the deployable staffs and 
aviation units. NMCI must interface with these networks to 
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be mission effective, and so by necessity rely on a trust 
relationship with them to function in a secure manner.  
This necessity effectively makes NMCI an unbounded network 
and therefore the concept of survivability is totally 
relevant to NMCI.   
Second, the size and scope of the legacy transition 
for NMCI presents a tremendous challenge to the security of 
NMCI.  At present there are approximately 37,000 legacy 
applications and 400 legacy terrestrial networks that exist 
within the Navy and Marine Corps organization [GCN02].  
Many of these legacy systems have been identified as 
mission essential by the organizations that employ them and 
are considered integral to their function and continued 
operation.  The inclusion of these and other legacy 
networks undermines the “hard target” approach that has 
been taken in the design and implementation of NMCI 
security. 
 
1. Legacy Networks   
Recall that the NMCI security architecture is enclave- 
based, employing the concept of defense-in-depth at each 
using the same means of perimeter defense at each layer. 
The inclusion of these legacy networks produces potential 
soft spots in the defense in depth concept by taking 
software and hardware that is known or assumed to possess 
security vulnerabilities (by its definition as a legacy 
system) and attaching it to a more hardened network through 
valid interfaces.  The net effect is to present an intruder 
the opportunity to compromise the NMCI environment via 
legitimate channels after penetrating an assumed weaker 
defensive perimeter.  At the end of the day the net 
effectiveness of the defensive mechanisms for NMCI are no 
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better than the weakest link in the perimeter.  In the case 
of NMCI that weakest link is the attached legacy network or 
application.  Attaching NMCI to these other legacy networks 
weakens the enclave strategy and hence the security of the 
entire NMCI network.  
The problem for NMCI is that it must operate with 
these other networks to be mission effective in spite of 
their potential weaknesses.  Consequently then, additional 
measures should be taken to mitigate the weakening of the 
overall network security by legacy participation with NMCI.  
The network survivability analysis method can be applied to 
NMCI and the transition of legacy to assist with this 
problem. 
 
2. Legacy Applications 
At present there are 37,000 identified legacy 
applications that must be dealt with by the NMCI ISF.  
While it is unlikely that all of these applications will be 
transitioned into NMCI, certainly a portion of them will be 
required.  The requirement will be driven by the mission 
essential functions that the legacy application provides to 
the organization.  Some systems, regardless of their age 
and format, will not or cannot be transitioned in a timely 
manner.  The consequence is then that some of these will 
persist within or attached to NMCI in some manner. For the 
Navy and Marine organizations to benefit there must be the 
greatest achievable range of connectivity.  This 
requirement for connectivity to these “mission essential” 
applications creates vulnerabilities in the same manner as 
the inclusion of the legacy networks, which may contain 
some of these legacy applications.   
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The inclusion of these legacy applications undermines 
the hard-target approach to the enclave security 
architecture.  Building a new network that includes older 
software that does not meet the newer security standards 
reduces the overall effectiveness of the integrated 
defense.  The implications and net effect for these legacy 
applications on network security is the same as the 
inclusion of legacy networks.  The newer standard will be 
only as good as the legacy applications.   
An alternative to the inclusion of legacy applications 
within NMCI would be to host them separately in a separate 
networked environment.  A “quarantine” strategy is being 
examined for the hosting of legacy applications that are 
considered too insecure or too difficult to make compatible 
for inclusion with NMCI. 
The quarantine concept is based upon the construction 
of a shadow network, external to NMCI, which provides users 
with access to those mission essential applications that 
cannot be hosted internally to NMCI.   The quarantine 
method, while providing access, runs counter to two of the 
basic tenets of the NMCI contract, the elimination of non-
standard networks and the achievement of total 
interoperability. The NMCI services contract was intended 
to and has performed well at consolidating the disparate 
networks operated by organizational level units. 
Producing a shadow network to host these legacy 
applications reverses that successful trend.  In addition, 
the shadow network produces a security risk at some level.  
The thin client machines required to access the legacy 
applications would undoubtedly be co-located with the other 
NMCI hosts.  Reliance on an “air gap” between the two 
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networks may appear to be adequate insurance against 
compromise, but in the end it is still exploitable. 
Social engineering attacks are commonly used to avoid 
the internal security measures of contemporary networks and 
there is no reason to believe that this tactic could not be 
successfully employed against the shadow networks and then 
ultimately NMCI [TR02].  In the effort to accommodate users 
the undercurrent of legacy applications could re-grow the 
networks eliminated by the services contract while creating 
a security weakness that has very little visibility. 
This is completely contrary to the two primary goals 
for the NMCI services contract which are the reduction of 
stove-piped networks and cost savings. Even if the security 
implications are completely ignored it is difficult to 
accept the obvious reduction in dollar savings to the Navy 
and Marine Corps as a result of this option of legacy 
inclusion. Given the Congressional oversight of NMCI to 
date, creating a significant funding requirement for a 
shadow network over the long or short term could endanger 
the existence of the network more effectively than any 
potential intrusion.   
There are still other alternative strategies for 
legacy applications that can be considered.  All of the 
legacy applications could be excluded until they are “de-
loused” of problems or validated to meet security 
requirements.  While this method places greater emphasis on 
security, it assumes that all legacy applications are of 
equal importance.  Unless the relevance of the individual 
application to the core NMCI mission functions is 
considered, there is the likelihood that the selection and 
sequence of applications for transition will be haphazard, 
inefficient or ineffective when compared to what the 
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mission essential functions are within NMCI.  The result is 
that the emphasis of the transition could then be less than 
optimal, producing greater costs and more time delays than 
would otherwise be necessary.   
Alternatively all legacy applications could be 
included in NMCI in a “Mariel Boat Lift” manner, bringing 
all of them into NMCI for convenience and then attempting 
to find the bad apples as you go, de-lousing them inside 
NMCI.  This is an equally inefficient and far more risky 
strategy.  Assuming that all the applications could 
function within the NMCI environment, which arguable they 
all may not, the likelihood of there being significant 
exploitable vulnerabilities in these applications is quite 
high.  Accepting such a tremendous risk for a network that 
has been deemed mission essential by the CNO seems very 
unsound.  Again, ignoring the security implications, this 
method of dealing with legacy applications does nothing to 
discourage their continued use and undermines the cost 
saving strategy of the NMCI contract.  There is no leverage 
on the user to bring his application into compliance with 
the NMCI security and application standards if they are 
allowed to continue to function as they did before NMCI. 
The Mariel boat lift approach is likely too great an 
accommodation and takes tremendous risks with the security 
of NMCI, running counter to the business and security 
models that are at the heart of the enterprise 
implementation. 
Legacy applications and networks are essential to the 
NMCI transition because they contain valuable information 
that is relevant to the entire Navy and Marine Corps 
enterprise as an ongoing concern.  The information they 
contain and the connectivity to the force that they provide 
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are extremely valuable to the first iteration of the NMCI 
contract.  At some level they require inclusion until a 
time that these older networks and applications can be 
brought in line with the desired standards for NMCI.  So 
then, if legacy must be included, the importance should be 
placed on choosing those legacy networks and applications 
that directly support the core mission functions of NMCI 
and the Navy and Marine Corps, and then applying 
survivability methods to mitigate the inclusion of these 
less secure networks and applications within NMCI.  The 
survivable network analysis method provides some of the 
answers to how to organize the transition process and then 
implement survivability into NMCI.  The survivable network 
analysis method will at least mitigate an inclusionary 
approach toward legacy systems. 
 
C. NMCI TRANSITION ORGANIZATIONAL METHODS 
 Before examining the concept of a transition under the 
SNA method, other more traditional methods for the 
organization of a transition should be examined.  Looking 
at these methods will provide some background for 
comparison to the NSA method to determine the advantages of 
each.   
 
1. Transition by Claimant 
 This method is focused on the command (or claimant 
depending on level chosen) and the functions therein that 
are considered essential for the continued operation of 
that unit, staff, or other type organization. The intent is 
to keep the organizational level functions intact and 
operating while retaining the ability to service the 
demands of the immediate superior, subordinate, and any 
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supported commands. This method of transition allows 
commands to move into the NMCI environment as a whole 
functional organization.  Legacy networks are addressed on 
an individual basis, being assumed piecemeal as the total 
unit enters NMCI. Legacy applications are addressed in a 
parallel manner by separate elements of the NMCI transition 
team.  Each application is categorized by functional area 
and then the transition team determines if there is a 
suitable substitute or if the individual application can be 
transitioned via an application interface [RM02].  The 
advantage of this method is that it allows units to enter 
NMCI intact, with all of their core functions operating 
within NMCI.  Unit effectiveness is retained because the 
organizational functions are consistent across the unit 
level enterprise.  There would likely be no two-tiered 
arrangement where some command level functions are within 
NMCI and some without.  Unit level costs for support are 
reduced and unit functional capability may be achieved in a 
single transitional period. The emphasis in this format is 
on the prioritization and selection of the Navy and Marine 
units for transition at each level of the command 
structure. 
 The disadvantages to the claimant organizational 
method is that there is no consideration to mission 
function of NMCI and the role or the contribution of the 
individual unit (and its inherent legacy applications) to 
that mission function or functions.  The emphasis is merely 
on unit cohesion and communication with superior and 
subordinate units regardless of what the intended purpose 
of that communication is. 
 While organizational cohesion is important, retaining 
the cohesion of mission function is equally important and 
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could potentially be ignored under this scheme.  This 
method is also iterative at some level.  If units are 
chosen based on claimancy, and legacy applications reviewed 
in the same manner, the potential exists for discovering a 
more suitable substitute application after some number of 
units have already been completed. 
 The result is that any previous claimant organization 
that was transitioned may have to transition an 
application(s) a second time after completing the initial 
cut over into NMCI.  This remedial transition process is 
inefficient and likely increases cost associated with the 
transition.  The result may be that once the transition of 
the total force is complete there will be a laundry list of 
required remedial transition efforts to put the entire 
enterprise on exactly the same application footing, which 
was a primary objective of the initial cutover process.    
 
2. Transition by Warfare Specialty 
 Many of the organizational lines of responsibility 
within the Navy are drawn along the lines of warfare 
specialty.  This method of transition would provide for a 
cohesive move of any particular warfare area into NMCI as a 
community of interest.  This method would move larger 
segments of the Navy organization into NMCI at one time but 
would require more coordination for the actual cutover.  
This would delay the specific transition date at the unit 
level; however the delay would be off-set by the resulting 
cohesiveness achieved within that community by resolving 
the community’s legacy application transition in aggregate 
vice on an individual basis.  The advantage of this method 
is that larger communities would transition in as a single 
event, placing more emphasis on mission function within the 
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communities and potentially better serving more of the 
mission function of NMCI and the Navy than a claimant 
approach.  The emphasis in this format then is on the 
prioritization and selection of warfare specialties for 
transition. 
 The disadvantage of a warfare specialty approach to 
transition is that the majority of the Navy’s warfare units 
(surface ships and submarines) are under the IT-21 
umbrella, a program separate unto itself specifically 
identified as a legacy system by the NMCI contract.  IT-21 
will likely merge with NMCI in the future, but to remain 
effective the surface units should retain a common network 
footing until the essentially terrestrial, non-mobile NMCI 
network is complete. NMCI was not intended for surface 
units, but for shore-based organizations. 
 This approach also ignores the area where the majority 
of the legacy applications reside, in the support 
organizations of the Navy and Marine Corps.   Transitioning 
the warfare units first would leave the vast majority of 
the legacy applications and many legacy networks untouched 
until the final stages of the transition period.  While 
being a mission oriented approach to transition it is 
uncertain whether the mission areas addressed are relevant 
to the mission functions of NMCI.  In the end the mission 
functions transitioned may not be the mission functions 
supported or desired within the NMCI environment.    
    
3. Transition by Navy Region 
 Many administrative functions are organized along Navy 
region lines around the globe.  Arbitrary functional lines 
of responsibility are drawn to separate control between 
fleet commanders, theater commanders, and regional 
  90
commanders.  These lines of separation provide for the 
smooth administrative function and allow the individuals 
responsible the benefit of understanding where their 
authority begins and ends for the myriad of administrative 
functions they must perform.  The advantages for this 
method are achieved in the cohesive and comprehensive 
nature of the transition by region and the multiple 
functions contained within them. 
 Many training and logistical functions occur within a 
particular Navy Region.  Most Navy regions contain large 
numbers of combat and support organizations that perform 
services for one another and or deploy and operate together 
underway.  Organizing by Navy region would produce a 
cohesive subnet within the Navy as each region is 
transitioned.  In addition, the functions contained within 
Navy regions are similar, so the transition of one region 
would likely be very similar to another. Though there may 
be relevant and significant differences, the composition of 
the major Navy regions is essentially the same.  
Efficiencies produced by the transition could be realized 
on a regional scale and the lessons learned applied to the 
transition of successive regions. The emphasis in this 
format is on the prioritization and selection of the 
individual Navy regions for transition. 
 The disadvantages of transition by Navy region are 
similar to transition by claimant or warfare specialty.   
First, choosing a region ignores the significance of 
mission function within the NMCI network.  The advantage is 
gained when the mission function is distributed across the 
largest possible number of nodes.  Segmenting the 
transition by region delays the ultimate payoff until all 
the Navy regions are completed.  In addition, there may 
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likely be a remedial transition process once all the 
regions are complete to assure that all of the regions are 
on the same application and security standards.  Given that 
the denominator for the transition in the Navy region the 
remedial effort could be significant.  The additional cost 
and time to complete the effort while not maximizing the 
mission effectiveness of NMCI could be significant.     
Each of these organizational methods for has been 
applied across a very wide variety of projects within the 
Navy and Marine Corps.  The shortcoming of these plans is 
that they ignore the potential mission capabilities and 
limitations of the NMCI network. In each of these methods, 
the NMCI mission is a secondary consideration in the 
implementation and the primary focus is on the needs or 
requirements of the Navy organizational level that is being 
transitioned.  While any of these methods could, in the 
long term, transition the legacy applications and networks, 
none of them attempt to optimize the employment of the NMCI 
structure and function to the war fighting needs of the 
Navy and Marine Corps. 
 
D. NMCI LEGACY TRANSITION  
It should be noted at this point that the majority, if 
not the entirety of the discussion pertaining to legacy 
within NMCI references deals with applications and not 
networks.  It can be assumed this is because the vast 
majority of the smaller local and base area networks can 
and will be assumed by the NMCI primary contractor at AOR, 
and the hardware completely replaced by the cutover.  The 
major legacy networks, MCEN and IT-21 are specifically 
identified in the NMCI contract and as such it is assumed 
they will likely be the only remaining legacy networks once 
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the NMCI transition is complete.  This assumption holds 
true only if the operational functions of the Navy are 
ignored.  There will still be significant assets employed 
by the LINK 16, LINK 11, CEC, and voice nets. 
That said it is quite possible that some other smaller 
terrestrial legacy nets may continue to exist after cutover 
is complete.  If so, the implications of their continued 
existence is relevant but can not be specifically explored 
until such time as the transition is complete.   The NMCI 
guidance on transition is explicitly application oriented 
and the relevance to the networks can only be inferred from 
those references.   
The Navy Marine Corps Legacy Transition Guide, version 
2.1, dated 26 October 2001 is the NMCI Program Management 
Office plan for the transition of legacy applications into 
the NMCI environment.  The specific requirements and 
procedures needed to transition and support a legacy 
application into the NMCI are contained within this 
document.  Examining the process of transition should then 
demonstrate the focus of the transition plan by the NMCI 
PMO and how the transition for the Navy is organized.  The 
end to end process for the transition of legacy 




Figure 4 Legacy End to End Process 
  
The transition process is initiated by the individual 
command as a preparatory to assumption of responsibility 
(AOR) by the contractor and final cutover into the NMCI 
environment. AOR is the period when the contractor assumes 
responsibility of managing the existing Navy IT assets for 
the Navy organization.  Cutover is the point when all the 
existing Navy IT systems are replaced with contracted 
hardware and software. 
The customer organizations are primarily responsible 
for identifying and gathering data on the requirements for 
the transition of legacy applications into NMCI [LTG01].  
The generic timeline for this process from beginning to end 
is estimated at 180 days.  The process begins with the 
collection of data on all legacy applications within the 
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command using some standardized tools provided by the ISF.  
It is primarily the customer organizations responsibility 
to rationalize and prioritize the legacy applications to be 
transitioned into NMCI.  Failure to perform this function 
properly or failure to identify critical applications in a 
timely manner will result in those applications not being 
migrated into NMCI by the cutover date. 
The implication of this is that the customer 
organization must then pay for the specific application to 
be transitioned.  Customers are also encouraged to 
eliminate redundant, unnecessary, or non-standard 
applications [LTG01].  This encouragement comes without any 
metrics for deciding what applications are redundant or 
unnecessary.  The customer must make these initial 
determinations.  When the ISF and PMO personnel arrive on 
site there are additional data collection and 
classification of the legacy applications that occurs.    
From this point, the responsibilities fall to either 
the PMO or the ISF, either individually or jointly, to 
complete the work necessary to transition and certify the 
applications for operations within NMCI based on the input 
from the customer organization.  Overlaid with this unit 
level function for transition is the higher level guidance 
from the DON CIO’s office for the elimination of legacy 
applications.  
Appendix E of the Navy Marine Corps Legacy Transition 
Guide is a Memorandum for Distribution form the DON CIO for 
the management of Department of the Navy Software 
Applications dated 23 April 2001.  The memorandum directs 
all of the Navy’s Claimant organizations to reduce the 
number of duplicative, obsolete, and non-secure 
applications.  This process is to be performed by all 
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Department of the Navy organizations.  The memorandum 
outlines the need to create a structured enterprise IT 
architecture along functional lines to ensure the 
horizontal integration of business practices [LTG01]. 
The DON CIO memorandum references the Navy Marine 
Corps Legacy Application Transition Guide for the specific 
processes to be performed for the transition process in 
support of the Claimants efforts to reduce the number of 
legacy applications.  With these two documents as reference 
we can step back and look at what the transition plan is in 
the larger context of NMCI.   
 
E. THE CURRENT PLAN FOR LEGACY TRANSITION 
 The Navy Marine Corps Legacy Transition Guide and the 
included DON CIO memorandum of 23 April 2001 combine to 
show the organizational plan and emphasis for the 
transition into the NMCI environment.  The process of 
identification and prioritization has been largely 
delegated to the unit or organizational level.  The 
customers, through their Claimant organizations, inform the 
DON CIO of what they need within NMCI to be fully 
functional.  The DON CIO will then assimilate, along 
functional lines, those applications that are not obsolete, 
not insecure, and not redundant. 
 The intent is to produce horizontal integration among 
communities of interest (divided along functional lines) 
and the desired standardization and interoperability across 
claimants for each functional area.  This transitional 
approach is an exhaustive bottom up process that is focused 
on claimants and their interactions with their subordinate 
organizations. While the intent is to achieve horizontal 
integration of claimants along functional lines, the 
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transition appears focused along traditional vertical 
organizational lines. 
 Placing the majority of the responsibility for 
identifying and prioritizing legacy applications at the 
unit level emphasizes the unit level functions.  The hope 
is that if the unit level transition is done correctly, all 
the pieces will fall in place together when the transition 
is completed.  If the effort is focused on the unit level, 
when do the intra unit functions get emphasized?  The 
assumption is that they will be achieved in the aggregate 
as the entire enterprise comes together.  This assumption 
may not be valid, however, and could result in gaps or 
incompatibility between Claimants. To be successful, this 
assumption relies on the idea that all units will identify 
all of the legacy applications in the same manner for 
prioritization for transition.  This appears to be a very 
large assumption given the number of organizations being 
transitioned.  
The vertical emphasis of the transition can be seen in 
how the PEO IT Office is tracking the NMCI transition.   
The figure below is from a briefing from the PEO IT office 
dated 12 April 2001.  This information was presented as an 
update of the transition process and illustrates the 





























Figure 5 Current Transition Plan 
 
The transition plan is organized along claimant lines of 
responsibility and their subordinate organizations when 
examining the problem of legacy application transition. The 
existing plan focuses on organizational structure and 
doesn’t specifically address the linkages that exist 
between claimants in a primary way, only as a secondary 
event.  The potential exists for the lateral interaction 
between claimants to be missed; resulting in remedial 
effort to produce the required functionality after 
transition is complete.  Given the structure of the NMCI 
contract award, this would likely result in additional 
expense.  To prevent such an occurrence an organizational 
method for the transition must be chosen that cuts across 
claimants.   
CLAIMANT SITES Original AOR Date Projected AOR date Actual AOR Date STATUS
NAVAIR
NAS Pax River 15-Dec-00 12-Jan-01 12-Jan-01 COMPLETED
NAWCWD China Lake 15-Jan-01 16-Jan-01 16-Jan-01 COMPLETED
NAWCWD Point Mugu 15-Jan-01 16-Jan-01 16-Jan-01 COMPLETED
NAWC-TSD Orlando 15-Jan-01 16-Jan-01 16-Jan-01 COMPLETED
NAEC Lakehurst 1-Feb-01 1-Feb-01 1-Feb-01 COMPLETED
NAWCWD White Sands 1-Mar-01 1-Mar-01 1-Mar-01 COMPLETED
NATEC North Island 1-Mar-01 2-Apr-01 2-Apr-01 COMPLETED
RESFOR
NAF Washington 15-Dec-00 3-Jan-01 3-Jan-01 COMPLETED
NARC Lemoore 15-Jan-01 2-Feb-01 5-Feb-01 COMPLETED
VFC13 Fallon 15-Jan-01 2-Feb-01 5-Feb-01 COMPLETED
NAS Atlanta 1-Mar-01 9-Mar-01 9-Mar-01 COMPLETED
REDCOM South HQ 1-Mar-01 21-Mar-01 23-Mar-01 COMPLETED
N&MCRC Dallas/FT Worth 1-Mar-01 21-Mar-01 23-Mar-01 COMPLETED
N&MCRC  Waco TX 2-Apr-01 2-Apr-01 2-Apr-01 COMPLETED
N&MCRC Shreveport (Bossier 
city) LA 2-Apr-01 2-Apr-01 2-Apr-01 COMPLETED
N&MCRC Austin TX 3-Apr-01 3-Apr-01 ON TRACK
N&MCRC Little Rock AR 3-Apr-01 3-Apr-01 ON TRACK
N&MCRC San Antonio TX 5-Apr-01 5-Apr-01 ON TRACK
N&MCRC Tulsa (Broken Arrow) 
OK 5-Apr-01 5-Apr-01 ON TRACK
NRC Harlingen 6-Apr-01 6-Apr-01 ON TRACK





The transition of legacy networks and applications 
should be approached in the same manner as the evaluation 
of the entire network system, from the view of mission 
function.  From reviewing the steps included in the legacy 
transition guide and the memorandum from the DON CIO it 
appears the NMCI mission is not a primary consideration in 
the legacy transition plan. The unit level organizational 
format employed was responsible for bounding the legacy 
problem but it is unlikely this approach will help solve 
it.  Therefore, another approach is required.   
The mission function of NMCI is the variable that 
should determine which applications are transitioned or 
migrated to NMCI first.  The selection of mission function 
is relevant because it is central to the concept of 
survivable network systems analysis method. As previously 
discussed, the NSA method is completely relevant because of 
the need to include legacy in NMCI during the transition 
and in the future.  Handling the triage of the legacy 
applications with a mission oriented focus will cull the 
large number of applications of a basis that is relevant to 
the entire Navy and Marine enterprise, the mission of the 
NMCI network, and the war fighting mission of the Navy and 
Marine Corps.  This is the most immediate problem to be 
handled by the PEO IT and the NMCI ISF. 
The problems of security and interoperability are 
significant and relevant that will require considerable 
time and effort.  They are in this case, however, secondary 
to the prioritization and focus of the transition efforts. 
If applications are transitioned in a random manner that 
does not consider the mission function of the network, the 
result is secure and interoperable applications on an 
individual or disaggregate level. The applications could be 
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safe and functional, but their contribution to the core 
missions of the Navy and Marine Corps team will be more 
obtuse.  Interoperability and security must be dealt with 
for each application migrated into NMCI. 
It is therefore more logical to spend the time, money 
and effort on transitioning and making secure those legacy 
applications that will serve your core mission functions 
first, and others that do not at a later time.  Doing so 
will optimize the transition effort while building in the 
survivability characteristics needed to improve the system 
security required by the inclusion of such legacy 
applications.  The same concept applies to the connection 
to external networks in the unbounded environment that NMCI 
will operate in.  The effort should be on the network 
connections that serve the core mission functions of NMCI 
and the Navy and Marine Corps first, and the organizational 
functions second. 
The more significant factor to the success of the 
entire enterprise network is the mission functionality 
provided by the transitioned legacy applications and 
networks and not the organization or organizations that 
possess them.  Once the applications are selected for 
transition based on mission function, more efficient and 
effective methods for implementing the transition can be 
examined.   
 
F. DESIGN METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING LEGACY APPLICATION 
TRANSITION  
The entire NMCI transition process can be viewed in 
terms of software design methodologies.  There exist a 
large number of independent and interdependent requirements 
that must be organized and given cohesion to form the 
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complex, functioning system know as NMCI.  Software design 
methodologies attempt to break the desired functions down 
into their simplest components and then, in a building 
block fashion, reassemble the functions to constitute a 
fully functional system of interoperable modules, each of 
which retains functionality that serves to produce the 
objective results (mission function) desired from the 
entire system.   
Placing the NMCI mission function as the determinate 
for the entrance of legacy applications and networks we can 
now examine how, in terms of design methods for 
implementation, the current transition is designed and how 
the transition could be designed under the NSA method.      
     
G. THE CURRENT TRANSITION; GRAND DESIGN METHOD 
The current transition plan can be likened to the 
grand design method of software development.  Under the 
grand design concept, requirements are captured up front 
and the total system designed in a single process.  This 
process is illustrated in the figure below.  The Grand 
Design method is a sequential method that relies heavily on 
the understanding of the system requirements at the 











Figure 6 Grand Design Method 
Requirement Design Implementation 
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This method provides good results if from the start 
the requirements are well known and all processes fully 
understood.  The difficulty with the grand design method 
occurs when there are functions or processes that are 
overlooked or under appreciated during the requirements 
development phase.  The vertical emphasis of the current 
NMCI transition plan, organized along lines of claimants, 
does not emphasize the requirements for horizontal 
interactions between claimants and their subordinate 
organizations directly when examining the problem of legacy 
application transition. While meeting the need to connect 
all the Navy and Marine “nodes”, the potential exists for 
remedial action by the contractor to provide the 
functionality missed in the transition phase of NMCI roll 
out. This requirement translates into lost capability and 
additional cost. 
The implementation of the NMCI transition via the 
grand design method should meet the NMCI mission of 
connectivity.  The unintended consequence of this method, 
however, is that the PEO IT office is left with an 
extremely large problem of how to separate the roughly 
37,000 legacy applications [GCN02].   The application of 
the same grand design methodology to these legacy 
applications would require the NMCI ISF to determine how to 
transition all the applications in one very large process. 
While not being a single process, it is a series of 
repetitive efforts done based upon claimant and ignores the 
mission function the application serves within the network.   
This has proven to be impractical if even doable at all.  
The transition efforts may be focused on applications that 
have little or no consequence to the mission function of 
NMCI. 
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Implementing the legacy application transition along 
the same claimant lines is a possibility, but it would 
require claimants to be prioritized among one another by 
some metric.  If an agreeable measure was at hand, 
transitioning a single claimant at a time ignores the 
horizontal integration that some of the legacy applications 
may possess.  The true benefits of the legacy application 
transition would not be realized until all claimants that 
have a horizontal interaction with the legacy application 
have completed transition.  This is at best inefficient.  
Certainly the benefits of the legacy transition will be 
wanted sooner rather than later.  
When viewed in the context of the survivable network 
analysis (SNA), the grand design method ignores the core 
mission functions of the Navy and Marine Corps.  Recall 
that for a network to be survivable it must continue to 
provide its primary mission functions even when suffering 
from an attack or a component failure.  The grand design 
method does not support this requirement.  The grand design 
method attempts to capture, design and implement all 
mission functions in a single effort.  This implementation 
method assumes all missions are of equal importance, which 
is known not to be the case. 
To meet the survivability requirement under the SNA 
method, the implementation of legacy applications needs 
focus on the mission prioritization of the network, just as 
in the application selection process. Implementing the 
transition to meet this demand can be enhanced by the 
employment of an iterative design method know as the spiral 
design method.   When the spiral design method is coupled 
with the concept of survivable network analysis method the 
result will be a layered approach that build that 
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transitions the mission essential applications and networks 
first. 
 
H. TRANSITION UNDER THE NSA CONCEPT; SPIRAL DESIGN METHOD 
The spiral design method is meant to provide a series 
of iterative software developments for an application.  The 
concept is used in the development of weapon systems 
software because of the complexity of the processes and the 
coupling that often exists between them.  The advantage of 
this method is that the software functions can be designed 
in a logical series of iterations of the same process. 
Successive iterations of the design process increase the 
complexity and functionality in a layered manner.  As each 
layer is completed it can be checked for errors and the 
functions validated more easily because of the smaller size 
of the code modules.  Successive layers can then be 
completed and checked for function more accurately because 
of the understanding gained from the previous iteration of 
the software.  It is essentially a building block approach 
to the software development process.  
The application of the spiral development method to 
NMCI transition could provide the NMCI ISF and PEO IT a 
building block approach to the construction of the mission 
functions for NMCI. The spiral method creates a logical 
division of function and complexity so that the relevant 
warfare commanders in coordination with the PEO IT can 
select and prioritize the legacy applications to be 
transitioned in a manner that supports the primary mission 
of the network and the relevant core mission of the Navy 
and Marine Corps team.  The logical division of functions 
can be viewed as the separations of mission essential and 
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non mission essential functions to be performed within 
NMCI.   
  The present transition is not oriented in a manner 
that truly supports the war fighting mission of the Navy 
and Marine Corps.  To date the focus is on connectivity. In 
chapter two of this thesis the case was made for a mission 
focus for the NMCI transition to pursue, that of Force 
Projection. The suggestion in chapter two was that NMCI 
should focus first on the logistics mission and then upon 
readiness.  Applying these mission areas as the focus to 
the spiral development of NMCI will build the functionality 
within NMIC consistent with the layering of mission 
essential functions under the NSA method.  The net result 
of this could be as each spiral is completed, the total 
force gains mission functionality that is relevant the core 
mission functions and capabilities of the network that are 



















Figure 7 Spiral Design Method for NMCI Implementation 
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1. The First Spiral; Roll Out (Connectivity) 
The starting point for any spiral application must be 
established in some way, either a date or a capability.  
The reference line or starting point for the spiral method 
of legacy transition can be viewed as the contract award 
date.  The transition steps taken to date can be viewed as 
the first iteration of the spiral method. As the 
transitions progresses, more Navy and Marine organizations 
are brought into the NMCI environment. 
To date approximately 15 percent of the Navy has been 
transitioned into NMCI [RM02]. Once complete, all the Navy 
organizations will have achieved connectivity to NMCI at 
some level.  The problem now facing the PEO office is what 
to do with the extensive collection of legacy applications.  
The answer to this problem is to first determine the 
primary mission for NMCI and second to prioritize within 
that mission the most significant function.  As previously 
discussed it is my belief that the Force Projection mission 
is the most relevant to NMCI.  Within the Force Projection 
mission, logistics is the most significant function and 
should be transitioned first.   
While only a limited percentage of the units have been 
transitioned to NMCI, it may still be possible to inject 
the mission emphasis into the transition.  With 15 percent 
of the targeted units cut over, there is still 85 percent 
that have not.  The difficulty at this point may the 
organizational resistance to realigning the transition. It 
may, from an organizational view be better to wait until 
cutover is complete before this approach is applied but, 
the gains in efficiency that could be achieved may outweigh 
the changing of horses at this time in the transition.  The 
time lost would be equal to only that required to define 
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their mission focus and then redirect the teams and their 
efforts for the transition of the legacy applications.  
Some organizations may be delayed in their date of 
transition but the mission functionality gained from the 
reorganization should outweigh the effort required.  At the 
end of the day, should the transition not be refocused, it 
would not preclude the execution of the second spiral, that 
of implementing the logistical mission functions within 
NMCI. 
 
2. The Second Spiral: Logistics 
The transition of the logistical system legacy 
applications is driven by the pivotal influence of 
logistics on conflicts.  Before September 11th 2001, the 
United States had not fought a conflict on home ground 
since the Civil War.  In every other conflict since then we 
have had to support our forces from afar, necessitating an 
extensive supply network. While the war on terrorism is 
being waged both at home and abroad, the importance of the 
logistical mission cannot be understated. The Battles of 
the Pacific and Atlantic during World War II show how the 
logistical battle must be fought and won first, before 
combat forces can engage with the hope of prevailing.  The 
logistical mission within the U.S. in support of the 
current war is no less important.  Successful response to 
terrorist events within CONUS can be equally enhanced by a 
logistical mission focus within NMCI.  This necessity of 
logistics for effective Force Projection is then obvious.  
The additional benefit to this is the coupling that exists 
between with logistical mission functionality and the 
capabilities of COTS applications prevalent in the 
commercial sector.   
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The logistical functions of the Navy and Marine Corps 
share the greatest commonality with the private sector and 
present the most likely candidates for transition to NMCI. 
The logistical mission function is in essence an extremely 
large inventory and delivery system.  The supply system is 
comprised of a hierarchical collection of supply points, 
each possessing a similar stock and line item inventory 
dependent on where they lie in the hierarchy of the supply 
system or where they exist in the geographical terms to 
those units they support.  The supply system also provides 
a delivery mechanism, either DoD or commercial, for all of 
its customers.  For this they possess a shipping and 
delivery system to ensure the material that is ordered 
arrives to the customer and can be traced while enroute.   
Neither the inventory nor delivery system is unique to the 
Navy or the federal government. 
There are several major commercial companies that are 
capable of performing either of these functions.  Because 
these functions are prevalent in the private sector they 
offer tremendous opportunity for expedient transition or 
migration to newer software.  They may also offer the 
greatest cost saving to be found in the implementation.  
The private sector software applications and organizational 
scheme can be emulated and could produce greater efficiency 
than is presently available within the supply chain.  
Transition of logistical legacy applications takes 
advantage of the commonality with contemporary business 
practices and the relative maturity of the field of 
software development for inventory management and control 
and delivery.  Transition of the logistical legacy 
applications also fulfills a primary mission function of 
the NMCI mission of Force Projection, which directly 
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supports a core mission function of the Navy and Marine 
Corps team. 
 
3. The 3rd Spiral: Readiness 
The third iteration of the spiral design should be for 
the transition of the readiness relevant legacy 
applications.  The most significant of the readiness 
applications is the Status of Readiness and Training System 
(SORTS).  This database system holds readiness data for 
every active and reserve component organization. This 
application is not yet web enabled but could likely be.  
This program may even be easily migrated into new software 
given that it is essentially a simple data base 
application.  The SORTS application is however just the tip 
of the readiness iceberg.  There are tremendous amounts of 
information that flow from detachments, squadrons, ships, 
air wings, and entire battle groups on a daily basis to a 
large number of Navy organizations around the world.  
Aviation Maintenance Readiness Reports (AMRR), Daily 
Operations Summaries (OPSUM), Logistical Requests (LOGREQ), 
and Casualty Reports (CASREP) are just a few of the data 
messages that are required on a daily or routine basis to 
the many supporting commands spread around the globe.    
Some of these messages contain both readiness and 
logistical data.  All of these traverse the Defense Message 
System (DMS) and arrive at their destination with data that 
is time late, but time critical.  The migration of this 
data into a web environment would allow the support 
organizations to view it in real time.  The information 
could be hosted in onboard (primary) and ashore (backup) 
data bases and accessed by the reporting unit when updates 
are required.  Hosting the data on shore would reduce the 
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requirement for transmission over the DMS for routine 
information and given CONUS or other users the ability to 
access the data easily through existing web methods.  At a 
minimum, organizations within CONUS would no longer require 
a DMS transmission from deployed units.  Deployed units 
would require only the bandwidth necessary for updates.  
Fleet and theater commanders slated to gain the 
participating units can view their readiness status and 
anticipate their needs or assess their ability to 
participate in operations on a near real time basis.  The 
visibility of the readiness data throughout the deployment 
cycle gives commanders at all levels a greater ability to 
assess the capability of their units on a near real time 
basis.  The availability of readiness data within NMCI 
again supports its primary mission of Force Projection and 
provides Navy and Marine Leadership with near real time 
data in support of a core mission function for the Navy and 
Marine Corps. 
 
4. Spiral Sub-Flows 
A further advantage of the spiral method over grand 
design is the granularity to which it can be employed.  
Larger processes can be decomposed into a series of smaller 
spirals or related steps.  The logistical spiral may be 
more accurately portrayed as a series of smaller spirals 
focused on a particular hull type, type/model/series 
aircraft, or carrier battle group.  For example, the 
aviation supply functions for the Fleet could be 
transitioned by aircraft type (F-18, F-14, H-60F/H/B) or 
functional organization (CVBG, ARG, CVAW, MAG).   These 
smaller iterations could be viewed as sub-flows in the 
larger context of the transition of the Force Projection 
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mission legacy applications.   While the sub-flows would be 
essentially vertical (within a single community, 
type/model/series aircraft, hull type, etc) they would 
possess more focus in application than the larger flows 
developed under the grand design method of transition 
employed today.  The focus of the smaller sub-flows is the 
same, transition of the logistical mission function.  
Figure 3-5 illustrates the iterative cycles for the force 












Figure 8 The Spiral Method View of Force Projection 
 
By the same token, this method can be applied to NMCI in an 
aggregate manner as more missions are required of NMCI.  
Successive spirals could add mission functionality in the 
same layered manner.  The advantage again being that those 
responsible for implementing the functionality can separate 
the implementation in a logical manner and plan the 
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progression of functions in a manner that supports the 
larger mission requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps.  
 
I. CONCLUSION 
To take NMCI to the level of supporting the war 
fighting capability of the Navy and Marine Corps there 
needs to be a more specific mission requirement. The 
function of the network must be tied to a core mission of 
the Navy and Marine Corps.  As discussed under mission 
analysis in Chapter Two, the Force Projection mission best 
fits the capabilities of the NMCI architecture and the 
mission needs of the Navy and Marine Corps team.  Defining 
a specific mission for NMCI will define what functionality 
it must possess to be an effective system for supporting 
the Navy and Marine Corps war fighting capability.   
Defining mission function requirements for NMCI will 
also provide a method for separating the very large number 
of legacy applications into more logical, cohesive and 
manageable groups.   This separation of legacy applications 
into mission functions also begins the construction of the 
layered mission essential functions required within NMCI. 
With the legacy applications prioritized for transition by 
mission function the most important applications are 
brought into NMCI first, supporting the core mission of the 
Navy and Marine Corps. The same method can then be applied 
to the existing applications as each layer is built through 
the spiral process. 
The additional benefit of this method is that the 
security requirements necessary for the inclusion of legacy 
applications and networks are handled in the same logical 
manner.  The net effect is that NMCI could begin to develop 
survivability characteristics that it would not otherwise 
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possess under the existing transition plan.  At the end of 
the current process, if it continues as planned, NMCI will 
have internalized some of the legacy applications and 
networks without any additional effort to mitigate their 
presence.      
 Coupling the mission focus of the transition with a 
more efficient method of implementation (spiral design) 
will increase the efficiency with which legacy systems are 
handled and NMCI mission functionality is increased.  
Focusing transition on mission functions eliminates the 
requirement for remedial efforts at the transition after 
the initial effort has been completed.  Moving a complete 
mission function in a single effort enhances the functions 
of both the network and the Navy and Marine Corps team.    
For NMCI to be effective, it must include legacy 
applications that are essential to the present 
organizational functions of the Navy and Marine Corps 
support elements.  Application of a mission focus to the 
transition which is implemented through a spiral design 
method will produce a more directed approach to culling 
these legacy applications for inclusion in NMCI. It will 
also induce the necessary survivability characteristics 
that will compensate for existence of the legacy 
applications and networks. 
This method may not make the actual transition of 
applications easier on an individual basis, but it will 
reduce the complexity of the selection process, give the 
transition process greater focus, begin the growth of 
survivability characteristics within NMCI, and create the 
direct linkage between NMCI and the war fighting 
requirements of the Navy and Marine Corps team that is 
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 When examining the security architecture of any 
network there are two essential elements to be considered.  
The first is the strategy that is employed for the defense 
of the network and or the data that flows within it. The 
second is the tactics employed in the execution of that 
strategy. These two elements combine to produce the overall 
network defensive (security) architecture.   
 The strategy of the network defense is centered on 
what the ultimate goal of the efforts of defensive systems 
is to be. Surveying the field of enterprise network 
implementations it can be seen that network defensive 
strategies fall into one of three general categories: 
protection of the network nodes and links, protection of 
the network data, or protection of network access or 
availability. 
 A network defensive strategy centered on the 
protection of a network’s individual members is focused on 
the continued operation of the individual hosts and 
servers.  This strategy is prevalent in the majority of 
enterprise wide network implementations and shall be 
referred to as a “hard target” defense. Most of the 
enterprise-wide networks contain a wide variety in content 
of communications and possess as their primary function the 
connectivity of all the nodes within the enterprise.  Under 
this strategy, the ability of individuals to communicate is 
considered to be of greater value to the enterprise than 
the content of each specific communication. By emphasizing 
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the protection of the individual hosts, it is hoped that 
the network will remain viable and usable to all. To 
support this strategy, organizations deploy layered levels 
of hardware and software in a distributed fashion across 
the network. 
 The intent is to give all network hosts an equal 
capability to resist attack.  This includes intelligent 
agents that serve to alert the entire network should an 
attack materialize.  The emphasis of the survival of the 
individual node under this network strategy is synonymous 
to the emphasis on the survival of the individual soldier 
applied in military strategies.   
While not exclusively so, real-world military 
strategies are constructed around the idea that for the 
greater benefit of all, the defensive efforts should be 
focused on the preservation of the members through the 
execution of mutual support.  Infantry units employ this 
strategy through the use of interlocking fire plans and 
preplanned artillery barrages.  The survival of the members 
on both the front line and in the rear areas is dependent 
upon the successful coordination of all their efforts in 
the execution of a cohesive defense.  This allows the 
entire organization to resist while maximizing the chances 
of survival for all the members in essentially equal 
fashion.   
 The retention of network data is a network defensive 
strategy that focuses less on the survival of the 
individual node and more on the information the nodes 
process or temporarily retain.  Organizations that depend 
heavily on the validity, accuracy, and currency of data 
employ this strategy. Banks are a good example of such 
organizations.  While seeking to avoid compromise that 
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would limit their ability to provide their service, they 
are more concerned with the integrity of their data.  Their 
data is at the heart of their mission of commerce, and the 
loss of it could be fatal. For this reason these networks 
emphasize redundancy in data storage and extensive and 
reliable backup capability. The same data may be stored in 
multiple locations across the enterprise and or across the 
country.  These organizations are willing to accept the 
loss of servers, hosts, and web site access in exchange for 
the preservation of the information that is essential for 
the ongoing function of the enterprise. Breaks in service, 
while undesirable, are often temporary and impart 
significantly less damage.    
 Protecting network access is a strategy that is often 
employed by on-line retailers or service providers.  Their 
data functions are not time critical and their monetary 
functions are typically handled through third parties, so 
the critical element to the ongoing operation of the 
enterprise is the ability for customers to access the 
organization’s virtual sales counter.  On-line retailers 
and auction houses are examples of these types of 
organizations.  Periods of loss of service or accessibility 
translate into lost revenue and directly impact the ability 
of the ongoing enterprise. 
 These organizations therefore emphasize availability 
of their web site through the use of redundant host 
locations and reliable crossover between them. If the 
enterprise web site hosted in a particular region is lost, 
an adjacent regional host will assume the load so that the 
entire customer base can be continuously served.  This 
serves to minimize non-availability while maximizing the 
opportunity for the organization to obtain revenue. The 
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primary concern of the enterprise, access by and to 
customers, is thus met through this strategy.   
 The second element of network defense consists of the 
tactics used in the application of the network defensive 
strategy.  The hardware and software systems deployed 
within the network and it resident hosts and servers 
constitute these tactics. These systems constitute what has 
been traditionally thought of as security. The importance 
of these two elements of network defense is that for the 
defense to be effective they must be aligned and consistent 
with one another.  If not, then there are likely weaknesses 
within the network defense that could be exploited. 
 The state of the art in network defensive software and 
hardware are represented by intrusion detection systems 
(IDS), firewalls, anti-virus software, link encryption, and 
virtual private networks.  These are the tactical systems 
that are deployed in a variety of ways in an attempt to 
ensure authenticity and confidentiality within a network.   
  Implicit with the evaluation of network security 
should be the examination of availability and quality of 
service.  The implications of these factors (availability 
(Ao) and quality of service (QoS)) are frequently 
overlooked but carry great significance.  These levels of 
availability and quality of service provided can influence 
a network’s ability to resist attack and recover from its 
effects.     
Availability within a network switched environment is 
defined as the accessibility of input and output ports.  
The significance of availability is that if not adequately 
provisioned, it can become the Achilles Heel of any network 
security strategy.  Secure networks that possess inadequate 
availability can become isolated through exploitation of 
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single points of failure within the network structure that 
may not be adequately addressed by the network security 
tactics.  Availability then is the examination of the 
network structure for multi-path routing to ensure reliable 
access to the input and output ports.  
Quality of service is the ability of a network to 
provide better service to selected traffic that is flowing 
within the same network. This can be referred to as 
differential service.   The primary goal of QoS is to 
provide priority including bandwidth, controlled jitter and 
latency, and improved loss characteristics to selected 
traffic during times of restricted bandwidth or 
availability [CISCO02].  This can be contrasted with the 
existing “best effort” service employed within the Internet 
and most other networks where all traffic is treated with 
the same priority for bandwidth, jitter, latency, and loss 
characteristics. 
Networks that do not possess the ability to provide 
differential service can find themselves unable to 
communicate important information during periods of 
restricted bandwidth or availability.  This is the result 
of the internal inability to discriminate among the high 
and low value information flowing within the network and 
then allocate the available bandwidth accordingly.   
In summary, examining the security architecture of any 
system means that all of these factors should be 
considered, strategy, tactics, availability, and quality of 
service. Determining the strategy and tactics employed for 
network defense, coupled with the level of availability and 
quality of service, will determine how effective a network 
will likely be in the event of a compromise or intrusion.  
This is a much more useful determination than merely 
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examining traditional network security measures.  The 
traditional definition of security extends only as far as 
the defensive mechanisms that constitute the network 
perimeters or define the enclaves. The strategy, tactics, 
availability and quality of service of a network combine to 
determine the survivability of a network. The Carnegie 
Mellon University Software Engineering Institute defines 
network survivability in similar terms [RJE98] and it is 
this frame work that will be used for the examination of 
the NMCI security architecture.   
 
B. NMCI SECURITY STRATEGY 
 
 The NMCI Information Strike Force (NMCI ISF) has 
employed a defense-in-depth concept of layered security 
measures for the protection of NMCI. This layered defense 
is an enclave-based security strategy aimed at providing 
the desired level of information assurance by providing 
high resistance to attack while minimizing the security 
weaknesses of any particular security component within the 
defensive mechanism [RAY01].  This explicit definition of 
NMCI security strategy maps onto the strategy focused on 
the preservation of the individual nodes discussed earlier. 
Further examining the NMCI enclave approach to security it 
can be seen that this strategy is host- (seat-) centric, 
with the innermost layer of network defense at the host 
level.  Figure 4-1 gives a representation of how the 
enclave strategy operates in coordination with the deployed 

















Figure 9 NMCI Seat-Centric Network Defense 
 
The boundary system places the NMCI seat as the final 
layer of defense should an attack be attempted against the 
network. For an attack to be successful against NMCI, this 
strategy attempts to force an intruder to first penetrate 
the outer ring (legacy, NMCI Community of Interest, etc.) 
before being able to then assault the next boundary, and 
then subsequently the NMCI host or server.  The intent of 
this defensive strategy is to force an attacker to fritter 
away his time and energy attempting to move from one area 
to the next through the layers of security, inward toward 
the host or server.  At each level there are deployed 
hardware and software meant to confound the attack and warn 
the network of a potential or actual attack.   
This strategy reflects the experience gained through 
the use of the hard target approach to network defense.  
This strategy is founded in a principle put forth by the 


















If you entrench yourself behind strong 
fortifications, you compel the enemy to seek a 
solution elsewhere. 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War 
The hard-target concept relies on an attacker to do 
one of two things when presented with a formidable network 
defense.  The attacker will choose to attack another less 
well defended target, one that can be overcome within the 
attackers existing capabilities, and ignore the hardened 
target. The second option for the attacker is to assault 
the more formidable defenses of the hardened target and be 
depleted and or defeated in his attempt.   
There are weaknesses in the hard-target strategy and 
its application to network defense that designers have 
failed to see.  They have overlooked the unstated 
importance included in Clausewitz’s strategic advice.  If 
the enemy is compelled to seek another solution as 
Clausewitz suggests, then the defense must consider that 
solution and develop an effective response.  The failure of 
the hard-target strategy within NMCI is its ability to 
effectively address the enemy’s other solution in two ways.   
First, the hard-target strategy cedes the initiative 
to the attacking force.  While Clausewitz’s statement 
recognizes the value of fortifications to the defender, he 
likely never advocated their use solely in defense.  
Defensive fortifications are only as valuable as the 
overall defensive strategy is able to flexibly respond. The 
Maginot Line and the fortifications at Eben Emel are 
perfect illustration of this shortcoming of over-reliance 
upon static defenses. The Maginot Line and the 
fortifications at Eben Emel were defensive solutions that 
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were rooted in the past.  They relied upon history to tell 
them what form the next attack would take. The Germans, 
having learned the lessons of World War I, sought another 
solution. The German Blitzkrieg and airborne warfare were 
the new forms of attack. The French and Belgians relied too 
heavily upon their static defenses and failed to consider 
the potential German solutions. They sat and waited for the 
assault. 
The forts at Eben Emel, while correctly placed and 
equipped, were unprepared for an airborne assault and so 
defeated in detail by German paratroopers and glidermen 
that attacked from the sky.  The Maginot Line was even less 
relevant to the defense of France. Once flanked, the 
fortifications of the Maginot Line became irrelevant to the 
fight at hand as the German Armies rushed to the open 
fields of France.  Having allowed the Germans the 
initiative, and not possessing a thoughtful plan to counter 
the German attack, the French defense became disintegrated 
and ineffective at the strategic level, the results of 
which are obvious to all.  The implication for NMCI is the 
same.   
The second failing of the hard-target strategy is that 
it does not address the mission functions of the network.  
Armies of Clasewitz’s time and beyond have always possessed 
as their primary guidance some mission, however defined. 
Implicit with armies and not with networks is an inherent 
offensive capability. The designers of the hard target 
defense failed to recognize the significance of the 
offensive component of any army, even while executing a 
strategic defense.  In military operations, the desire to 
execute offensive operations (attack) is in tension with 
the need to retain a defensive capability. This is not the 
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case in the networked environment.  Network attackers do 
not have the burden of being required to react to a counter 
move by defending forces.  There is little if any 
meaningful threat to them.  They have the luxury of 
pursuing the attack until exhausted or effectively shunned, 
but they live to hack another day.  The hard target 
defensive strategy gives NMCI nothing in the way of an 
offensive capability that would enhance it mission 
effectiveness in the face of any active intrusion or 
attempt.  NMCI, like much of the French Army in the spring 
of 1940, sits and waits. 
 
C. INITIATIVE CEDED TO THE ATTACKER 
The traditional sense of network defensive strategy 
employed within NMCI concedes the initiative to the 
attacker. There are no proactive measures taken as part of 
the defense meant to deter an attack or enhance the mission 
performance of the network while under attack.  Deterring 
an attacker requires that the defending party possess the 
ability to either deliver greater punishment to the 
attacker, or possess the ability to deny the attack or any 
hope of having meaningful effect on the target. There are 
legal issues that restrict the former behavior from 
occurring, so while desirable, they are impractical and 
illegal in the current environment.  The latter behavior, 
blunting the effect of an attack, is not fully addressed by 
the capabilities of firewalls, intrusion detection systems, 
encryption, or virtual private networks that constitute the 
NMCI network boundaries.  By examining these individual 
tools that constitute the bricks in the NMCI boundaries, 
their minimal deterrence and lack of mission enhancing 
capabilities within the network can be seen. 
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1. Intrusion Detection Systems   
Intrusion detection systems are passive systems that 
examine network traffic and user behavior for a weakness 
that correlate to suspicious or malicious behavior. 
Typically, an intrusion detection system follows a two-step 
process. The first are host-based and considered the 
passive component, these include: inspection of the 
system's configuration files to detect inadvisable 
settings; inspection of the password files to detect 
inadvisable passwords; and inspection of other system areas 
to detect policy violations. The second procedures are 
network-based and are considered the active component: 
mechanisms are set in place to react to known methods of 
attack and to record system responses [TT02]. 
The IDS strives to deter the attacker by eliminating 
known or recognized malicious behavior that is already 
documented as a security threat.  The first step eliminates 
the known weaknesses and known behaviors, but successful 
attacks often are the result of newly developed malicious 
behavior and newly found weaknesses.  Consequently, 
established malicious behavior is screened out, but 
assistance against new malicious behavior is very 
problematic. Independent IDS response will likely be 
limited to preprogrammed responses that are historically 
based.  New malicious codes and behaviors often 
specifically attempt to avoid these pre-existing patterns 
to avoid detection.  In either event, the IDS primarily 
provide the network with a notification of an intrusion and 
taxonomy of events in the aftermath.  This response, while 
relevant, does nothing to assist the network in the 
performance of its mission while under attack, and in the 
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event entirely new tactics are employed against it, may not 
provide sufficient or any warning at all. 
 
2. Firewalls   
Firewalls are equally incapable of dealing with new 
behaviors.  A firewall may be either a packet filter or a 
proxy server in nature and attempt to eliminate malicious 
behavior based on a set of rules that are implemented by a 
system administrator.  These rules are essentially 
experienced based, making use of previous events in the 
determination of what type of behavior or packets can be 
viewed as malicious and should be shunned.  What 
constitutes illicit behavior or an infectious packet is 
largely determined by previous events and this experience 
is what drives the development of the governing rules sets 
that the firewall uses to perform its job.  The behavior of 
the firewall in the event of detection then is predictable, 
and so as long as the attacker avoids known behaviors he 
retains some potential for success. 
In addition, the effectiveness of the firewall is 
limited to its ability to restrict access to the network, 
impacting users, friend or foe, equally.  Restricting 
access within the network may not be desirable, or helpful 
in the event of an intrusion.  The response is essentially 
experience-based and therefore reactive, doing little to 
assist the network against new malicious behaviors. 
Also, the firewall’s primary response to a threat, the 
restriction of access to ports, does nothing to improve the 
performance of the network mission. A firewall could resist 
attack by blocking all packet entry, but in doing so could 
provide the attacker with an effective “mission kill” of 
the network. Some ports must be left open, and the 
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implication is that they could be used by both friend and 
foe alike 
 
3. Link Encryption   
Link encryption, used extensively in the long haul 
movement of data in NMCI, is a mechanism to prevent traffic 
analysis, traffic flow analysis, or the jamming of 
transmission within a network.  Recall the Buddenberg 
Matrix illustrated in chapter 1. Encryption makes invisible 
the sending and receiving node IP addresses and the content 
of the datagram. However, it only indirectly guarantees the 
confidentiality, authenticity, and doesn’t even address the 
needs of the enclave defensive strategy. Over-reliance upon 
linked encryption for confidentiality makes the entire 
system only as strong as the weakest link in the encryption 
chain.  While useful in overall view of security, they 
serve only to complicate the attacker’s pre-assault efforts 
at detecting and localizing a target before determining the 
suitable method of attack. 
In fact, depending upon the location of compromise, 
these systems could work against the defensive efforts to 
identify the source of the attack.  The net effect is to 
make the attackers reconnaissance efforts more difficult, 
but once a successful attack has been executed linked 
encryption is lacking in its ability to mitigate the effect 
of an onslaught.  In fact, continued use of a compromised 
encryption method is a counterproductive and inherently 
insecure act.   
 
4. Virtual Private Networks (VPN’s)  
VPNs are a means of connecting geographically 
separated members of a network to the local area network in 
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a secure and confidential manner.   Within NMCI, VPNs are 
used to connect members of communities of interest within 
NMCI, and to connect remote users to NMCI proper via a 
secure connection. The benefit of this application to the 
remote user is the ability to touch NMCI through the 
unwashed environment of the Internet from any desired 
location.  The benefit to the network is to provide some 
assurance of authenticity and confidentiality within the 
network while providing a required service.  It also 
provides some mechanism of security against traffic 
analysis or the jamming of transmission within a network 
traffic flow, in the same manner as link encryption.   
However, traffic flow analysis may not be prevented 
completely as the headers of the IP data grams in VPNs are 
unencrypted, allowing an observer to at least identify the 
gateways used for the transmission.  The utilization of the 
VPNs to support remote users also undermines the enclave 
strategy of NMCI by placing the host outside of the other 
boundaries.  While operating remotely, the VPN capable host 
does not enjoy any support from the other NMCI boundary 
applications. VPN host defense capabilities are limited to 
boundary layer 4 and should those be compromised the other 
layers can then be bypassed through the illegitimate use of 
the connectivity provided by the VPN. 
This act is known as “island hopping”.  Again, should 
a compromise occur, the utilization of a VPN offers no 
assistance in the continued function of the network. The 
VPN has no value added capability to help mitigate the 
attackers effectiveness, and if exploited could actually be 




5. Anti-Virus Software 
These applications function in a manner similar to 
that of firewalls. They possess the ability to identify and 
shun IP packets that possess characteristics that are known 
or suspected of possessing malicious content, or promote 
malicious behavior.  These systems are widely deployed at 
the host and server level in an effort to screen out the 
transmission of harmful software applications.  They, like 
firewalls are experienced based applications that require a 
historical profile of files that possess hostile 
characteristics.  They are effective at eliminating items 
that have existing virus qualities, but their effectiveness 
fades quickly when presented with new software viruses or 
worms.  Successful worms and viruses often masquerade as 
legitimate applications, or come packaged in a binary 
manner so as to avoid detection.  If the inherent 
characteristics are not known or identifiable as hostile, 
they will be ignored. Since the application is only as 
smart as the most recent successful exploit, its usefulness 
in the immediate post attack environment is limited to 
preventing known virus or worms from exploiting the ongoing 
attack.  Anti-virus software is reactive, and when faced 
with newly constructed malicious code often fails, 
providing no assistance to the network. In addition, the 
dexterity of the anti-virus software response and the 
policies that guide their actions impacts the usefulness of 
the network.  
At present, Department of Defense DoD restrict 
executable as a virus threat.  Consequently java applets 
and cookies are eliminated, as well as some spread sheet 
applications that contain “macro” level functions.  These 
types of executable code are useful to the network members, 
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but they also fit the profile of potential virus hazards. 
The result is that both good and bad code are preclude from 
the network, reducing the overall usefulness of the network 
to its members. 
 
6. Initiative Ceded to the Attacker: Summary 
In summarizing the limitations of these tools it is 
obvious that they provide only a limited, reactive response 
to network intrusions that have been previously experienced 
or observed in some manner. In addition, they do little or 
nothing to assist the NMCI network in performing its 
mission in the face of the attack. It should also be noted 
that these applications are dependent upon the human 
intervention or other software applications to remain 
current and viable.   
The overall effectiveness of the strategy is limited 
by the weakest link within the defensive chain. The 
individual applications are only as good as the management 
process that they each rely upon to keep them current when 
compared to the threat.  Their effectiveness is a dependent 
variable based on the timeliness and accuracy of the 
updates initiated by a separate agent of the network. 
Second, the effectiveness of the strategy is limited by the 
ability of the weakest individual application within the 
defensive chain.  The capability of the firewalls and IDS 
are negated by the weaknesses in the authentication scheme 
or the VPNs or the data base of the anti-virus software.     
The net effect of reliance upon these applications for 
defense is yet again to cede the initiative to the 
attacker.  The hard-target strategy within NMCI relies upon 
the attacker to stumble over one of the application trip- 
wires before any action is taken.  This allows the attacker 
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to study the networks defensive systems and effectively 
plan his attack based upon their known, relatively static 
qualities.  An unsuccessful attempt will illuminate the 
attacker, but he will suffer little else.  The attacker 
gains from the failed attempt by evaluating the response 
and the defenses.  NMCI likely gains little other than a 
validation of the prepared defense. The benefits to this 
trial and error approach lie overwhelmingly with the 
attacker.  He is allowed to probe until he penetrates the 
defense, whereupon he gains tremendous knowledge, while the 
defender may be unaware.   
This strategy and these tools may be effective at 
excluding a majority of potential attackers, those that 
attempt to exploit defined weaknesses employing existing 
tools, but they do not adequately address the need to 
counter those that do not follow the previously discovered 
path.   The hard target defensive strategy grants the 
opponent the luxury of picking the time and place of 
attack, based on the knowledge gained through the 
examination of the relatively static defense, while the 
NMCI must rely on historical data to tell it about an 
opponent as yet unseen, or to protect a weakness that has 
yet to be discovered.      
 
D. FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE MISSION OF THE NETWORK 
Attempts to compromise networks frequently begin with 
an attempt to compromise a host, either internal or 
external to the targeted network, through an exploit or via 
a method of social engineering.  Once compromised, the 
attacker makes use of the legitimate network resources 
provided by the host in an illegitimate manner to further 
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compromise the network. The advantage to the attacker is 
that by controlling a network host, they can bypass some of 
the network defensive systems. The result for NMCI could be 
that the integrated defensive system of boundaries would be 
decomposed into single barriers that are attacked in a 
piecemeal fashion.  The hard-target strategy designed to 
defend the network by protecting the individual hosts 
becomes inverted.  The network becomes only as well 
defended as the individual hosts are able to defend 
themselves.  If the host level defenses fail, NMCI’s hard 
target strategy doesn’t address what to do next.  This 
shortfall is the result of the enclave or hard target 
strategy’s failure to consider the importance of the 
mission performed by the network.  
As discussed earlier, the tools used in the 
traditional practice of network defense do not address the 
mission performance of the network.  These defensive tools 
are responses to specific threats that have, over time, 
been improved to counter the increased capability of the 
attacker.  Firewalls and IDS are the countermeasures 
deployed around the network that hope to screen out the 
offending behavior.  As the attacks have gotten better, so 
have the countermeasures, and vice versa.  The logic behind 
continuing to pursue this spiral is that the defenses will 
eventually outpace the improved attack capabilities, 
producing a condition of diminishing returns for the 
attacker. Unfortunately historical data tells us otherwise.   
 If the defensive strategy was improving at a faster 
pace than that of the attackers, then logically the number 
of compromises should be decreasing. Table 10 below shows 
that the number of cyber attacks has not ebbed as a result 
of our best defensive efforts.  These numbers call into the 
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question the effectiveness of the purely defensive strategy 
in meeting the needs of a mission critical system like 
NMCI. 
  


























Figure 10 Reported Cyber Incidents 1990 to 2001 
 
The problem lies in the misalignment between the 
mission of a network and the objective of enclave based 
network defense.  Networks were designed to move data, not 
to defend it or protect it within a bastion or behind a 
rampart.  The elemental design of networks is centered on 
making the movement of data increasingly more efficient.  
The enclave security strategy attempts to achieve the goal 
of security by employing tools that function in opposition 
to the elemental nature and primary mission of networks, 
movement of data.  Attackers are employing a denial form of 
strategy when assaulting a network. The hard target defense 
within NMCI attempts to employ another form of the same 
denial strategy to defeat the attackers.  To better 
illustrate this mismatch consider the application of 
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power strategy to the 




E. MAHANIAN STRATEGY AND THE NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT  
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan was a noted naval theorist 
and considered to be the father of modern naval strategy as 
practiced by the United States Navy for over a century.  
Mahan’s theory divides naval strategy into two bodies of 
thought. Those two communities are sea denial and sea 
control. Those that desire to deny use of the world oceans 
by others practice a strategy of sea denial.   The sea 
denial strategy is intended to disrupt and deny the free 
use or travel of the seas by another. Sea denial is not 
considered a war winning or offensive strategy. This 
strategy is employed to try and mitigate the chance of 
losing the war. Those wishing ensure freedom of the seas or 
to dominate it for their use in furtherance of national 
aims practice a strategy of sea control. Those that 
practice sea control seek to dominate the sea, allowing 
them free rein to transit for commerce or the ability to 
project power on a distant land mass. Sea control is an 
offensively oriented, war winning strategy. Using these 
definitions, Mahan’s concepts can be mapped onto network 
strategies and the mission of networks.   
The Internet, or the networked environment, is the 
neutral medium that is used for the movement of data 
between the nodes.  The network is the ocean upon which the 
data is moved from node to node or port to port.  Those 
that wish to block the use of networks or the Internet 
practice an information denial strategy. They seek to 
disrupt or deny the free, unrestricted movement of 
information.  Those seeking to get their data across the 
network in spite of the efforts of those executing an 
information denial strategy are following an information 
control strategy [RB97]. The enclave defensive strategy 
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within NMCI attempts to counter the attacker’s information 
denial strategy by executing a similar information denial 
strategy of its own. This denying of the denial strategist 
is a purely defensive and avoidance strategy that assumes 
from the onset that the war can not be won.   
This strategy is comparable that pursued by the 
Imperial Japanese during World War II after mid-1942.  The 
Japanese had fortified many Pacific islands, hoping to 
deplete or deny the American attack by extracting such a 
high price in lives and material that they would in some 
manner prevail and retain their territorial gains in the 
Pacific.  However, without the sea power to control the 
oceans in and around these island fortresses, the Japanese 
could not influence the movement of the American forces or 
pursue a war-winning strategy.  Subsequently, American 
forces attacked at the points of their choosing and on 
their timetable, crushing some very formidably defended 
islands while selectively avoiding and ignoring others.   
The lesson for traditional network defenders is that 
the enclave strategy is rooted in the same idea held by the 
defeated Imperial Japanese. The enclave defensive strategy 
creates an island chain of fortresses within the ocean of 
NMCI, believing that dominance of the internal network 
environment will manifest control in the external 
environment.  The tactics of the enclave strategy do not 
enhance the connectivity or availability between the nodes.  
The enclave strategy only assists the network in resisting 
the attempts of others in the execution of an information 
denial strategy against it. Simply preventing the execution 
of an information denial strategy by an opposing force, 
however, does not equate to the application of an 
information control strategy for the network.  For a 
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defensive strategy to be effective it must possess an 
offensive component.  This offensive component must assist 
the network in the performance of its primary mission, 
moving data from node to node, in spite of any intrusion.  
Being able to do so effectively blunts the attacker’s 
efforts and could provide some deterrent capability.   
 
F. NMCI STRATEGY SUMMARY 
What is needed, but is not present within NMCI, is an 
information control strategy that that supports the 
essential mission functions of the network and makes use of 
the enclave strategy defensive tools.  The network strategy 
must assume a more offensively-oriented posture.  This idea 
is a distinct departure form the traditional notion of 
network defense.  An offensive network strategy must not be 
confused with the idea of computer network attack (CNA).  
CNA is an execution of the denial strategy against another 
network.   
In this context, an offensive network strategy is one 
that employs mechanisms that will enhance the capability of 
a network to move data from node to node in spite of 
compromise or damage.  The reliance on signature-based 
recognition applications is being rapidly overcome by the 
ability of attackers.  Signature based recognition may 
become impossible in the future because of the innate 
ability of these malicious codes to morph or change [5]. 
Purely defensive tactics may have been overcome by the more 
capable “blitzkrieg” posed by these viruses and worms.   
Intrusion systems may suffer the same fate.  They rely 
on the identification of malicious behavior based upon 
historical profiles. Unfortunately, malicious behavior can 
result from what appears to be authorized, legitimate 
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behavior within a network.  Rules and permissions are only 
as effective as the knowledge base of those that develop 
them, and they are only as good as the experience of the 
developer.  The enclave strategy is fighting a losing 
battle, hoping that the information denial forces never 
become capable enough to totally dismember its defensive 
mechanisms. There needs to be an offensive strategy for 
NMCI, one that enhances connectivity, availability, and can 
distribute bandwidth in response to an attack, supporting 
the networks mission of data transfer.  Employing a 
strategy that does anything less will leave NMCI wanting 
when faced with new capabilities of the information denial 
forces. 
 
G. NMCI SECURITY TACTICS 
The second element of any network that should be 
examined is the employment of the defensive applications or 
mechanisms to defend the network.  The importance of this 
is that whatever the particular strategy is that has been 
chosen to defend the network, at the very least the 
defensive mechanisms should be arrayed in a manner that is 
consistent and supportive of that strategy.  If not, an 
effective strategy may be able to produce only limited 
mission success and an ineffective strategy may become that 
much worse.  In either case, the result is undesirable and 
regardless of the viewed viability of the network defensive 
strategy, the applications and mechanisms that constitute 
the tactical elements of the strategy should be positioned 
to optimize their performance within the network in support 
of that strategy.  
As discussed earlier, any examination of network 
defensive tactics must include the evaluation of all three 
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of the relevant elements that constitute that defense.  
Namely they are availability, security, and quality of 
service.  These three elements are interrelated and the 
shortcomings or failure of one impact the others, and 
consequently the network as a whole.  For a defensive 
strategy to be successful, all three of these elements must 
be in alignment and adequately addressed so as to produce 
the desired levels of authenticity, confidentiality, 
security, and connectivity.   
 
1. NMCI Availability 
 Within a network-switched environment, availability is 
defined as access to input and output ports.  Availability 
goes directly to connectivity between nodes, which to date 
is the only clearly defined mission possessed by NMCI. For 
networks in operation there are definitive statistics.  
Availability is a very tangible parameter and there are web 
sites in existence that can provide very specific data 
concerning this parameter for hundreds of large distributed 
internet service providers around the globe.  NMCI, 
however, does not yet physically exist in its entirety and 
so if any statistical performance on NMCI was available it 
would require some sort of rationalization to make a valid 
comparison.  Therefore another method for comparing NMCI 
availability must be found.   
 NMCI is a services contract, and while there is no 
existing network that can provide historical performance 
data, a comparison of the performance parameters within the 
NMCI contract to the performance of other large networks is 
useful.  An assumption can be made that NMCI contractual 
requirements equate to actual nominal performance of the 
network in its operating environment. Based on this 
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assumption, a valid comparison between NMCI contract 
performance and existing terrestrial networks can be made.  
The results of this comparison can then be used to evaluate 
the potential effectiveness of NMCI in the performance of 
its mission.   
 The nominal performance levels of NMCI can be found 
within the NMCI contract award.  This services contract has 
thirty-nine specific service level agreements (SLA’s) 
within it that define the desired performance 
characteristics of NMCI. Of these thirty-nine SLA’s, 
twenty-six of them address availability in some manner.  Of 
the twenty-six that address availability, ten of them are 
relevant in some manner to the operation of the network 
mission function of connectivity.  Of these ten, there are 
eight SLAs that can be used in the comparison process in 
determining the adequacy of the availability provisioned 
within NMCI.  These eight SLAs are identified by number and 
their contractual requirements summarized (in terms of 
availability) in the table below. 
 
NMCI Service Level Agreement Contracted Level ofAvailability 
SLA 6: Web Access Services 99.5% 
SLA 10: NMCI Intranet Performance 99.8% 
SLA 11: NIPRNET Access 99.5% 
SLA 12: Internet Access 98.0% 
SLA 24: WAN Network Connectivity  99.99% 
SLA 25: BAN/LAN Communication Services 99.9% 
SLA 27: External Networks 99.5% 




Table 10 SLA Availability  
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However, to see the true value of the connectivity that has 
been provided we need to consider the totality of the 
connectivity is a function of the interdependent networks 
that constitute the enterprise network known as NMCI.   
 A complex intranet like NMCI is composed of a series 
of smaller networks.  Under NMCI each of these separate 
internal networks has been provisioned individually, 
independent of the one another.  The availability of the 
enterprise wide network to the user level then is a 
function of the availability of the series of independent 
networks based upon the distance from the host.  Consider 
the following illustration.  
 
Figure 11 NMCI Series Network Effective Availability 
 
The value that needs to be determined for a valid 
comparison is the effective availability at each level of 
NMCI 
Host 
BAN Ao = .999 WAN Ao = .9999 NMCI 
Intranet Ao 
= .998 
NIPRnet Ao = .995 
SIPRnet Ao = .98 
External Networks 
Ao = .995 
Internet Ao = .98 
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service under the SLAs when viewed from the user level.  
For this determination it will be assumed that host 
availability is essentially 100%, based on the examination 
being the accessibility of the higher level services.  The 
effective availability of a host to reach each level is 
determined as follows; 
 
Ao of NMCI BAN = (1.0) * (.999) = .999 
Ao of NMCI WAN = (1.0) * (.999) * (.9999) = .9989 
Ao of NMCI Intranet = (1.0) * (.999) * (.9999) * (.998) = .9969 
Ao NIPRnet = (1.0) * (.999) * (.9999) * (.998) * (.995) = .9919 
Ao SIPRnet = (1.0) * (.999) * (.9999) * (.998) * (.98) = .97696 
Ao of External Networks = (1.0) * (.999) * (.9999) * (.998) * (.98) = .9919 
Ao of Internet = (1.0) * (.999) * (.9999) * (.998) * (.995) *(.98) = .97207 
 
The calculation is viewed from the host level, based on the 
logic that the host level is where the vast majority of 
traffic will originate and end.  This is also where the 
majority of the users will reside.  It must also be noted 
that while the levels provided under the SLAs are higher, 
they are meaningless without considering the interaction 
required between the network segments within NMCI for the 
operation across the entire enterprise.  Even though the 
WAN is provisioned at 99.99%, that fact is irrelevant when 
viewed in isolation because the WAN is of no value unless 
attached the users who reside at the BAN/LAN level internal 
and external to NMCI.  The implication of this structure is 
that while SLA-provisioned availability is defined in the 
contract, the maximum attainable level of availability to 
the user is always going to be something less because the 
availability at the user level must take into consideration 
the down time accumulated by the cooperating networks 
segments.  Table 11 summarizes the SLAs, their contracted 
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availability and their calculated effective availability 
when viewed from the user level.   
 
NMCI Service Level 
Agreement 
Contracted 
Availability Effective Availability 
SLA 6: Web Access Services 99.5% 97.207% 
SLA 10: NMCI Intranet 
Performance 99.8% 99.69% 
SLA 11: NIPRNET Access 99.5% 99.19% 
SLA 12: Internet Access 98.0% 97.207% 
SLA 24: WAN Network 
Connectivity  99.99% 99.89% 
SLA 25: BAN/LAN 
Communication Services 99.9% 99.9% 





Table 11 SLA Effective Availability 
 
These effective availability numbers are valid for 
comparison because they reflect the down-time of the 
interdependent networks just as the data measured on the 
large internet service providers does. With these more 
representative figures we can make a comparison of the 
availability provisioned within NMCI and that provided by 
other, similar, large area networks and consider the 
implications this may or may not have on the performance of 
the NMCI network and mission. 
 A web site available hosted by the Matrix Netsystems 
collects data on the performance of internet service 
provides around the globe. This data is available for a 
variety of periods, but for the purpose of this examination 
the data for the periodic data used will be for the last 30 
day period. This measurement approximates the period to be 
used for the evaluation of performance under the NMCI 
contract. The measurement performed by the Matrix 
Netsystems web site is done externally to the evaluated 
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network, representing the end users point of view.  As such 
it considers any subdivisions that may exist within the 
evaluated ISP’s and is representative of the performance of 
NMCI and its availability.   
 The Matrix Netsystems site subdivides the ISP 
evaluated by their size.  For the sake of comparison, only 
the large ISP’s that service within the United States were 
chosen for representative data.  This was done based upon 
the similarity in size and the assumed similar U.S. 
terrestrial environment that NMCI will operate in.  Given 
this as the starting point, data was obtained in May of 
2002 for the twenty-six large U.S. ISPs measured by this 
site and a cumulative average calculated for the three 
parameters (latency, packet loss, and availability) 
measured.   Based on that data, these are the averages to 
be used for comparison: 
Latency 67.12 milliseconds 
Packet Loss  0.2705 % 
Availability 99.86% 
Using this data the availability table can be reconstructed 
and the effective availability of the NMCI structure can be 
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Hours per Year 
(A-B) 
 
SLA 6: Web 
Access 
Services 
97.207% 243.996 * 99.86% 12.23 231.766    
SLA 10: NMCI 
Intranet 
Performance 
99.69% 27.0816 * 99.86% 12.23 14.8516 
SLA 11: 




97.207% 243.996 * 99.86% 12.23 231.766 
SLA 24: WAN 
Network 
Connectivity  
















97.696% 201.277 * 99.86% 12.23 189.047 
Table 12 SLA Effective Availability vs. Large U.S. ISP 
 
When the two systems are compared on the basis of effective 
availability rates they appear at first to be only 
marginally different.  The NMCI contract award is only 
marginally better in performance when compared to the 
existing ISP in two areas, specifically BAN and WAN 
availability. For these two SLAs the effective availability 
exceeds that of a commercial service.  For the remaining 
SLAs the commercial ISP availability exceeds that 
provisioned by the NMCI structure at the contracted 
availability rates. The differences in rate, however, hides 
the more meaningful number, the total time the system is 
unavailable for use by the users. 
 To determine the total down-time accumulated for the 




(7 days x 24 hours x 52 weeks) = 8736 total hours available in a year 
8736 hours x (1- effective availability %) = total down time for the  
        system 
 
Looking at total down-time, there are obvious advantages to 
the level of service provided by the commercial ISP.  Based 
on the assumption that the 99.86% availability is across 
the full spectrum of service, the ISP performs considerably 
better. Over a twelve-month period the commercial ISP 
accumulates less than 50% of the down time when compared to 
NMCI. This holds true for all of the services except the 
BAN and LAN.  The BAN and LAN level service, however, is 
not reflective of the larger purpose of NMCI.  NMCI is an 
intranet, meant to connect the entire Navy and Marine 
enterprise. The telling figure is when we examine how well 
NMCI can connect all of the members and supporting network 
functions.   
The core of NMCI is reflected in SLAs 10, 11, 27, and 
35.  These SLAs address the capability of the system to 
connect all of the user members of the Navy and Marine 
Corps and the cooperating networks.  When comparing the 
availability here we can see that NMCI is considerably less 
capable than the commercial ISPs.  NMCI Intranet 
performance (SLA 10) accumulates more than twice the down 
time of the commercial ISP.  The availability to the 
NIPRnet, SIPRnet, and other external networks (MCEN, IT-21) 
falls off considerably.  The NIPRnet and SIPRnet expect 
nearly six times more down time, and the external networks 
more than sixteen times more non-availability compared to 
the service of a commercial ISP.  This is surprising based 
upon the how NMCI was developed.  In the process of 
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outlining the requirements for provisioning the network, 
the Navy consulted with large U.S. corporations, drawing on 
their experience of operating enterprise networks in the 
formulation of the NMCI contract [RM02].  If commercial 
ISPs can provide this level of availability, why doesn’t 
NMCI meet that same level of performance?  There are two 
possible answers. 
The first possible answer to this question is that it 
is purely a business deal, unconnected to Fleet needs. The 
availability levels contained in the contract award were 
negotiated as part of the NMCI contract.  The contractor 
may actually be able to provide service better than the 
negotiated availability, equal to the commercial ISP, and 
so the lower performance levels were negotiated to give 
them a margin for error and a potential greater profit 
based upon the performance incentives contained within the 
NMCI contract [PEOIT00].   
The second possible answer is that because of fiscal 
constraints or other reasons this was the best that could 
be obtained under the contract.  This answer, however, 
doesn’t square with the pre-contractual discussions between 
the Navy and large U.S. corporations regarding enterprise 
networks and the provisioning of the NMCI contract [RM02].  
It is illogical that the Navy would accept performance less 
than what is commercially available. Even when viewed in 
the best light, the Navy has contracted for availability 
within NMCI that is no better than commercial ISP service.  
If this is the case, the next question is whether that 
level of availability is adequate to support the mission 
requirements for the network.   
  To determine if the provisioned level of availability 
is adequate to support the NMCI mission, there needs to be 
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a clear definition of that mission.  As was discussed in 
chapter 2 of this thesis, NMCI lacks a clear mission 
definition, but two things emerge from the examination of 
the mission statements that are made in the available 
documentation.  First, NMCI seeks to achieve connectivity 
within the Navy and Marine Corps enterprise.  Second, NMCI 
is determined to be a mission critical asset for the Navy 
as part of the larger global information grid used by the 
service.  Using these two mission objectives was can 
compare the availability rates to determine NMCI’s adequacy 
in reaching its objective goal of mission success.  
It must be remembered that the NMCI contract is for 
services, the Navy and Marines have not dictated to the 
primary contractor any specifications of how to provide the 
service, only the level of service to be provided.  As a 
consequence, then, if the contractor builds the physical 
network to these levels, NMCI will likely possess less than 
a dual threaded level of reliability.  The implication of 
this is that there may not be reliable crossover and or 
adequate redundancy built into the network for the true 
needs.  At present, the only level of the NMCI network 
provisioned to a dual-threaded level of availability is the 
WAN (99.99%).  When viewed from the user level, the 
effective availability to the WAN is essentially equivalent 
to three nines (99.89%), but drops off when reaching the 
NMCI Intranet level to only two nines (99.69%).  At this 
level, service is no better than single threaded and 
implies that the network possesses physical or logical 
single points of failure within its structure.  
Provisioning only single thread connectivity at the NMCI 
Intranet level gives only tenuous support to the stated 
mission objective of force wide connectivity.  When the 
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need to interoperate with external networks is included in 
evaluating the adequacy of NMCI availability, things are no 
better. 
As a part of the global information grid (the second 
stated mission), NMCI will need to be able to operate in a 
cooperative manner with these and potentially other 
external networks. SLAs 11, 27, and 35 address NMCI 
availability to the NIPRnet, SIPRnet, MCEN, and other 
external networks. The effective availability of these 
networks to the end user within NMCI is equally poor.  
Availability to the NIPRnet and the other external networks 
is well below the dual threaded threshold of four nines 
(99.99%), coming in at only 99.19%.  Availability to the 
SIPRnet, the Navy and Marine Corps classified network 
system, is a dismal 97.696%.  If the other primary mission 
function of NMCI is to be part of a global information 
grid, it appears that the information contained within that 
grid is of little importance to the Navy based upon the 
accepted level of availability to those networks.  The 
relatively low level of availability to these other 
networks puts the usefulness of NMCI participation within 
the global information grid in doubt.  The levels of 
availability provisioned for NMCI do not rise to the level 
of dual threaded capability.  Instead, the capability is 
significantly less than that obtainable by applying 
relatively simple hardware redundancy to achieve dual 
threaded availability through multiple independent paths 






a. NMCI Availability Summary 
 The effective availability numbers reflected in 
NMCI place doubt on its ability to achieve even the diffuse 
mission goals of connectivity and participation in a global 
grid in support of DoD.    This situation is unlike the 
capability typically designed into any of the Navy and 
Marine Corps weapons systems today. Surface ships, 
submarines, and aircraft all some possess redundant 
capability within their basic structure.  While not 
directly related to the combat capability of the larger 
system, these redundant features are meant to keep the ship 
afloat and moving, if for no other reason than self 
preservation of the members. Many military combat systems 
possess a capability that allows them to avoid becoming 
both combat ineffective and a combat liability 
simultaneously.  NMCI does share this capability. 
 While not actually participating in combat, NMCI 
is a system meant to support the functions of getting the 
forces to the fight.  The comparatively low effective 
availability within the network indicates that NMCI is at 
best a large DoD contracted ISP.  NMCI is a system that 
could suffer damage or disruptions that would render it 
combat ineffective or a combat casualty as the result of an 
intrusion or compromise.  Loss of NMCI could place vital 
assets out of reach of the command and control structure or 
render them useless because of the unavailability of data. 
The overall combat effectiveness of the Navy and Marine 
Corps team could be compromised because of the lack of 
system availability.  
 This means that NMCI will likely be ineffective 
at completing its intended mission of enterprise 
connectivity or participation in any global information 
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grid in anything other than a comparatively benign 
environment.   
2. NMCI Security 
 In examining the security characteristics of a 
network, there first needs to be a definition of those 
characteristics.  Once the desired characteristics are 
defined, then the network can be examined for their 
presence or absence, and a judgment made on the level of 
security that exists within that network.  The 
characteristics that define security within any given 
network are; 
• Confidentiality. Unintended recipients can't read 
traffic. Confidentiality includes secrecy of the data. 
 
• Authenticity. Unintended originators can not fake 
traffic or forge messages. Authenticity is a superset 
of integrity. 
 
• Integrity. Traffic hasn't been tampered with.  
 
• Non-repudiation. Transmitted messages contain 
characteristics of attribution so that it can not 
later be denied.  
 
• Access control. Unauthorized users denied use of 
network and computing resources.  
 
• Assurance of service. The network is available for use 
and possesses resistance to denial of service attacks. 
 
• Traffic analysis. Ability to derive intelligence from 
the addresses of messages, even if the contents are 
confidentiality-protected. 
 
• Traffic flow analysis. Intelligence inferences gained 




• Interceptability. Ability of unintended recipients to 
receive traffic (regardless of whether they can read 
it). 
 
• Jammability. Vulnerability of a link to interruption 
by signal interference.[RB02]  
  
There are numerous ways of achieving these characteristics 
within a network and they can be applied to a multiple of 
layers within the OSI model.  This is drawn out in ISO 
7498-2 that lists the potential areas of application of 
security measures at each of the seven layers within the 
OSI model. The table that summarizes ISO 7498-2 is 
contained in chapter 1 of this thesis. The significance of 
this OSI model is that the actual implementation of the 
security measures must be resolved with the specific 
characteristics they are trying to impart to the network.  
The resolution process is summarized in what I earlier 
defined as the Buddenberg Matrix. The Buddenberg matrix 
aligns the technical solutions for security with their 
respective requirements and objectives.  The great 
advantage of this matrix is that it permits an effective 
high level examination of the structure and software 
without requiring an in depth examination of the individual 
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Table 13 Buddenberg Matrix of Security Requirements 
 
The operative theory behind the Buddenberg Matrix is that 
in order to achieve the most efficient and effective 
security, all the elements (problem, solution, objective, 
and application) must be in alignment.  This is not to say 
that applications can not be employed in other ways, but 
that to do so will at best sub-optimize the security for 
the network.  Misalignment of requirements and applications 
within the Buddenberg Matrix produces inefficiencies and 
security that is likely less than thought or desired.  
Using the Buddenberg Matrix as an overlay to NMCI security 
we can begin to see there are potential gaps.   
 The NMCI security architecture is an enclave-based 
defense-in-depth concept that would employ services at OSI 
layers three and four.  For the obvious reasons the network 
also utilizes applications at OSI layers one and two to 
provide resistance to attempts to jam or intercept the 
transmissions within the network. The boundaries that 
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constitute the layers of network security within NMCI rely 
heavily on many of the contemporary hardware and software 
applications for a security solution.  These layers and 
their respective tools are summarized below. 
 
Boundary 
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Table 14 Boundary System Summary 
     
Notes    * used only on the classified side of the boundary 
   @ used only on the unclassified side of the boundary 
# VPNs used only for applications that are not compatible with NMCI 
firewalls 
   ** not used across all of the VPNs in boundary     $ used only with the PKI implementation  
 
This table highlights one of the problems with the deployed 
defensive systems within NMCI.  The application of software 
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and hardware is inconsistent across the boundaries both 
internally and externally. While this by itself is not 
outside the norm when other enterprise networks are 
observed, there are potential problems with what these 
applications are intended to achieve and what that are best 
suited for.  To see the potential problems we can examine 
them boundary by boundary.  
 
a. Transport Boundary 
 The transport boundary is intended to move both 
classified and unclassified data between NMCI BANs/LANs via 
the vBNS or DISA services.  The transport boundary employs 
intrusion detection systems and link encryption for 
security of its two internal layers.  Referring to the 
Buddenberg matrix we can see that the intrusion systems are 
a mechanism to provide enclave security, while the link 
encryption is a method of preventing traffic analysis or 
traffic flow analysis.  The link encryption is deployed on 
the classified side of the transport boundary only. The 
inverse is true for the intrusion detection systems which 
reside only on the unclassified portion of the transport 
boundary [RAY01].  VPNs are employed on the unclassified 
side of the transport boundary to connect the communities 
of interest that are separated geographically.   
 The communities of interest that reside within 
NMCI and utilize the unclassified portion of the transport 
boundary are likely the best protected of any within the 
network based on this arrangement.  The combination of the 
VPN, transport layer IDS, and the host level IDS and 
configuration monitoring address the needs of 
confidentiality, authenticity, perimeter protection, and a 
secure pipe. There are gaps in the coverage, however.  The 
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VPN is not an end to end encrypted path, beginning and 
ending at the VPN gateway within each NMCI LAN.  The 
weakness to this arrangement is that confidentiality and 
authenticity of the data between the gateway and the 
destination host is not guaranteed. After reaching the 
gateway the data moves in the clear text from the gateway 
to the NMCI host.   This gap is significant, given that the 
greatest threat is often from internal participants of the 
network [11]. This vulnerability could allow a member of 
the network the ability to exploit the data before it 
reaches the destination host.  The assumption that supports 
this deployment of a VPN are that the NMCI BAN/LAN could 
not be compromised, the data is somehow otherwise 
unobtainable by an intrusion, or that any intrusion would 
be discovered.  The historical experience of dealing with 
intrusions shows this last assumption to be utterly false.   
 Users who are not part of a COI do not benefit 
from the deployment of a VPN.  For those users there is no 
application that provides them with any level of 
confidentiality, authenticity, non-repudiation or data 
integrity.  The IDS at the network and host level serve the 
requirement for enclave security, but remainder of the 
transport boundary is essentially a commercial ISP service. 
While the network is isolated from other traffic, this is 
not a guarantee of security of the data while in transit. 
The data could be quite vulnerable to alteration in this 
environment.  Viewed in an operational context, this 
practice accepts a significant risk.   
 Today, much of the logistical data sent within 
the defense message system is at the unclassified level.  
Data integrity is extremely important in this mission area 
and the potential disruption that could be caused by 
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changing relevant quantity, quality, or line item numbers 
on logistical messages is tremendous. Misdirected delivery 
of munitions, fuel or personnel to improper locations can 
result in units becoming combat ineffective.  Corrections 
of these transactions while in process would require human 
intervention to perform and some element of chance or luck 
to detect before they have actually occurred.  The prospect 
of catching these malicious acts before they produce a 
significant disruption in a high-volume, high-tempo 
environment is extremely low.  The upshot of this is that 
even though the segment of the network is unclassified it 
requires an application or mechanism to support data 
integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation to required by 
the mission. This need for authenticity is universally 
applicable to all traffic that rides within NMCI.  There 
should be an authentication mechanism for all the official 
business transactions that occur.     
  On the classified layer of the transport boundary 
link encryption is employed to provide confidentiality and 
resistance to traffic analysis/traffic flow analysis while 
relying on the intrusion detection systems of the outer 
routers of the BAN and the host based IDS for perimeter 
protection of the network.  This arrangement, when compared 
to the Buddenberg matrix constitutes a misalignment between 
the network requirement and applied solution. The 
encryption in the classified portion of the transport 
boundary is being used to address the need for 
authenticity, non-repudiation, and data integrity.   Given 
this portion of the transport boundary moves classified 
data, it would seem logical to emphasize these 
characteristics for the data while in transit.   This 
deployment doesn’t allow for the authentication of the 
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originator of the data, the integrity of the data while in 
transit, or provide for the accountability of the receiver 
of the data after delivery.  Accountability for who has 
accessed what data is of particular emphasis when handling 
classified printed media and there should be some mechanism 
for doing so within NMCI given the migration to non 
tangible medium for all types of information, both 
classified and otherwise.     
b. Boundary Layer 1 
 Boundary Layer One is intended to provide 
connectivity between NMCI and the NIPRnet and SIPRnet. Like 
the other boundary layers, boundary layer one has both a 
classified and unclassified portion.  Firewalls, IDS, and 
VPNs are used within the unclassified portion of boundary 
layer one to provide security.  The network firewalls and 
IDS work in concert with the host level IDS to produce the 
enclave protection when an NMCI host utilizes this boundary 
for access to the NIPRnet. The VPNs employed within the 
unclassified side of the network are applied in a manner 
different that in the transport boundary discussed 
previously.  The VPNs on the unclassified boundary layer 
one are there to support access to legacy applications that 
reside on the opposite side of the NMCI firewall from the 
user.  These legacy applications are not or can not be made 
compliant with the current NMCI firewall policy.  Rather 
than weaken the firewall on the NMCI BAN/LAN the choice was 
made to use the VPN to transport the legacy application 
through the firewall to give the users the required access.  
The weakness to this arrangement lies with the legacy 
application and the relative misuse of the VPN in this 
role. 
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 The legacy application is likely non-conforming 
with firewall policy because of identified exploitable 
insecurities. VPNs are intended to provide a degree of 
authenticity and confidentiality, not necessarily to 
address an enclave security issue as these legacy 
applications appear to represent.  The VPN use in this case 
provides a point of entry for the insecurity that could not 
be obtained otherwise.  If the legacy application has been 
compromised, the VPN is simply providing the intruder a 
door to bypass some of the enclave protection the boundary 
is intended to provide.  There is a cofferdam configuration 
that is built into VPN employment that allows the datagrams 
to be decrypted, examined for defect by IDS, re-floated via 
another VPN device, and then forwarded to the destination 
gateway. 
 This arrangement could catch identified 
vulnerabilities, but again the vulnerability must be known 
to exist for it to be effective.  This employment of the 
VPN in this case also suffers from the downstream lack of 
encryption to the destination.  The VPN carries the data in 
encrypted form only as far as the VPN gateway in the 
BAN/LAN and from there it moves in the clear.  As in the 
use in within the transport boundary there is the chance of 
compromise from within the NMCI network while the data is 
moving between the VPN gateway and the NMCI host. 
 The classified layer of boundary one employs both 
link encryption and VPNs for security and provides 
connectivity between NMCI and the SIPRnet.   It is assumed 
that there exist within this boundary some communities of 
interest (COIs), and so the employment of the VPNs in 
concert with the link encryption would provide those 
members with an effective level of authenticity and 
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confidentiality, in addition to the benefits of the enclave 
security.  Outside of a COI, however, there is no 
identifiable mechanism for providing assurance of 
authenticity or non-repudiation within this layer of the 
network.  The sophistication of the Type One encryption 
presents a significant barrier to entry; however it is not 
principally intended to provide authenticity to the data.  
The assumption appears to be that this sophisticated 
encryption effectively does just that.  Encryption has been 
shown to have its limits and reliance completely upon it 
for security of classified information accepts less 
security than is placed on other forms of classified data. 
In any event, the use of encryption to provide for 
authenticity is a misalignment of the requirement and the 
solution within the Buddenberg Matrix.  
 It should be noted that greater demands for 
authentication and data integrity are placed upon the 
examination of hard copy classified media.  For some 
classification levels and some types of classified 
material, viewing and handling it requires two persons be 
present at all times. Two-person integrity is cumbersome 
and may be equally so on a network, but allowing the 
information to move so freely with a networked environment 
without some aspect of traceability and data integrity 
check is an insecurity we do not accept with hard copy 
classified material. Given the ease of movement of digital 
data there should be some application for achieving 
authenticity to place network access on the same footing as 
hard copy access.  Simply encrypting the data for transit 
while providing the end users with the decrypted text 
leaves open the issues of who viewed the material and at 
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what time and place, and did all of the data return without 
being duplicated?  
   
c. Boundary Layer 2 
 The construction of Boundary Layer Two is 
essentially identical to that of boundary layer one.  
Firewalls, IDS, and VPNs are deployed in the same manner as 
in boundary layer one.  Only the unclassified portion of 
boundary layer two is described in any detail.  The 
classified portion is only differentiated in the 
documentation by the mention of the use of type one 
encryption “where needed” [RAY01].  There are a multiple of 
access configurations that could be present in the 
unclassified portion of boundary layer two and the final 
definition of those has yet to be determined.  As part of 
the NMCI SSA five different representative scenarios are 
presented as possible solutions to this problem.  The five 
scenarios are described as follows [RAY01]; 
Scenario 1: NMCI Hosted DON Legacy Server 
Scenario 2: Non-NMCI DON Legacy Server 
Scenario 3: Joint Non-DON Legacy Server 
Scenario 4: Joint Non-DON Hosted Server, Replicated 
Scenario 5: Joint Non-DON Hosted Server with Non-DON 
VPN 
  
Viewed in terms of the use of VPNs, scenarios one and three 
employ the VPN as a mechanism for access to a legacy 
application that is resident on the legacy network and is 
not firewall compliant.  In each of these scenarios the VPN 
is being employment as an access tool for the NMCI user to 
reach the legacy application.  The difficulty here is the 
same as was seen in boundary layer one.  The VPN is being 
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employed as an enclave defensive system when its purpose is 
to provide confidentiality and authenticity, not a 
protection against exploits that are buried within the 
legacy application itself. Whatever burdens the legacy 
application possesses are brought into the NMCI environment 
at the BAN/LAN level. 
   Scenario Five employs the use of a network to 
network VPN, combined with type 1 encryption to transfer 
data via the SIPRnet, between another service’s classified 
BAN/LAN and an NMCI BAN/LAN.  Upon entering the NMCI 
BAN/LAN the joint VPN is routed through a specific joint 
service VPN gateway and then into the NMCI environment to 
he end user.  The VPN provides service only when the data 
is on the WAN.  This effectively hides the information 
while riding on the SIPRnet (which is also employs type one 
encryption) between the two classified BANs.  This could be 
used to prevent the disclosure of sensitive data to SIPRnet 
members that do not possess the “need to know”, but again 
the data moves unencrypted within the NMCI classified BAN 
to the end user.  If the data is so sensitive as to require 
limited exposure within a classified network, then the data 
would likely require equivalent confidentiality end to end.  
The NMCI classified BAN however, doesn’t provide this level 
of confidentiality and so the need for confidentiality and 
authenticity is not addresses to its fullest in a situation 
that may require it.   
  Scenario Four is a replica of the scenario five 
deployed for access through the unclassified NIPRnet.  This 
boundary uses a network to network VPN to move the data 
from the legacy server to the NMCI BAN via boundary layer 
one, and then a single sided VPN moves it to the NMCI BAN 
and the end user.  The legacy application resides in the 
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DMZ external to NMCI and behind a firewall operated by 
another service.  The employment of the VPN in this manner 
implies the application may not be firewall compliant 
thought his is not specifically stated.  This implication 
is supported by the use of a single sided VPN to move the 
data past the NMCI firewall.  The VPN terminates at a 
gateway and then flows to the end user over the NMCI BAN.  
Given the data is unclassified and the VPN is single sided 
the primary purpose must be to avert the conflict between 
the firewall and the application providing the user access.   
  Scenario Two is the most basic of the five and 
uses the Boundary Two firewall and IDS as the mechanisms 
for defending the network.  This is the conventional 
enclave arrangement and as such does little to provide he 
user with any level of confidentiality or authenticity of 
the data.  The firewalls and IDS are the static defenses 
that are relied upon for protection.  What is unclear about 
this boundary protection is that the legacy applications 
accessed are identified as not firewall compliant, so it is 
uncertain how these identified non-compliant applications 
will be accessed through that same firewall.   
d. Boundary Layer 3 
  Boundary Layer Three is designed to give 
separation between specific communities of interest that 
lie with NMCI.  There are four communities of interest 


















































(D)    X X  
 Table 15 NMCI COIs 
Notes: 1. To limit network access to a private server   
2. To protect private server or enclave with its own LAN 
3. If required 
   
 
Communities of Interest A through C employ a virtual LAN in 
concert with the host based system for enclave security.  
Because of the dispersed nature of COI B a VPN is deployed 
to provide confidentiality and authenticity. COIs C and D 
benefit from the use of an IDS and either a dedicated 
firewall or VPN as required.  This configuration is likely 
the most effective within NMCI, but is limited in its 
application because of the comparative small size of the 
groups involved.  The VLAN application and host defenses 
provide reasonable enclave security, while the use of VPNs 
serves the needs of confidentiality and authenticity to the 
users.  The weakness existing in the VPN encryption is not 
truly end to end, providing an opening to an internal 
intruder.  The relative small size of the COIs may mitigate 
this to a degree, however it is not as effective as true 




e. Boundary Layer 4 
  Boundary Layer Four is the host server level of 
the NMCI defense.  This layer utilizes host based IDS, 
anti-virus applications, and configuration management.  In 
conjunction with these applications there will be a Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) implementation.  Unfortunately 
this will not be implemented as part of the roll out and so 
the true date for PKI operation is presently undetermined.  
Without the PKI implementation the boundary four 
protections provide enclave protection only.  Authenticity 
and confidentiality are provided via the password 
protections which is a conflict between the requirements 
and solution with the Buddenberg matrix.  The VPN clients 
that are deployed provide this confidentiality when used, 
but we have seen that this application only goes as far as 
the gateway and provides only limited capability.  The IDS 
and antivirus applications are reactive in nature and only 
as effective as the management tools that keep them up to 
date. 
  While effective at protecting the box, these are 
of little value to the network in total and do not address 
the full spectrum of security requirements.  What is needed 
for NMCI is a method of security that effectively provides 
security for the data that is being moved in addition to 
the security of the boxes and pipes that constitute the 
network.   
 
f. Security Summary  
  While the security applications deployed within 
NMCI are effective at providing a degree of enclave 
security, there are significant gaps in the coverage they 
provide. There are obvious misalignments in the system 
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requirements and the applied solutions throughout the 
boundary layer system.   
  The transport boundary relies heavily upon the 
use of link encryption to provide authenticity and 
confidentiality of the data as it moves on the classified 
portion of the boundary.  The VPNs deployed on the 
transport boundary are gateway to gateway and do not 
protect the data all the way to the end user.  In Boundary 
Layer One the VPNs are employed as a mechanism for 
accessing legacy applications that are not compliant with 
the NMCI firewall policy.  Boundary Layer One also employs 
link encryption as a means of providing authenticity and 
confidentiality.  In Boundary Layer Two, three of the five 
offered scenarios employ VPNs in the same manner as 
boundary layer one, to provide access to legacy 
applications.  Boundary Layer Three is one of the better 
arrangements within NMCI, but here again is the limitation 
that the VPNs employed cover the data only as far as the 
gateway within the BAN or LAN.  At Boundary Layer Four the 
defensive mechanisms support only the enclave defense and 
do not provide any level of protection for the data 
contained therein.  Each of these solutions constitutes a 
misalignment of the applied solution and the network 
requirement when mapped onto the Buddenberg matrix.   
  In addition to these misalignments, there appears 
to be a lack of consideration of the threat posed by an 
internal network member.  Even in the portions of the 
respective boundaries where the solutions and objects are 
reasonably aligned, there are gaps that could be exploited 
by an internal intruder.  The VPN devices provide 
protection only as far as the gateway and not all the way 
to the end user.  These gaps offer an opportunity to 
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members of the network to sniff or capture the traffic as 
it flows internal to the BAN or LAN.  An intruder would 
have to defeat some of the internal network defenses to 
deploy his own exploit, but this has been done successfully 
in the past and is likely to occur again in the future.  
Effectively securing the data could negate this effort or 
at least make its execution of much less value.    
 There may be an assumption that internal 
compromise is unlikely, but when considering the historical 
cases of compromises to Navy security in other areas, the 
internal members have proven to be the most damaging.  The 
John Walker family espionage case proved that significant 
and long term intrusions can go unnoticed or unchecked and 
produce tremendous damage.  Without more effectively 
addressing this weakness NMCI could suffer a similar 
compromise.  This is of particular concern given that NMCI 
is obligated to support the numerous legacy applications 
and networks that are in the Navy inventory today.  
 Legacy applications represent a distinct 
challenge during the initial transition into the NMCI 
environment because many of them were created before 
network security was given the significance is possesses 
now.  If there is a weakest link in the network chain it is 
these legacy networks and applications that are based upon 
operating systems software than possess demonstrated 
compromises.  Consequently, inclusion of these legacy 
applications and networks poses a significant risk to NMCI 
in its initial phase of operation.  This is not meant to 
suggest that this issue has been ignored; rather it is 
obvious when looking at the NMCI security boundary system 
that this issue has been addressed.   
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 Stepping back from the specifics of the 
individual boundary definitions their larger purpose can be 
seen.  Of the five defined boundaries within NMCI, Boundary 
Layers One and Two exist primarily to provide access to 
legacy applications or networks that reside within the Navy 
and Marine Corps.  Contemporary networks are difficult 
enough to maintain security within, and these legacy 
systems makes the job for NMCI that much more difficult.  
Some of the difficulty lies in the methodology that is used 
in the application of that security.  Securing the network 
pipe and the network box, as is attempted within NMCI, has 
limited effectiveness without greater attempts at securing 
the data that exists within it.    
 Securing the data within NMCI is dependent upon 
the inclusion of an object level security approach to the 
problem of securing NMCI as a whole.  Looking back at the 
OSI layer model and the Buddenberg Matrix, and then 
comparing the layers of the NMCI enclave we can see that 
nearly all of the NMCI protective features are placed at 
OSI layers 1, 2, 3 and 4.   
 
Service  OSI Layer 
Confidentiality 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 
Authentication 3, 4, 7 
Integrity  3, 4, 7 
Access Control  3, 4, 7 
Non-Repudiation 7 
Table 16 ISO 7498-2 Layers 
 
 VPNs address the layer seven requirements 
incompletely because of their configuration within the 
network.  In Mahanian terms this would be like escorting 
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your merchant ships only seventy-five percent of the way to 
port and hoping the enemy raiders just don’t show up in 
that other twenty-five percent. The data require a convoy 
system for protection while in transit. The data needs 
protection port to port and node to node for the network to 
be successful in its mission. Object level security is the 
only method of addressing all of the OSI layer security 
requirements at the same time and at the same OSI layer.  
Application of object level security also carries with it 
additional benefits to the network as a whole. 
 Employing object-level security requirements will 
alleviate the need for the use and management of some of 
the encryption and VPNs employed within NMCI now.  With 
object level security the network pipe can be come more 
generic because the security functions are being provided 
at the application level and not the transport level.  This 
eliminates the need for widespread encryption throughout 
the network and allows it to be employed only where there 
is a need to protect the network pipe.  This gives the 
network greater flexibility, reduces the management burden 
and cost, while providing effective security through the 
alignment of the requirement and the applied solution.  The 
need to secure the network box and transport layer may not 
be completely eliminated, however network security is 
greatly enhanced through the application of object level 
security by effectively addressing all of the network 
security needs on a common OSI layer, making its 






H. QUALITY OF SERVICE 
 An effective quality of service implementation is 
essential to the network being able to perform its mission 
tasks during periods of limited availability or restricted 
bandwidth as the result of compromise or damage.  
Differential services within the network routing structure 
are what give a network the ability to cope with these 
problems in a logical and predetermined manner than 
supports the networks primary mission functions.  The 
functionality provided by differential services is 
applicable down to the BAN and LAN level, but is most 
relevant at the WAN level and above that connect the 
various NMCI enclaves deployed in the U.S. and around the 
globe.  This translates to the vBNS and DISA services that 
constitute the transport boundary within NMCI.  
Differentiation at this level is most relevant because the 
communicating parties are geographically isolated from one 
another by large distances.  In addition, the vBNS and DISA 
will likely be handling the largest volume of prioritized 
traffic when compared to any individual WAN or metropolitan 
area network within NMCI.  This requirement is even more 
critical when considering the need to provide a global 
connection to the Fleet.   
 NMCI is tasked to provide connectivity in cooperation 
with a global information grid.  This implies the need to 
connect to the Fleet underway, likely through a radio wide 
area network (radio-WAN).  The radio-wan will likely be a 
bottleneck for communications with the Fleet.  Consequently 
the radio-WAN will need an effective means of applying 
differential services to its traffic.  NMCI, operating in 
cooperation with that radio-WAN, will need to be able to 
  170
respect the differential service scheme employed within the 
radio-WAN as it moves the incoming Fleet traffic.   
 The quality of service implemented within NMCI is a 
designed to provide specific applications with reserved 
bandwidth, controlled jitter, latency and packet loss.  The 
vBNS system operated by MCI Worldcom utilizes multi-
protocol label switching (MPLS) to perform traffic 
engineering within the backbone of the transport boundary 
of NMCI.  The MPLS used by Worldcom employs resource 
reservation protocol (RSVP) to develop the quality of 
service guarantees for various application flows.  The key 
feature of the MPLS is its ability to provide label 
switched paths (LSP) which are similar to permanent virtual 
circuits (PVC).   
 The MPLS works by measuring the available resources 
(bandwidth) and then allocating them to LSP tunnels, which 
are explicit flow paths from ingress to egress of the vBNS 
structure. MPLS traffic engineering routes traffic flows 
across a network based on the resources the traffic flow 
requires and the resources available in the network. An 
interior gateway protocol measures the flow within the 
tunnels and the demand for service and then dynamically 
reconfigures the tunnels to fit the required load.  If any 
particular stream exceeds the capacity of a LSP tunnel, 
multiple tunnels will be allocated to the same ingress and 
egress points to carry the traffic.  This application 
allows the vBNS backbone to support a high use of 
transmission capacity while being very resilient, so that 
it can withstand link or node failures.  This gives NMCI a 
higher degree of availability of the backbone than might 
otherwise be available, but does not fully address the need 
for differential service.   
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 The MPLS system allows the network to achieve greater 
connectivity during restricted bandwidth because it 
dynamically matches the available bandwidth to the LSP 
tunnels.  The problem with this application is that it 
meets the needs of connectivity based on the available 
bandwidth without restricting access to that bandwidth on 
any other criteria.  The LSP tunnels are determined by the 
destination of the packet and not by the mission function 
or originator of the packet being sent.  Consequently, 
bandwidth is likely allocated to functions that may or may 
not be considered mission essential during times of 
restricted bandwidth.  There needs to be an effective 
mechanism for discriminating between high bandwidth demand 
applications based on mission function.  The latest AFRTS 
(Armed Forces Radio and Television System) release and real 
time video from a remotely operated vehicle would demand 
similar bandwidth. But how does the network determine who 
gets the available bandwidth, Arnold Schwarzenegger or 
Osama Bin Laden? MPLS, while enhancing the availability of 
the network, does not address the natural tension that 
exists between the need of all to be connected and the need 
to maintain mission essential functions.  As bandwidth is 
reduced, the internal gateway protocol will attempt to keep 
as many tunnels open to as many locations as possible, 
allocating bandwidth reductions in line with the existing 
ratios.  While this is desirable, as some point there must 
be a decision to allow some members availability to fall 
out in favor of other more relevant and mission essential 
organizations or units.   
 This QoS application discriminates based on 
destination IP address and not the mission functions 
contained within the network or possessed by specific 
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application flows.  What is needed is a protocol that will 
allocate the available bandwidth in a dynamic manner based 
upon the mission precedence of a given demand for traffic 
flow.  The highest mission precedence should be allocated 
the required available bandwidth first.  Lower precedence 
traffic should be required to wait in a queue until it 
possesses adequate precedence compared to competing traffic 
and can be forwarded.   
Implicit with this idea of precedence is that at some 
point available bandwidth to some users will effectively 
become zero based on the assigned or designated precedence 
of their transmissions.  This can be likened to the 
imposition of “minimize” that exists within the defense 
message system.  The imposition of “minimize” requires 
users desiring to transmit a message to a specified 
destination that is under “minimize” to obtain a precedence 
of a certain level.  This is intended to cull out much of 
the non-mission essential traffic that would otherwise be 
sent.  Differential services follow this same pattern, only 
in reverse.  
Under restricted bandwidth conditions users would be 
restricted or prohibited from transmitting on the network 
based upon the precedence assigned to their traffic.  This 
imposition would likely be based upon user identification 
within a particular command, as is the message release 
authority for the defense messaging system. If adequate 
granularity could be achieved the optimal solution to this 
problem would be to base it on the specific application 
being used.  Placing the deterministic factors for 
differential service at the application layer would permit 
all users access to the network if the precedence of the 
traffic deemed it appropriate.  This keeps some degree of 
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connectivity to each organization at each level.  Placing 
the deterministic characteristics at the application level 
also aligns the need for the performance of the 
differential service with the security requirements as 
expressed within the Buddenberg matrix.  
Another potential limitation of this QoS application 
is that it relies on RSVP to create tunnels within the 
network.  The potential problem is the unintentional 
development of logical single points of failure within the 
network through the reservation of resources.  This could 
be the result of the attempt to remain connected to as many 
nodes as possible without regard to effective bandwidth or 
availability. 
While the implementation of quality of service within 
the NMCI vBNS system is superior to the best effort 
service, it falls short of providing adequate ability to 
differentiate between mission essential and non-mission 
essential service application flows.  The MPLS will enhance 
the availability of the network, which improves its 
survivability, but it doesn’t adequately enhance the 
performance of the mission essential functions within NMCI 
to the point of making it a survivable network.  
   
I. NMCI SECURITY ARCHITECTURE CONCLUSION 
The NMCI security architecture is likely superior to 
many enterprise implementations that are operating today.  
It possesses significant improvements over the basic 
concept of network security architecture through its 
employment of multiple internal layers.  NMCI does not, 
however, possess the requisite characteristics necessary to 
make it a survivable system.  There are lapses or gaps that 
need to be addressed within the structure. 
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The enclave security strategy is arguably an 
incomplete practice, particularly in terms of the needs of 
a modern network intended to perform a military mission.  
Enterprise implementations in the private sector are 
comparable, but the fact that is overlooked by NMCI is that 
even these business organizations have a central mission 
focus to their network.  NMCI is attempting to perform all 
missions for all masters and this is reflected in the 
enclave strategy.  Efforts were made to protect everything. 
Unfortunately there were no efforts made to enhance any of 
the specific mission capabilities of the network.  Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s theories suggest we need to be offensively 
minded if we desire to dominate the battle space. The 
network environment is the definitive battle space of the 
future, if not the present. With NMCI we have chosen to be 
purely defensive, attempting to deny the denier.  The 
network security strategy within NMCI needs to change to 
reflect the needs of network centric warfare, not network 
centric defense.   
The focus on network-centric defense can be seen in 
the security systems within NMCI.  The boundary layers that 
constitute the network reflect the dependence upon 
contemporary network defensive strategy.  The tools are 
essentially reactive and possess very limited ability to 
adapt on their own. The defensive mechanisms are largely 
constructed upon historical data and don’t adequately 
address the implications of future attackers.   
The availability provisioned by the relevant SLAs do 
not fully address the standards of dual threaded 
capability.   While not a certainty, the contractual 
agreements do not require the service provider to 
specifically meet these levels in the design or 
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construction of their systems.  The availability levels 
established are below the dual redundancy demanded in other 
major systems employed in the warfighting function of the 
Navy and Marine Corps.   
The quality of service implementation within NMCI is 
certainly better than could be had in most other networks.  
The effect is to enhance the availability levels of the 
NMCI backbone, which is a benefit based upon the 
examination of the contractual levels obtained.  
Unfortunately, as good as this application is, it falls 
short of the level of differential services required to 
protect the networks mission essential functions.   
At the end of the day the NMCI architecture, while 
measurably more effective than previous designs, fails to 
meet the requirements of survivability because of its 
inability to protect and preserve the networks mission 
essential functions. Unfortunately for the Navy and Marine 


































The analysis of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet 
undertaken in this thesis evaluated, at a relatively high 
level of abstraction, the mission, mission functions, and 
architecture of the network to determine if the design was 
consistent with the concepts of the network survivability 
analysis method.  In the process of this evaluation, it 
became evident that concepts of survivability can be better 
defined by tying them to the contemporary framework of 
networks.  Doing so allows for an easier translation for 
those who are less familiar with the original documents and 
places them into a context more suitable to the 
applications and hardware that will perform the necessary 
network tasks.   
The original work on network survivability identified 
the key properties as recognition, resistance, recovery, 
and adaptation.  When these definitions are mapped onto the 
more conventional terminology used in the discussion of 
networks it can be seen that there is some overlap among 
them.  The characteristics of a survivable network can be 
better parsed so as to eliminate the overlap and more 
clearly separate the qualities and their relevant required 
functions.   
I believe the requisite survivability attributes that 
a network should possess are better defined as mission, 
availability, security, and quality of service.   These 
characteristics map more explicitly to the software and 
hardware applications that comprise a network and the 
functions they perform both individually and collectively.  
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It is also important to understand that these four 
characteristics and the overall survivability of a network 
are interdependent.  A network needs to possess all four of 
these characteristics to be survivable and the failure of 
any one places the overall network survivability in doubt.  
Of the four, however, the characteristic of mission 
definition is the most significant.  
The network mission definition is the most important 
characteristic to network survivability because it directly 
influences the implementation of hardware and software that 
combine to create the other three characteristics within 
the network.  The opposite can not be said to occur.  The 
application of hardware and software within a network can 
not combine to produce a mission definition for a network 
because the mission definition is derived from the network 
designer’s/user’s intent.  An examination of the resident 
hardware and software and the resultant internal 
characteristics of the network can infer what mission(s) is 
(are) relevant to the network or what mission functions it 
could perform, but it can not derive intent.  Therefore, 
networks that possess a poorly defined, nebulous or too 
broadly characterized mission definition possess a 
fundamental flaw that likely inhibits their ability to 
achieve survivability.  Such is the case with the Navy and 
Marine Corps Intranet.   
 
B. NMCI MISSION DEFINITION 
Navy and Marine Corps Intranet survivability is 
fundamentally flawed because of the lack of a clearly 
defined mission function.  The network is required to 
support the core functions for business, scientific, 
research, computational activities, and warfighting. 
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Essentially NMCI is required to perform every mission for 
every man.  Consequently, determining the mission essential 
functions of the network was impossible, since all missions 
and all functions were given equivalent footing within the 
network architecture.  The examination then became one to 
determine what mission the network was best capable of 
performing based upon the established architecture.   
In broad terms, I defined the most demanding mission 
for NMCI as force projection, disaggregated this mission 
into the two mission essential functional flows of 
logistics and readiness, in that order of precedence. NMCI 
can begin its progression toward survivability by adopting 
the force projection mission definition and developing the 
mission essential functional flows of logistics and 
readiness I have identified in this thesis. By doing so, 
NMCI’s mission definition will become aligned with a core 
warfighting mission requirement of the Navy and Marine 
Corps.  
 
C. NMCI LEGACY AND TRANSITION 
Given the number and varied composition of software 
operated by the DoN and the essentially finite amount of 
funding available there will likely always be something 
that falls under the legacy definition. The existence of 
legacy systems and the requirement to transition them will 
then be an ongoing issue for NMCI for some time to come.  
Legacy is a double-edged sword for NMCI.  These systems 
hold vital, valuable data to the enterprise that needs to 
be preserved and passed forward so that NMCI can 
effectively perform its assigned mission. Legacy systems 
are also a threat to NMCI because they offer a weak point 
for exploitation, potentially becoming legitimized trojan 
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horses used to violate an otherwise more secure 
environment.  The question for NMCI then is not if it must 
accommodate legacy, but rather how it must accommodate 
legacy in a manner that is consistent with NMCIs mission 
definition.   
The selection of legacy systems for transition should 
be based upon the contribution the individual application 
makes to the primary mission function of NMCI.  Based upon 
the force projection mission definition I offered for NMCI, 
the legacy applications chosen first for transition into 
the NMCI environment (from the list of approximately 37, 
000) should be those that support the essential logistical 
functions of the Navy and Marine Corps. The next 
applications selected should be those that support the 
primary readiness and training functions of the Navy and 
Marine Corps.  Transition of applications in this manner 
balances the risk and benefits to the network in a logical, 
mission based manner.  Since all legacy applications 
represent a potential threat, it is logical then to bring 
only those that enhance the network’s ability to support 
the Navy and Marine Corps combat capability.  Transitioning 
any application that does not meet this requirement 
constitutes the acceptance of unnecessarily greater risk to 
the network. 
The organization of the transition of the Navy and 
Marine enterprise should be guided in the same manner.  The 
transition into the NMCI environment has been guided by the 
traditional organizational lines that dominate large 
organizational thinking. The failing of this methodology is 
that the transition of any single unit or staff is not 
effectively complete until the entire enterprise has 
transitioned.  This is because the benefits of increased 
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functionality are best realized only on the enterprise 
level.  The transition into NMCI should be functionally 
based upon NMCI’s mission definition and the transition 
executed on an enterprise level.  By transitioning in this 
manner the functionality provided by the individual 
application is achieved force-wide in a single event and 
the requirements for remedial work are reduced 
significantly.  To guide the execution of the transition 
and the implementation of the legacy software I have 
offered a practice from the software design community known 
as spiral development.   
The application of the spiral design methodology to 
the NMCI transition will permit functionality to 
implemented force wide while allowing an incremental 
approach to the execution of the entire process.  The 
advantage of this approach is two-fold.  First, employing 
the spiral method to the transition into the NMCI 
environment will produce functionality across the entire 
force in each iteration.  If functions are transitioned 
instead of command organizations, then all the members that 
employ that functionality gain. 
Assuming the functions are transitioned in priority 
based upon mission function, the entire force gains because 
the functionality is connected to the Navy and Marine Corps 
core mission requirements. Second, the spiral method allows 
for the development of the mission essential functions for 
the network, a critical requirement for the achievement of 
survivability.  The definition of NMCIs mission essential 
services can then be used to guide the application of 
availability, security, and quality of service 
implementations within the network architecture in the 
effort to achieve network survivability.   
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D. NMCI SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
The NMCI security architecture was examined for the 
characteristics of availability, security, and quality of 
service, the elemental requirements of network 
survivability.  How effectively these elements are 
implemented within the network determines if NMCI is a 
survivable network.  
The levels of availability provisioned within NMCI are 
reflective of other enterprise network implementations.  
Unfortunately, this is not entirely adequate to meet the 
mission requirements for a survivable network or for a 
network that entails a military mission function.  The 
effective availability for the network is less than the 
dual redundant capability that the application of 
survivability reflects in other types of complex systems.  
Ships and aircraft possess this redundancy at some level, 
the focus of which is to keep the ship afloat or the 
aircraft in flying.  The same can not be said for NMCI.  
The levels of availability within NMCI do not reflect the 
mission essential status the network has been given.   
Quality of service is implemented within the network, 
but not in manner that supports survivability requirements.  
Application flows are given priority based upon their 
function without consideration to the network mission 
function of the flow or the precedence of the originator.  
For a network to be survivable it must provide those 
mission essential functions while under duress. To meet 
this requirement NMCI needs a prioritization of internal 
functions and originators and a mechanism for traffic 
differentiation.  The quality of service within NMCI 
doesn’t present this capability and as such does not fully 
meet the needs for a survivable network.  
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The security mechanisms within NMCI are as current as 
any network system in operation.  Unfortunately, they are 
rooted in a defensive network security strategy that may be 
fundamentally flawed.  At a fundamental level, networks are 
designed and built to move information while network 
defensive strategy hopes to protect the network by somehow 
restricting the movement.  What is needed is an offensive 
network strategy that emphasizes the ability of the network 
to move the data to the location it desires in spite of the 
success of any attack against it.  Network survivability is 
the strategy that moves NMCI in that direction.     
The applications that perform the security function 
are likely effective in many areas, but there exist 
misapplications of technology and gaps in coverage that 
present opportunities for exploitation.  More importantly, 
the security applications within NMCI are potentially sub-
optimal because they seek to secure the network boxes and 
pipes, ignoring the importance of the information that 
travels within them. Shifting the focus to securing the 
data within NMCI could produce a more cohesive while less 
coupled network, significantly enhancing the survivability 
of NMCI.  
To achieve this, the authentication and 
confidentiality mechanisms must be internalized to the 
specific applications.  Embedding these functions into the 
individual applications secures the data being transmitted 
and allows the application to be completely indifferent to 






E. NMCI SURVIVABILITY CONCLUSION 
To summarize the work conducted in this thesis, NMCI 
is not a survivable network for the following four reasons; 
 
 1. Lack of a clearly defined mission or missions 
2. Availability (Ao) that is less than needed to 
ensure the retention of full mission capability. 
3.  The quality of service implemented does not 
provide for application of differential service 
of network traffic. 
4. The security mechanisms employed do not 
ensure the security of the data within NMCI. 
 
While all of these failings are significant, three of the 
four are essentially technical problems. Technical problems 
have not proven to be insurmountable.  The most difficult 
problem faced by NMCI is the lack of a clear mission 
definition, and until this is determined, no amount of 




If the U.S. Armed Forces are to transition to network 
centric warfare, then one among them must make the first 
leap into the waters of cyberspace.  The Navy and Marine 
Corps team have chosen to be the first with the advent of 
the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet.  The problem being 
faced now is how to make this system viable for use in a 
military application. There are several things that should 
be done to correct the drift of NMCI and lay it on a course 
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that will produce direct, tangible results that support the 
Services and their warfighting mission. 
First, NMCI should assume as its primary mission force 
projection, disaggregated into the logistical and readiness 
mission essential function flows. This will begin the 
process of segregation of functions within the network and 
among the legacy applications awaiting transition that is 
necessary for the construction of an adequate quality of 
service application for the network.   
Second, NMCI availability should be contracted to the 
level of four 9’s (.9999) of availability throughout. This 
measure should be taken from network host to network host.  
Given the series-dependent nature of NMCI, this level of 
service makes the requirements for SLAs addressing 
availability at other levels much less significant if not 
irrelevant.  If the availability measured host-to-host is 
at four 9’s then the cooperating network segments then must 
be higher than that. This is likely the easiest fix to be 
performed.  The addition of hardware and planning of 
additional alternate routes is not a significantly complex 
task in most cases.   
Third, NMCI must implement a quality of service 
control that will provide granularity at least equivalent 
to the existing JANAP 128 notion.  While crude in 
comparison to the potential capability of a QoS 
application, it will require NMCI to meet the standard 
applied within our existing radio networks.  
Fourth, NMCI must implement an object level security 
strategy for the entire network.  Object level security 
will enhance overall security of the data while decoupling 
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the security mechanisms from the physical network. 
Decoupling security from the physical network provides NMCI 
with the greatest flexibility operationally and in terms of 
the overall NMCI business plan fee for service.  
Lastly, NMCI needs to sponsor good housekeeping rules 
to guide the transition of legacy applications both now and 
in the future.  Foremost among these rules should be the 
requirement for object level security and the need for 
alignment of the individual applications function with the 
overall mission of the network.    
In total these recommendations constitute threshold 
requirements for networks performing in military 
applications.  These requirements can be expressed in terms 
of availability, security, and quality of service and are 
mission dependent. Using the broad mission definitions from 
chapter two (Administration, Force Projection, Battle 
Management) we can see how the requirements increase with 
the desired mission function.  
 Administration Force Projection 
Battle 
Management 















> JANAP 128 
Table 17 Mission Area Threshold Requirements 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to refine these 
characteristics further. It has established what I believe 
to be the threshold requirements for the utilization of 
networks in a military mission.  A network requirement that 
falls to the right of the force projection mission will 
likely require a greater application of these qualities to 
meet the mission need.  This is due in large part to the 
greater demands of the specific mission area.  A 
requirement that falls to the left of force projection 
mission area begs the question of why construct a Service 
specific intranet in the first place.   
Adopting these recommendations will place NMCI on the 
road to survivability without undue effort compared to what 
has taken place so far.  Adopting the mission function and 
reorganizing the legacy transition are a matter of 
emphasis.  The increase in availability levels are the 
simple application of additional hardware where needed.  
The quality of service implementation is the most 
difficult, but is likely solvable in a short period given 
the comparatively crude sieve desired for network traffic.  
Force projection is likely not the proverbial “killer app” 
that the Navy and Marine Corps sought with the inception of 
NMCI.  It is in my opinion a near certainty that, if the 
rather mundane but vital functions of logistics and 
readiness cannot be mastered in the networked environment, 
then we have little hope of ever obtaining any viable 








































This appendix contains the lecture notes of Professor 
Rex Buddenberg and addresses the subject of availability of 
a networked system.  These notes are the work of Professor 
Buddenberg and he is responsible for their content.  This 
appendix is included for the readers benefit and to gain a 
better understanding of how availability applies to 
networked systems.  
 
Availability (and survivability) 
 
"Amateurs talk about tactics; professionals discuss 
logistics" 
 
.............................sign on John Lehman's desk[1] 
 
Network analog: Amateurs talk about bits per second; 




I. Why is the subject of availability important in 
networking? 
 
II. How do we do the arithmetic? 
 
III. Putting it into some perspective. 
 
 
I. Why is it important to know something about 
availability? 
 In a network centric set of information systems, 
sooner or later, enough of the operation uses the network 
that it can be viewed as mission critical[2]. Indeed, a 
network centric approach to systems engineering tends to 
result in several information systems (which may or may not 
be interrelated) all using the same network 
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substrate. A failure of that networking substrate brings 
many parts of the overall operation to a halt -- an 
increasingly unacceptable circumstance. The good side of 
this state of multiple systems using the same network is 
that it becomes increasingly economical to make the 
investments in high availability in the network because 
you only have to do them once rather than once for each 
information system. The other piece of good news is that 
all the tools required to build high availability networks 
are available off the commercial market. Indeed, by 
distributing information systems across a highly available 
network, we can build more survivable information systems 
through distribution than by using more traditional combat 
system engineering methods. (Unfortunately this is a 
subject that I've never found treated in networking 
textbooks; the quantitative parts here are mined from a 
reliability engineering text). 
 
II. How do we do the arithmetic? 
 Ao is the engineering symbol for operational 
availability. It is usually expressed as a percentage and 
is defined as: up time / total time[3]. For example, the 
telephone company may quote you a 99.7% Ao, assuming you 
can find someone in the phone company who will tell you. 
Given 8640 seconds in a day, this 
means that for 8614 seconds the phone system will be 
responsive to you and for 26 seconds it won't -- on the 
average. 
 
                    up time  
        0.998 = ----------------------- 
                     8640 
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Note that (up time) can be represented as (total time - 
down time) so we can solve for down time directly if we 
wish: 
 
                   8640 - down time 
 0.998 = ------------------------------- 
                        8640 
 
Usually it makes much more sense from a requirements point 
of view to specify tolerable down time. 
 





Serial arrangments.  
 We can either obtain availability figures for 
components from the suppliers or we can estimate them from 
experience. In this case let's assume: 
 
     Ao of WAN as 99.7%  
     Ao of router as 99.9%  
     Ao of the LAN and end systems (collectively) as 99% 
 
Since the three components are wired in series, the Ao for 
the system as a whole is the product of the three component 
values: 
 
Ao = 0.997 * 0.999 * 0.99 = 0.986 
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Figured over a month, this Ao figures as 605 minutes of 
down time: 
 
                 43200 - down time 
     0.986 = ------------------------------ 
                        43200 
 
Can your network stand 5 hours of down time per month? (To 
be fair, note that the downtime is as likely to occur at 
night as during working hours).  While it has been common 
practice in many DoD systems to attempt to improve 
readiness rates by increasing the Ao of the components, one 
can see that there 
are severe limits. And the limits are prohibitive in solid 
state systems such as current technology networks -- we 
have to replicate components and solve our Ao 
problems through redundancy. 
 
Three principles of high availability engineering: 
     - eliminate single points of failure (often called 
common-cause failures)  
     - provide reliable crossover (from primary to backup)  
     - promptly detect failures upon occurrence 
 
The rest of this section addresses the first of these 
principles. The second is neatly and inherently handled by 
the TCP/IP protocol stack for internetworks and by 
FDDI ring-wrap in LANs. The third is a core function of 
network management systems. These threads are taken up on 
those lessons. 
 
Multiple-threaded systems.  
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 Let's redraw our network layout to include two network 
installations: 
 Many networks grow like topsy so it's quite frequently 
that we find a pair (or more) of independent network 
installations [4]. In the stovepipe configuration above, 
both systems will exhibit the single-threaded Ao 
characteristics we've penciled out. But, let's twiddle a 
bit: 
     - let's assume that the larger WAN has multiple 
altroutes within it.  
     - bring the connectivity into the 
command/building/facility through two different central 
offices and through two different cable trenches. (Remember 
this 
     need when we talk about radio-WANs)  
     - cross-connect the routers (i.e. campus backbone)  
     - don't do something stupid like putting both routers 
on the same UPS or in the same wiring closet (different 
buildings makes sense)  
     - if the LANs are compatible, cross-connect them (one 
way is to add a bridge). 
 
If we can reach a situation where one line failure can be 
compensated by the other, one router failure can be 
compensated by the other and component failures in the LAN 
can be compensated by redundant workstations and LAN 
cabling, then we've reached a point where recalculation of 
the arithmetic makes sense. 
 If the line Ao remains 99.7%, then the expected 
probability of failure is 0.3% or 0.003. Since we now have 
two lines, either of which being up represents success, 
then failure is represented by both lines being down: 0.003 
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* 0.003 or 0.000009. This means that the two lines working 
together have a combined Ao of 
.999991[5]. If we had a third line to contribute to the 
cause, and could still maintain independence of mode of 
failure, then we cook an Ao of 0.9999997! 
 
Procedure: 
     - find probability of failure (1-Ao).  
     - multiply the probabilities of failure for all 
parallel systems.  
     - convert back to Ao by subtracting from 1 again. 
 
Perform this procedure for each module: line, router, LAN. 
Given the hypothetical numbers we're using, and a simple 
duplication of the system, we get Ao for the 
pair of routers of six 9s and for the combined LAN assembly 
of four 9s.  
 
     - now multiply the three Ao values just as before: 
 
Ao = 0.99999 * 0.999999 * 0.9999 = 0.999889 
 
And you can then refigure predicted mean down time:  
 
                    43200 - down time 
0.999889 = ---------------------------------- 
                      43200 
 
And get about 5 minutes of down time per month. This is a 
pretty dramatic shift -- at pretty nominal cost. 
 
III. Perspective. What does all this arithmetic mean? 
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1. To the requirements setter. 
2. To the network manager. 
 
Requirements setter. First of all, make sure the 
requirements setter specifies an Ao requirement or 
objective. Of all the requirements documents I dealt with 
in 6 years in the business in CGHQ, I only had one that 
specified an Ao value -- and I'd ghostwritten it. In 
general, if you ask an operator what his availability 
requirement -- Ao = ____(fill in the blank) -- is, he won't 
give you anything meaningful. Ask the question in terms of 
tolerable down time and then do the arithmetic. 
 Expect the requirements setters to lowball the 
availability requirement. This happens for several reasons: 
     - the sponsor is only worrying about his application 
on the network. If you look at the aggregate of several 
information systems residing on the network, the real 
availability requirement will be higher. 
     - a sponsor will often lowball because he's trying to 
chisel costs. Seems to be a natural human tendency to deny 
this requirement. 
 Network manager. Fortunately, with current 
internetworking technology, if we do a decent 
modularization job, these shortcomings can almost always be 
fixed later at fairly modest costs. This can be done by 
adding diverse altroutes, and by cross-connecting of 
routers and LANs. Many commands have multiple stovepipe 
networks that arrived from different programs and only need 
to be cross-connected. As DMS-like and NES-like security 
products enter the market and remove the reasons for 
segregating networks, or at least segregating WANs, this 
cross-connecting job gets easier. 
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 Now, step back a bit and think about what the numbers 
mean. While the example component Ao values are fictitious, 
they are probably not too far from the truth. A 0.98 
availability value may be acceptable for a garden variety 
office automation network, but won't be the instant you 
have some mission critical (C3I or combat system) functions 
floating around on it. And it may very well not be 
acceptable in the non-operational environment as soon as it 
gets popular with the boss. As soon as you eliminate all 
the single points of failure, you bump the Ao figures up to 
about 4 or 5 nines. Which is pretty respectable for C3I 
systems. Note that there's a pretty sharp knee in the curve 
between 2 and 4 nines. So don't quibble about values in 
between -- simply plan on dual-threading the system.[6]  
 
If you look at the problem from a logistics and 
repairability point of view[7], this reinforces: even if 
the tech is standing by with the correct repair part in 
hand, nobody can repair equipment in less than half an 
hour.  
 You're forced to a dual-threaded system even if you 
work your numbers over a year instead of a month and then 
realize that you're likely to get something equivalent to 
one router hardware failure in that time -- and buy all of 
the downtime at once. 
 Note that there are major logistics savings in dual-
threading systems as well. If one of the parallel 
components in our illustrated systems fails, the overall 
system continues to operate. And you can usually live with 
a 'next working day' repair regime which is much cheaper 
than '24 hour on-call'. Indeed, in shipboard environments, 
you have the flexibility to shift from organizational level 
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(ship's force) repair to dockside, depot level, repair 
which is usually a lot cheaper when you figure the costs of 
keeping qualified personnel and spare parts aboard. Since 
the vast majority of network components today are COTS, 
installing one or more spares in the network infrastructure 
is a fairly small capitalization cost. 
 Survivability. Once we understand the concepts of 
availability, thinking in terms of survivability adds only 
some minor twists.  
 The same principles apply, the only real differences 
are that instead of components frying themselves there is 
someone external who's trying to fry them. The same tools 
and arithmetic apply in analyzing survivability situations 
and designing to account for them. 
 As the Internet grows, there is a second twist, most 
noticable when examining security issues -- the good guys 
and the bad guys are on the same network. This provides 
some deterrent for the bad guys taking down the network -- 
it harms them too. This phenomenon is very pronounced in 
radionavigation systems -- moreso than in networks. 
 Conclusion. Requirements analysis of networks can 
resemble trying to ascend the down escalator if you attack 
the problem from a capacity analysis point of 
view. Whatever capacity requirements you calculate, they 
won't be the same when the network is actually installed. 
And there's a version of the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle at work here too -- trying to estimate data rates 
will influence the estimates.  
 A far better approach is to examine the availability 
requirements first. Many times you will find that if you 
address the availability needs, you've taken care of the 
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capacity requirements in the wash. Or placed your network 
architecture in a position where capacity can easily be 
































This appendix contains an excerpt from a thesis by 
Saravanan Radhakrishnan, Anupama Sundaresan, Gowri 
Dhandapani, written at the University of Kansas Information 
and Telecommunications Technology Center Department of 
Electrical Engineering & Computer Science, 19 December 
1999.  This brief discussion is meant to give the reader an 
overview of how differential service may be applied within 
a network.  
 
 The traffic classification process begins at the edge 
router or firewall. The edge router could be responsible 
for altering the TOS octet based upon the user profile 
originating the message.  The edge router then places the 
outbound transmissions in a cue based on their traffic 
classification and employing the first in first out 
methodology then empties the cue.   The core routers then 
have to only differentiate between the three levels of 
classification for transmission.  This is simple but will 
provide a means of performing this task in a mission 
oriented method.   
 Present implementations are concerned largely with the 
prioritization of traffic based upon the type of 
application originating the traffic and not the source or 
individual or mission criticality behind the application 
[18].  The emphasis is on the quality of the transmission 
as received by the destination and not the value of the 
information within the transmission when compared to 
others.  Tying the classification to the user profile 
creates a traceable link of responsibility to the 
individual originating the transmission.  If greater 
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control over the use of the prioritization scheme is 
desired then the edge router could be used to check the 
destination IP address.   
 While it would be impractical to screen individual IP 
addresses, a simple check to see if the assigned IP address 
lies within the NMCI domain should be easy to accomplish.  
This would ensure that the services were being used for the 
appropriate purpose. This also gives the LAN administrator 
a mechanism for authenticating the originator at the edge 
router or the host, depending upon their desires, 
requirements, or configuration.  In the end this employment 
of a differentiated services model could provide a means of 
providing a quality of service that would segregate traffic 
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